11102 4CTESAT1 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 -------------------------------------x 2 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 3 3 v. S1 02 Cr. 395 (JGK) 4 4 AHMED ABDEL SATTAR, a/k/a "Abu Omar," 5 a/k/a "Dr. Ahmed," LYNNE STEWART, 5 and MOHAMMED YOUSRY, 6 6 Defendants. 7 -------------------------------------x 7 8 December 29, 2004 8 9:30 a.m. 9 9 10 10 Before: 11 HON. JOHN G. KOELTL 11 12 District Judge 12 13 13 APPEARANCES 14 14 DAVID N. KELLEY 15 United States Attorney for the 15 Southern District of New York 16 ROBIN BAKER 16 CHRISTOPHER MORVILLO 17 ANTHONY BARKOW 17 ANDREW DEMBER 18 Assistant United States Attorneys 18 19 KENNETH A. PAUL 19 BARRY M. FALLICK 20 Attorneys for Defendant Sattar 20 21 MICHAEL TIGAR 21 JILL R. SHELLOW-LAVINE 22 Attorneys for Defendant Stewart 22 23 DAVID A. RUHNKE 23 DAVID STERN 24 Attorneys for Defendant Yousry 25 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11109 4CTESAT1 1 (Pages 11103 to 11108 sealed by order of the Court) 2 (In open court; jury present) 3 THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. It's 4 good to see you all. 5 All right. Ladies and gentlemen, we now begin the 6 portion of the trial for summations. As I've explained to you 7 before, this is the portion of the trial in which the lawyers 8 are given the opportunity to sum up, to explain to you what 9 they submit the evidence in the case has shown or not shown. 10 Like opening statements, the summations by the lawyers are not 11 evidence. They are the statements by the lawyers with respect 12 to what they submit the evidence in the case has shown or not 13 shown. As always, it is your recollection of the evidence that 14 governs. And as I will tell you in my final instructions, if 15 any of the lawyers say something that differs from your 16 recollection of the evidence, it is your recollection that 17 governs. 18 With that as an introduction, the first summation is 19 given on behalf of the government by Mr. Dember. 20 Mr. Dember? 21 MR. DEMBER: Let me adjust the equipment. 22 May it please the Court. Counsel, ladies and 23 gentlemen of the jury. Despite the volume of evidence in this 24 case, despite the length of time it has taken us to present all 25 that evidence to you, this is really a very simple case. These SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11110 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 three defendants, Ahmed Sattar, Lynne Stewart and Mohammed 2 Yousry carried messages from a known, designated terrorist into 3 prison to a convicted terrorist, Omar Abdel Rahman. Not just 4 ordinary innocuous messages; terroristic messages. And after 5 they did that, the convicted terrorist, Omar Abdel Rahman, 6 responded to that message -- those messages by issuing a 7 statement, a statement from him, who at that point was still a 8 very powerful and influential leader, of a terrorist 9 organization based in Egypt, a statement in which he announced 10 he no longer supported a ceasefire that was in place in Egypt. 11 And his withdrawal of support of that, support for that 12 ceasefire meant one thing and one thing only: He was 13 advocating a return, a return to the violence, a return to the 14 killing that existed before that ceasefire was put in place. 15 This case is about the obtaining of that withdrawal of 16 support and that change in position and the use of that change 17 in position by Ahmed Sattar and his friend, pal, partner and 18 coconspirator, Rifa'i Taha. To bring about a change in the 19 government of Egypt and a resumption of violence and killing. 20 And that statement by Abdel Rahman withdrawing his support 21 emboldened, empowered Taha and Sattar to -- after that to issue 22 and ugly, hateful fatwah calling for the murder of Jews 23 everywhere they were and everywhere they could be found. A 24 fatwah, that the evidence has established, they intended to be 25 carried out. That's what this case is all about. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11111 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 It is as we described for you at the very beginning of 2 this case, a jail break. They broke Abdel Rahman out of jail, 3 not literally, of course, figuratively; but made him available 4 to other criminals, the worst kind of criminals we know in this 5 world, terrorists. Rifa'i Taha. They made him available so 6 that he could participate in those -- in their crimes and give 7 them support. It was a secret stealth jail break but a jail 8 break nevertheless. 9 What have we proven in this case? By the nature -- by 10 the evidence we've presented and the -- and those two 11 incidents, breaking Abdel Rahman's message out of jail and the 12 issuing of that fatwah, we have proven the charges in this 13 case. 14 What have we proven? Well, we have proven that all 15 three of these defendants participated in a conspiracy, a 16 criminal agreement to defraud or to fool the United States 17 government by passing those messages to and from Abdel Rahman 18 in violation of the prison restrictions that were in place at 19 the time, the SAMs. You know all about that. 20 What also have we proven? Well, we have proven that 21 Sattar participated in a conspiracy to kill and kidnap people 22 outside the United States. How? By assisting Taha in getting 23 Abdel Rahman to withdraw his support for the ceasefire so that 24 Taha and he could make efforts to resume the violence and 25 killing in Egypt. And also, by issuing the fatwah, the fatwah SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11112 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 to kill Jews. Those two events, those two occurrences are what 2 prove that Sattar is guilty of conspiracy to kill and kidnap 3 persons outside the United States. 4 What else have we proven? What we've proven is that 5 Lynne Stewart and Mohammed Yousry provided and concealed 6 material support to the conspiracy to kill and kidnap that I 7 just mentioned. And how did they do that? By making Omar 8 Abdel Rahman available, available to Sattar, available to Taha, 9 where he was otherwise inaccessible to them because of the 10 restrictions; made Omar Abdel Rahman available as a 11 coconspirator to participate in the crimes that Sattar and Taha 12 engaged in, conspiracy to kill; by carrying the messages to and 13 from Abdel Rahman, the messages that Taha provided to Sattar 14 during their conversations that we'll talk about shortly. 15 What else have we proven? Well, we've proven that 16 Sattar is guilty of soliciting crimes of violence. And how is 17 he guilty of that? Quite obviously by the issuing, by the 18 creation and the sending, the distribution of the fatwah, the 19 fatwah to kill Jews wherever they are. And also by his 20 participation in sending in messages to Abdel Rahman, the 21 messages from Taha. 22 And finally, we've proven that Stewart is guilty of 23 deliberately lying to the United States government on two 24 separate occasions when she twice in May of 2000 and May of 25 2001 submitted false statements to the United States SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11113 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 government, when she signed attorney affirmations promising to 2 abide by the SAMs knowing full well, she had no intention of 3 abiding by those promises and of course violating the SAMs, 4 violating those promises. 5 Let me take a moment and tell you what this case is 6 not about. This case is not about the Egyptian government, its 7 officials, its policies or how it conducts itself. Whatever 8 the defendants thought about or think about the Egyptian 9 government is no defense to the conduct, their conduct in this 10 case. It's no defense to what they did in this case. This 11 case also is not about the religion of Islam. The religion of 12 Islam is a peaceful religion. 13 This case is very much about Sattar and Abdel Rahman 14 and Taha, who distorted the Muslim religion and used it to 15 foment and justify violence. That's what this case is about. 16 This case is not about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 17 Whatever Sattar, Stewart or Yousry think of that particular 18 conflict, that very difficult and complex relationship that 19 exists in the Middle East, whatever they may think, it is no 20 defense to what they did in this case. It does not justify 21 anything they did in this case, including issuing a fatwah 22 calling for the murder of Jews everywhere. 23 This case is not about what these defendants thought 24 of Omar Abdel Rahman's conviction. As you well know now, Omar 25 Abdel Rahman was tried in this very courtroom over a ten-month SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11114 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 period by a jury like yourselves. And that jury, after hearing 2 all the evidence, hearing the arguments from the attorneys and 3 being instructed on the law, reached its own conclusion: That 4 Omar Abdel Rahman was convicted and should be convicted and was 5 guilty of some of the most serious charges we have. And he was 6 sentenced, based on that conviction, to life imprisonment. 7 His conviction was affirmed by the Second Circuit 8 Court of Appeals. Whatever these defendants may think about 9 his conviction one way or the other does not justify anything 10 they did in this case. 11 And, finally, this case is not about what these 12 defendants thought or think about the Special Administrative 13 Measures -- I'm going to start referring to them as SAMs, it 14 makes it much easier for all of us -- simply because their view 15 of the appropriateness or the nature of those restrictions 16 imposed by the Department of Justice on Abdel Rahman is not a 17 defense or justification, again, for anything they did in this 18 case. To the extent they didn't like those restrictions, to 19 the extent they thought they were illegal or improper, Stewart 20 had the capability, had the training to challenge them, 21 challenge them legally if she wished. She chose not to. They 22 chose, instead, to violate them and lie about them. 23 By the way, just as an aside, to the extent anybody 24 thinks or would think that Omar Abdel Rahman was in some way 25 mistreated by the Bureau of Prisons, let me just remind you of SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11115 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 some testimony by Dr. Edwardy, the doctor from -- and the chief 2 of medical services at the Federal Medical Center in Rochester. 3 He told you that Omar Abdel Rahman had his own committee of 4 professionals in the institution that dealt with the care and 5 treatment for him. Omar Abdel Rahman was not only cared for by 6 the medical professionals who worked at the Rochester facility, 7 but he was also cared for by doctors from the Mayo Clinic, one 8 of the finest medical institutions in this world. 9 Let me take a moment and talk about you for a second. 10 As you hopefully understand by now, jury service is one of our 11 most important civic responsibilities. Our justice system is 12 obviously very much dependent on jurors who come and serve 13 willingly on all kinds of trials, regardless of how long they 14 are. I know I speak on behalf of all the lawyers in this case 15 when I take a moment to thank you all. Thank you for your 16 tremendous patience, for your obvious commitment to this case 17 and, of course, for your participation. We can't thank you 18 enough. 19 Let me tell you, there is much to discuss with you. 20 It's going to take a while, more than a day for me to discuss 21 it with you. I'll tell you that up front as a warning. 22 Let me tell you how we're going to do it. Let me give 23 you somewhat of what we call a road map of how we proceed 24 through the evidence. Much of the road map will make, kind of, 25 sense to you because it will be chronological. Let me tell you SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11116 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 how we're going to proceed. 2 First we're going to talk a little bit about Omar 3 Abdel Rahman, and then I'll move to talking about the SAMs for 4 a few minutes, what they're about, why they came into place and 5 what they meant in this case. After that I'm going to talk 6 about the ceasefire, what preceded it, what it resulted in, and 7 one can't talk about the ceasefire in this case without talking 8 about Rifa'i Taha. We'll talk about him a bit. He's a major 9 player in this case. He doesn't sit here in court, but he's a 10 major, major player in this case. 11 After I finish talking about that, we're going to take 12 you through the prison visits. It may be hard to remember now, 13 but there actually were four of them, four prison visits of 14 interest that we present evidence to you about during the 15 course of the trial. All four of those prison visits took 16 place at the Federal Medical Center in Rochester, Minnesota, 17 between March of 1999, the last one that I'll talk about in 18 this section, and it is the famous and perhaps most significant 19 one in May of 2000. There is a fifth visit which we'll talk 20 about later. 21 We'll discuss those visits. We'll discuss what 22 happened during those visits and what happened and the 23 significance of information that went in with the persons who 24 took those messages in on those days and what came out of those 25 visits. Significantly we're going to also talk about what the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11117 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 lawyers did or, maybe more significantly, did not do during 2 those visits. And after we do that, after we finish talking 3 about the last visit in that section, the May 2000 visit, as 4 you'll remember, after that was the press release. Actually 5 two press releases that were issued by Stewart and Sattar and 6 Yousry regarding Abdel Rahman's statements. We'll talk about 7 those. We'll talk about the response to that by the United 8 States Attorney's Office, particularly Pat Fitzgerald. 9 After that we're going to talk about that fatwah I 10 have been referring to for a number of times this morning, the 11 fatwah written by Taha and Sattar and disseminated by them, the 12 one calling for the murder of Jews everywhere. 13 After that we're going to talk about this fellow Atia. 14 You will find, and hopefully you've gathered from the 15 evidence -- it wasn't easy evidence necessarily to follow, but 16 hopefully after we talk about it, you'll be able to put the 17 pieces together quite tightly. We'll talk about him because 18 Atia is kind of an interesting fellow. It's the Atia evidence 19 in this case that sort of brings together the ceasefire, the 20 fatwah, brings them into play together and brings together what 21 Sattar and Taha were trying to accomplish, which was a 22 resumption of violence in Egypt. So, we'll talk about him. 23 That's important. 24 And then we'll talk about January 8, 2001. You all 25 scratch your heads and say January 8, 2001? What happened on SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11118 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 that particular day? I'll tell you about it. It's a day in 2 which there were a number of conversations with some of the 3 people on trial here, and as a result of those conversations, 4 lies were told, issued to the press about Omar Abdel Rahman. 5 I'll keep you in suspense and not tell you anything else at 6 this point. We'll get to it most likely sometime tomorrow 7 morning I hope. 8 We'll talk very briefly about the bombing of the USS 9 Cole after that, a war ship that was bombed as a result of a 10 terrorist attack in Yemen back in October of 2000 and how it 11 relates to the case. We will then move from there to the 12 July 2001 visit, that's the fifth visit paid to Omar Abdel 13 Rahman by Ms. Stewart in that case with Mr. Yousry. And then 14 we're getting towards the end, you'll be happy to hear, and 15 we'll talk about the knowledge and intent of these three 16 defendants, what these defendants knew when they did what we 17 say they did; what did they intend by their actions? We'll 18 discuss that towards the end of my remarks. 19 Finally I'll talk briefly, because I probably won't 20 have any energy at that point, talk briefly about the charges 21 in this case, and we'll be done. 22 Let's talk -- let's start. Omar Abdel Rahman. Well, 23 you all know about him. He is a convicted terrorist, a very 24 influential, a very powerful terrorist leader. He was and 25 remained after his conviction, as you learned, the leader of SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11119 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 the Islamic Group, one of their leaders, the Egyptian based 2 terrorist organization. And even after his conviction and 3 sentence, a sentence you know which was life imprisonment, Omar 4 Abdel Rahman remained a serious threat to the safety of the 5 people in this country and abroad. Not because he personally 6 posed a physical threat to anyone; as you all know he was 7 blind. He was an older man. But because of his ability to 8 communicate, to incite and inspire violence, he was and 9 remained a very serious threat on the world stage. 10 You all know he was convicted after a trial in this 11 very courthouse in 1995, convicted of some very serious 12 charges, seditious conspiracy, which was to -- which was a 13 crime, conspiracy to engage in a war of urban terrorism against 14 the United States right here in New York City. He was 15 convicted of soliciting crimes of violence, including the 16 murder of President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, also of soliciting 17 other persons to carry out terrorist attacks against 18 military -- American military installations. He was convicted 19 of conspiracy to murder Mr. Mubarak. And finally he was 20 convicted of a bombing conspiracy, to bomb buildings, landmarks 21 and tunnels here in New York City. 22 Because of these very serious charges and the finding 23 of that jury, he was sentenced to life imprisonment, as you 24 know. You learned in this case Omar Abdel Rahman, as I said 25 before, was and continued to be, despite the conviction, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11120 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 despite the sentence, the leader of this -- the Islamic Group. 2 In fact, Mr. Sattar, based on almost his own testimony, and 3 Taha viewed him as sort of the ultimate arbiter of any disputes 4 within the group, despite his confinement, despite his location 5 here in America and during much of the case as we've presented 6 it to you, in Rochester, Minnesota. And that's why they 7 communicated with him and passed him messages, because of his 8 influence and his power. 9 You know that the Islamic Group and Omar Abdel Rahman 10 oppose the Egyptian government, wanted to overthrow it and they 11 wanted to overthrow it by the use of violence. And violence by 12 the Islamic Group meant, plain and simply, cold-blooded murder. 13 That's what it meant. 14 You know that Abdel Rahman, from the speeches and 15 sermons that we read to you in the beginning of the case, was a 16 man who preached violence and hatred. He was a man who 17 preached violence and hatred against anyone and anything that 18 conflicted with his view of the world, and preached and 19 solicited violence to achieve his goals. He preached 20 antisemitism and antiChristianity. He was a man who embraced 21 the title terrorist and preached that he and his followers were 22 terrorists and they, "must terrorize those they viewed as the 23 enemies of Islam" and, in his words, "to frighten them and to 24 disturb them and to shake the earth under their feet." 25 When Omar Abdel Rahman referred to the enemies of SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11121 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Islam in those speeches, he wasn't shy about it. He preached 2 that Islam's primary enemy was the United States and its 3 allies. And he would proudly, proudly took responsibility in 4 one of those speeches for issuing the fatwah that resulted in 5 the murder of President Anwar Sadat of Egypt back in the 1980s, 6 obviously the president of the country, and also of Rabbi Meir 7 Kahane, an Israeli politician. He was proud of that and 8 bragged about it. And he advocated his own form of jihad, his 9 form of jihad was violent jihad. "Jihad with the sword, with 10 the cannon, with the grenades and with the missile, this is 11 jihad, jihad against God's enemies for God's cause and his 12 word." 13 And also what you learned and what you learned from 14 evidence found at Mr. Sattar's home during the course of the 15 search by the FBI was even though he was convicted, even though 16 he was in jail and sentenced to life imprisonment, that didn't 17 stop Abdel Rahman from preaching violence, soliciting crimes of 18 violence, from wanting violence to be brought against America. 19 Government Exhibit 2070, which is an audio tape, it's Arabic, 20 and 2070T which is the translation of it, there's a portion, a 21 portion of it, and we're going to put up a section of it to 22 document, it's a speech by Abdel Rahman when he was in prison 23 in 1996. Well, 1996 is when he was -- after he was convicted 24 and after he was sentenced. A speech that was apparently 25 perhaps read over the phone by him. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11122 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 This is a preSAMs period of time, before the SAMs and 2 restrictions were put in place. And here's what he said. 3 Well, he was angry, obviously, with his conviction. He was 4 angry with his sentencing and he demanded revenge against the 5 United States, issued a fatwah calling for revenge against the 6 United States. Here's what he said and it's up on the screen 7 for you if you want to follow along or just listen to me. Take 8 your choice. 9 Oh you Muslims everywhere, sever the ties of their 10 nation, tear them apart, ruin their economy, instigate against 11 their corporations, destroy their embassies, attack their 12 interests, sink their ships and shoot down their airplanes. 13 Kill them in land, at sea and in the air, kill them wherever 14 you find them; take them, surround them and lie in ambush for 15 them everywhere. Fight those infidels, treat them with 16 brutality. Fight them. 17 That's a fatwah found in Mr. Sattar's possession. If 18 you recall, when we introduced the evidence from the search of 19 Stewart's offices, there was a piece of paper with almost 20 identical language on it found in her office. It's Government 21 Exhibit 2638. Take a look at it in your deliberations. She 22 knew, as well as Sattar knowing, that despite his conviction, 23 despite his sentencing, the man was still preaching violence, 24 violence against the United States, murder against the United 25 States. He hadn't been silenced and his word had gotten out in SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11123 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 1996. 2 Well, not surprising, by 1997, United States officials 3 realized this man who was a tremendous threat prior to that 4 time when he was out before he was arrested, realized that even 5 after he was arrested, convicted and sentenced, he was still a 6 tremendous threat; a threat to the safety of Americans and 7 others living abroad. 8 And so, what happened was officials in the Department 9 of Justice and Patrick Fitzgerald, who you met back in June of 10 this year still -- yes, this year -- testified about being 11 involved in imposing those Special Administrative Measures, the 12 SAMs, because of the danger and threat that Abdel Rahman 13 remained. And the Attorney General of the United States at the 14 time, Janet Reno, authorized those SAMs and they went into 15 effect in April of 1997. And there was never a period of time 16 during the course of this entire case that the SAMs were not in 17 effect; that those restrictions did not apply. They apply at 18 all times. The reasons for them were obvious: He remained a 19 danger to the world. And the purpose of the SAMs, the purpose 20 themselves were simple: To prevent acts of violence and 21 terrorism (SAMs). The SAMs restricted with whom Omar Abdel 22 Rahman could communicate with in order to prevent him from 23 receiving or passing terrorific messages. That's the purpose 24 of them. That's why there were restrictions on his ability to 25 communicate, with whom he could communicate with and how he SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11124 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 could communicate. To prevent terrorism and violence. 2 Well, how did they evolve? Because the SAMs weren't 3 in their final form from day one. They were -- they evolved 4 over time. As you saw, the early versions of the SAMs were 5 quite different from ones that were imposed later on. The 6 SAMs, as you learned, were sort of a new procedure. Very few 7 federal inmates lived under these restrictions. And so, it was 8 a new concept different than anything that had been used 9 before. And the restrictions and the language used and the 10 actual restrictions placed on Abdel Rahman changed a bit. And 11 this is rather important. As I mentioned, the SAMs restricted 12 who he could talk to on the phone; who could visit him and it 13 restricted -- it had restrictions with respect to mail, letters 14 coming in to him and leaving from him. Obviously all these 15 restrictions were geared towards preventing acts of terrorism 16 and violence. 17 Now, with respect to the telephone, only his attorneys 18 and his wife could speak to him by telephone, and that never 19 changed. With respect to the visits, well, his attorneys could 20 visit him and also immediate family members; not just his wife 21 but other members as well. That never changed. 22 The mail had certain restrictions placed on it. And 23 the restrictions were very simple: Anything coming in to him 24 had to be screened. Anything going out from him in the mail 25 had to be screened. If you look at the mail sections of all of SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11125 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 the SAMs in evidence in this case, you'll realize and see 2 anybody could have sent him mail. And when we talk about mail, 3 you learn during the case that the mail also consisted of 4 tape-recordings. Obviously, Abdel Rahman was blind. If 5 somebody wrote him a regular letter he himself couldn't read 6 it, perhaps a translator at the facility certainly could read 7 it to him. But he couldn't read it himself. But people could 8 and did send him recordings, messages. They tried to translate 9 Taha's book, put it on tape, let him read it. The Bureau of 10 Prisons thought otherwise. We'll talk about that book in a few 11 minutes. And there was ways of communicating with him. 12 But anybody could communicate with him if they wished 13 by mail. And that mail, as I said, could be letters or could 14 be recordings. Anybody could. 15 But because anyone could communicate with him by mail, 16 what was extremely important and obvious in the SAMs was 17 that that mail had to be screened to make sure there were no 18 overt or -- overt messages or coded messages in those 19 recordings or letters or communications, coded messages that 20 might mean, what? Terrorism. His views on whether a terrorist 21 act should be committed, his views on whether a certain target 22 should be or individual or country should be targeted. Coded. 23 And so the Bureau of Prisons and the Attorney General 24 of the United States said, sure, anybody can communicate with 25 him by mail, but it has to be screened. That's very important. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11126 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Because who knows what's coming in and coming out. 2 Now, let me talk about one thing about the SAMs where 3 there may be some confusion and there shouldn't be. In no 4 version of the SAMs that existed in this case from the very 5 beginning in April of '97 to the very end in 2002, no version 6 of the SAMs ever prevented any of the lawyers representing Omar 7 Abdel Rahman from talking to the press and making their own 8 statements. None. 9 Now, the defense, particularly Stewart and Yousry, run 10 around and presented evidence in their case suggesting, oh, my 11 goodness, you know, press releases and attorneys making 12 statements was done all the time. And for some reason that 13 should justify or explain why, gee, they really didn't think 14 there was any problem when Stewart and Sattar and Yousry issued 15 Abdel Rahman's withdrawal of support for the ceasefire in June 16 of 2000. 17 Well, and a lot -- almost all of -- almost all of the 18 cases or the instances they cited of press releases were of 19 Abdel Rahman's lawyers, whether it's mostly Clark or Jabara, 20 making statements to the press expressing their own views. 21 Nothing prevented and ever prevented any of the lawyers in any 22 version of the SAMs whenever they existed from commenting about 23 Abdel Rahman's case, his conditions of confinement, the SAMs. 24 They could talk about anything they wanted to talk about. 25 At some point in time -- and I'll explain this in a SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11127 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 minute -- they were prevented, prevented from relaying any 2 statements by Abdel Rahman. That was clear. But during the 3 entire period of time, if they wanted to make their own 4 statements, they could do it. Nothing ever restricted them 5 from doing that. 6 Now, what came into being was a restriction that they 7 could not, they could not communicate his words to the media 8 or, for that matter, any third person. Now, if we go back and 9 look at the SAMs that existed at the very beginning -- and 10 LS203, which is an exhibit that Stewart introduced, was the 11 first SAMs in place. It's the April 1997 SAMs right there, 12 just look at the top of it. 13 And that version of the SAMs -- and when I say "that 14 version," that language in that particular document remained 15 the language in the SAMs for the April '97 SAMs, the 16 August 1997 SAMs, the December 1997 SAMs -- and those are, by 17 the way, Exhibits 375 and 376. We introduced those to you 18 during our rebuttal case. 19 That language in that -- in LS203 also appeared in 20 Exhibits 319 and Exhibits 320, which were SAMs that were issued 21 in January and February of 1998. 22 Now, in those SAMs from April of '97 to April of '98 23 there was not a single provision in that -- those SAMs that 24 prevented any of Abdel Rahman's lawyers from relaying to third 25 persons or to the media Abdel Rahman's statements. Now, the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11128 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 defendants, particularly Yousry and Stewart, made a big deal 2 about the fact that, my goodness, Ramsey Clark in the summer of 3 1997 issued a press release after the ceasefire went into 4 effect that Abdel Rahman supports the ceasefire. And Stewart 5 and Yousry pointed to that and said, my goodness, of course, we 6 lawyers all were operating under the assumption we could always 7 issue press releases. We could issue press releases with Abdel 8 Rahman's statements in them and that was always understood. 9 That's what they wanted you to believe. 10 Well, when we questioned Stewart, when it was our 11 turn, we asked her about that press release that Ramsey Clark 12 issued in '97. And then we confronted her with her own 13 exhibit, LS203, and asked her, asked her to read the exhibit. 14 She read through the provisions. There wasn't a single 15 provision in the SAMs in existence at that time throughout 1997 16 that prevented any of Abdel Rahman's lawyers, including Ramsey 17 Clark, from issuing a press release with Abdel Rahman's 18 messages or words or statements. Didn't exist. It didn't 19 exist. 20 They could at that time, throughout 1997 into early 21 '98, they could do that. But they portrayed that to you as if, 22 gee, Ramsey Clark did it so we all can do it, and there was 23 nothing wrong in doing it in June 2000 when these three 24 defendants issued a press release in which Abdel Rahman 25 withdrew his support for the ceasefire. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11129 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Well, they well knew, and Stewart certainly knew, that 2 in 1997 there was nothing restricting Clark from doing what he 3 did. But that changed. And it changed with the May 11, 1998, 4 SAMs. 5 Let me backtrack for a second. The reason why Stewart 6 and Yousry wanted you to believe, aha, Clark's issuance of that 7 press release was a precedent for them to issue their release 8 in June of 2000 was because they are looking -- because Ramsey 9 Clark was the former Attorney General of the United States. 10 He's a prestigious, important man, or was, certainly in that 11 position. And if he did it, gee, we relied on what he was 12 doing. So what we did in June of 2000 couldn't have been 13 wrong. 14 Well, Stewart in her own testimony proved to you that 15 she was being dishonest when she presented that to you, because 16 when we asked her about the 1998 SAMs, she told us -- told you, 17 more importantly, she told you that, yeah, in 1998, 18 particularly that May 11, 1998, SAMs, that was the first time 19 the government put in the SAMs the last paragraph that appeared 20 in every SAMs from May 1998 to the end. And that was the 21 provision that explicitly said, explicitly said, that Abdel 22 Rahman could not communicate with the media by any means 23 possible, including through his attorneys. 24 And Stewart, who was relying upon the Ramsey Clark 25 press release in '97, said to you, oh, yes, when they put that SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11130 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 provision in in '98, that was the result of Ramsey Clark 2 issuing the press release in '97. Because in '97 he could do 3 that. But you couldn't do it after 1998, May of 1998. 4 She knew full well that was not a precedent. Clark's 5 press release in '97 was no precedent for what she did in June 6 of 2000. But she tried to portray it that way. She and Yousry 7 were dishonest with you, dishonest with you by trying to 8 present to you the fact that, gee, the lawyers make statements 9 all the time about Abdel Rahman, so what was the big deal? 10 And so they understood, they understood that in 11 June 2000 they could do the same. They knew better. They all 12 knew better. What they understood and knew was in '97, there 13 was nothing preventing the lawyers from issuing statements, 14 including statements to the media, which included Abdel 15 Rahman's message. That changed in May of 1998. 16 And they knew full well that practically every 17 message, every press release, every press statement that they 18 presented to you was simply a lawyer saying to somebody in the 19 media or commenting to somebody in the media about their own 20 view of the case, their own statements. Those messages, those 21 press releases or press statements did not include statements 22 by Abdel Rahman. They did not pass Abdel Rahman's statements. 23 The first time that happened after the summer of '97, 24 when Clark issued the press release in which he said Abdel 25 Rahman supports the ceasefire, was in June 2000 when Stewart SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11131 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 issued the press release saying he doesn't support the 2 ceasefire. He withdraws his support for the ceasefire. At a 3 time when she knew quite clearly that, in fact, that was a 4 violation of the SAMs. 5 Now, as I mentioned, in 1998, May of '98, the SAMs 6 that were in effect -- Government Exhibit 3, that's one version 7 of it. There is other exhibits which also consist of the same 8 SAMs. And it's the first SAMs -- and as I said, here's the 9 front cover of it. We can put it up, if you like. It's the 10 first copy -- excuse me, it's the first SAMs that has that 11 provision in it. 12 That says, quote, no contact, no communication with 13 the media by any means, including by lawyer. And if you go to 14 the last page of the exhibit -- we'll do that for you, 15 Ms. Griffith is faster than I. The last page, in fact, it's 16 the last paragraph on the page has that provision that says 17 quite clearly, the inmate shall not be permitted to talk with 18 or otherwise communicate with any representative of the news 19 media, either in person, by telephone, by furnishing a recorded 20 message, by communicating through inmate's attorneys/staff. 21 Can't be any clearer. Can't be any more unambiguous. Clear as 22 can be. 23 Well, you also learn, by the way, that during the 24 progression of the case, by December of 1999 -- and the 25 different versions of the SAMs are all in evidence for you. If SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11132 4CTESAT1 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 you want to look at them, just ask during the deliberations. 2 But by December of 1999 the language of the SAMs at 3 that point never changed from that point going forward through 4 2002. They never changed. Not a word, not a sentence, not a 5 punctuation mark. It's identical. The only thing different 6 between each versions of the SAMs themselves is the date on the 7 top. They didn't change at all. 8 (Continued on next page) 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11133 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 MR. DEMBER: Now, you know the SAMs existed. You know 2 they existed now certainly; we've read them to you many, many 3 times. You probably have them memorized, or at least some 4 sections memorized. Did the defendants know about the SAMs? 5 You bet they did. They knew all about the SAMs. Let's go 6 through some of the evidence. 7 The first one we will talk about is easy, Stewart. 8 She certainly knew about the SAMs. She was periodically sent 9 copies of the SAMs. She would sign the attorney affirmations 10 saying she had reviewed the SAMs and would abide by them. She 11 took those affirmations and sent them to the U.S. Attorney's 12 office here in Manhattan. She had copies of the SAMs and 13 copies of the affirmations in her office. 14 Mr. Francisco from our office testified about sending 15 and having copies of the various versions of the SAMs that he 16 had sent to Stewart and actually also to some of the other 17 attorneys as well. 18 And, she obviously read them. She knew them. It was 19 important for her to know them because her important client, 20 Abdel Rahman was -- had to live under them and lived under 21 those restrictions. And she told you it was important that she 22 know what they were like so she could vigorously represent him. 23 How about Mr. Yousry, did he know the SAMs? You bet 24 he did. He knew all about the SAMs. 25 How? Well, you know it from his own testimony. You SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11134 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 know he had copies of the SAMs in his home that were seized 2 during the search of his home. He even had a copy of the 3 federal regulation, as Stewart did, but he also had a copy of 4 the federal regulation that allowed the Department of Justice 5 and the Bureau of Prisons or attorney general to impose the 6 sentence. It is a rather technical federal regulation to have 7 a copy of. 8 You know he talked about the SAMs. Maybe most 9 significantly, and we will get to some of this, he wrote about 10 the SAMs. He wrote about the SAMs at periods of time that make 11 it absolutely clear that by May of 2000 and June of 2000, when 12 that press release is issued and Abdel Rahman withdraws his 13 support for the cease-fire, he knew full well that he was bound 14 by the SAMs himself and that Abdel Rahman communicating with 15 the media was absolutely taboo, couldn't be done. He knew 16 other aspects of the SAMs as well, okay? 17 Well, I gave you a whole bunch of categories. Let's 18 go through them as quick as I can. 19 What did he do? He testified and told you he had a 20 general understanding of the SAMs. He said that he believed 21 the SAMs were imposeed to restrict Abdel Rahman's 22 communications with the outside world. That's obvious. He 23 knew that Abdel Rahman first became, had to -- was first 24 subjected to the SAMs in the spring of 1997. He knew that they 25 changed over time. He discussed the SAMs with Abdel Rahman SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11135 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 during visits, prison visits or calls a number of times. He 2 told you that. 3 He knew certain aspects of them. He knew about 4 certain aspects of the SAMs that he testified about. He told 5 you that the visits were restricted to his first wife and some 6 family members and the lawyers. He told you about the fact 7 that Abdel Rahman could only speak to certain people on the 8 phone. 9 For a person, just from his testimony alone, for a 10 person who knew that much about the SAMs, it sure seems like he 11 must have read them. 12 There is more. Well, he had copies of the SAMs, as I 13 said, in his home. An example is Government Exhibit 2305-1. 14 Ironically, that's a copy of the SAMs that were in effect in 15 December of 1999. And as I told you just a moment ago, the 16 SAMs in effect in 1999, the language of those SAMs never 17 changed each time they were renewed. It all remained the same. 18 Not a sentence, not a word. And that was certainly the SAMs in 19 effect in May of 2000 during the prison visit and the 20 subsequent press release. 21 Another example, another copy of the same SAMs was 22 2312-37. And, ironically, when we asked him about that first 23 exhibit I just mentioned, 2305-1 was the December '99 SAMs, he 24 told you that in his testimony that he had received that on or 25 about April 5th, 2000. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11136 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 If you remember, that exhibit had the cover letter 2 which was dated April 5th, 2000, from the United States 3 Attorney's office. If you look at it, it's a cover letter from 4 the U.S. Attorney's office signed by an assistant U.S. Attorney 5 named Paul Butler, the cover letter indicating it was enclosing 6 the SAMs and attorney affirmation. 7 What was most interesting about that exhibit, it was 8 an original -- it was the original letter that was sent. Now, 9 it was addressed to Mr. Jabara and Ms. Stewart, so we don't 10 know if it's the letter that Jabara got or the letter that 11 Stewart got, but one of those attorneys gave that letter with 12 the SAMs attached to it to Yousry. He had the original letter. 13 And he said he got it around the date of the letter, which was 14 April 5th, 2000. That's more than a month before the May 2000 15 visit. 16 And I mentioned before about Yousry possessing a copy 17 of the federal regulation authorizing the Department of Justice 18 and the Bureau of Prisons to impose SAMs. That's exhibit 19 2405-4. 20 And, you know, during the cross-examination when we 21 questioned him about his knowledge of the SAMs, we asked him 22 about his knowledge of the mail provision in the SAMs. 23 Remember that provision? It's very basic. Anything coming in 24 has to be screened. Anything going out has to be screened. 25 And what we found in his possession in his home was Government SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11137 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Exhibit 2415-10. 2 May we have that, and we will put it up in front of 3 you. It's a memo, if you remember, from the Bureau of Prisons, 4 that Yousry told you he got. I believe there is a fax on the 5 top page -- you don't have to show it -- but on the top line of 6 the document there is a fax number. And I believe it's -- the 7 fax line indicates that Yousry got it on March 10th, 1999. 8 And it refers to some tapes that had been sent to 9 Abdel Rahman. And we later learned from Mr. Sattar that's the 10 tapes, the book on tapes. It's Taha's book, which we will talk 11 about in a couple of minutes. And it was rejected by the 12 Bureau of Prisons. Surprise, surprise. Taha's book was 13 rejected by the Bureau of Prisons. They didn't let it go in 14 and let Abdel Rahman listen to it on tape. 15 There is an interesting provision in the memo, and I 16 think we will highlight that for you in a moment, which says 17 the following: The Special Administrative Measures provide 18 that if any common mail is determined by the FBI or the Bureau 19 of Prisons to contain overt or covert discussions of or 20 requests for illegal activities or actual or attempted 21 circumvention of the Special Administrative Measures, that mail 22 shall not be delivered. 23 What does that tell you? Well, it tells you that 24 Yousry knew all too well, well in advance of -- well in advance 25 of many of the visits he made with the various attorneys, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11138 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 including Stewart, to Abdel Rahman that any mail, any letters, 2 any messages being brought in for Abdel Rahman had to be 3 screened by the Bureau of Prisons and the FBI. He knew that. 4 Now, as I mentioned before, Mr. Yousry's knowledge of 5 the SAMs wasn't limited to what he possessed and what he told 6 you he knew during his testimony. It also consisted of things 7 that he wrote. He actually wrote about the SAMs. 8 And one of the things you know is a note that he 9 kept. He kept a notebook in which he kept, he would write 10 down, put down various statements made by him or others and 11 Abdel Rahman during his visits with Abdel Rahman with the 12 attorneys or during the calls, the legal calls that Abdel 13 Rahman had with his attorneys that he would translate. 14 And one of the entries in his notebook is a 15 fascinating one. By the way, it is not our exhibit; it is 16 Mr. Yousry's exhibit, okay? And the number is MY--1002-CT. 17 It's page 284 of that exhibit. 18 With that up for you, let's focus a little more on it. 19 Very good, that's great. If you want to, look at it on your 20 screens there. It's very interesting. It is a very 21 interesting document. 22 What's interesting about it is on the top of the line 23 there after the translator's notes, which I think we have taken 24 off for you, right below that and just the strict translation 25 of what was on the -- because, remember, Mr. Yousry wrote his SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11139 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 notes in Arabic, so this is the translation of his Arabic that 2 Mr. Yousry offered into evidence or put into evidence. And the 3 first line says, SAM, May 11 98. Interesting date. You have 4 heard that date before. I think I have mentioned it a few 5 times before already. 6 If you look at the top of Government Exhibit, or the 7 top of the second page of Government Exhibit 3, it's the 8 Special Administrative Measures. It's dated May 11, 1998. 9 Yousry is telling Abdel Rahman about the May 11, 1998 10 SAMs. Sounds like he's got a copy of it in front of him and he 11 is making his notes. Very specific, SAMs 1998. Okay. 12 And, by the way, there is copies of these SAMs from 13 the Stewart search as well. There are a number of copies of 14 them. And let me just, so you can put the time frame on here, 15 Mr. Yousry, if you look through his notebooks, doesn't date 16 every entry. So sometimes it is not easy to figure out when he 17 makes a particular entry in his notebooks. If you look at the 18 pages before you get to this particular page, and this page is 19 284, and look for the first page that has a date on it, you 20 come up with the date, a date that says "Tuesday, 4/21." So 21 one can conclude that's Tuesday, April 21st. It doesn't 22 indicate the year. That's the first date that appears on a 23 page before the page we have up in front of you. 24 If you go and look at the pages behind this page, 25 which is page 284, and look for a page that has a date on it, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11140 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 that seems to indicate it's the date that the note or entry was 2 made. You will find it several pages behind this page before 3 you on the screen, and it has the date that says 6/3/98. 4 June 3rd, '98? Probably, sure. The preceding was probably 5 April 21st, the one after is June 3rd '98. 6 So, most likely sometime between those two dates is 7 when Yousry makes this entry, because the SAM -- May 11, '98, 8 clearly refers to the SAM itself, but there is no other date on 9 that page. 10 So, some time between April and June of '98 Yousry is 11 talking to Abdel Rahman about this version of the SAMs. Okay, 12 that's interesting. 13 Here is something more interesting. Well, clearly it 14 says on the third line down, concerning Sheikh Omar Abdel 15 Rahman. And then go one line down. Fascinating. And 16 remember, these are Yousry's notes. And it says: "The 17 lawyers, members of their staff and those who work with them, 18 they should abide by this" -- then the word law is crossed 19 out -- "administrative order." 20 What does that tell you? What that tells you is 21 Yousry is writing down that anybody working with the lawyers 22 has to abide by the SAMs. Guess who is working with the 23 lawyers for Abdel Rahman? Yousry. He wrote it down. He knows 24 he has to abide by the SAMs. Well, of course he knows. 25 And by coincidence, where does he get that from? SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11141 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Where does he get that information from? Well, he gets it from 2 Exhibit Number 3, or this version of the SAMs, specifically 3 page 1 -- the first page of the SAMs where it is dated -- 4 paragraph 2, the first part, okay? I won't put it up for you, 5 but I will read it for you. And it says as follows: 6 The inmate's attorneys of record -- the inmate is 7 Abdel Rahman -- individually, by each, if more than one, must 8 sign an affirmation acknowledging that counsel, counsel's staff 9 and anyone else at the behest of or with the knowledge of the 10 attorneys, will fully abide by the below listed restrictions. 11 That's where Yousry gets the information from. He's 12 got the SAMs. And what he has got in his notes comes right out 13 of the SAMs. And most significantly, in 1998, probably 14 sometimes in May or early June of '98, Mohammed Yousry knows, 15 if he didn't know beforehand, he is required to abide by the 16 SAMs. 17 What else does it say here? Let's go down a few lines 18 to there is an E, then the number 3 circled, and then the 19 letter A. Right there, that section. If you are with me, it 20 says: The Sheikh is forbidden to send or receive any 21 information, taped or written, unless it is from the lawyer. 22 Where does that come from? Well, that comes from 23 page 1 of the SAMs, the May 11th, '98, SAMs paragraph 3A, which 24 reads as follows: The inmate is prohibited from passing or 25 receiving any written or recorded communications to or from SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11142 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 other inmates, visitors, attorneys, BOP staff or anyone else, 2 except as outlined and allowed by this document. 3 That's where he is getting it from. So, we've 4 established Mr. Yousry knows full well he must abide by the 5 SAMs, most likely sometime between April and June of 1998. 6 Okay? 7 Now, you have heard a lot about Mr. Yousry and his 8 famous dissertation. We all know he is a doctoral student and 9 had finished a lot -- I guess most of his coursework, and still 10 had to write his dissertation. 11 His lawyers and he introduced into evidence the 12 various versions, the various parts of his dissertation. 13 Obviously it wasn't final, it isn't final -- he told you -- but 14 they introduced that into evidence. 15 And this is rather important, because during the 16 course of the evidence we couldn't read and we didn't read and 17 we didn't ask and the other attorneys didn't ask every possible 18 question, didn't read every single document to you. If we had, 19 we would probably be here forever. We didn't do that for one 20 reason or another; the obvious ones I think you know. 21 But, Yousry wrote about the SAMs in his dissertation. 22 There is a particularly interesting part of it which you 23 haven't heard yet and you haven't seen yet, but I'm going to 24 read it to you and show it to you. 25 The exhibit itself is MY-550-LT4. And unfortunately SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11143 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 for all of us, the pages of his dissertation weren't numbered. 2 It's in there, and we are going to put it up on the screen for 3 you. The two pages that I am going to read from, this is what 4 he wrote about the SAMs. I'm going to skip around a little bit 5 as I read this, so if I can, I will read this slow, if you can 6 follow it. 7 We are going to start where -- in the section that 8 says silencing the Sheikh. Convicted criminals are not allowed 9 to preach. 10 We are going to skip the first sentence or so, and the 11 third line down after the title, if you go to the very end, 12 there is the word in at the end of the line there. I'm going 13 to start there. And it says: In March of 1997, the FBI and 14 the Justice Department jointly issued Special Administrative 15 Measures forbidding the Sheikh from speaking to anyone except 16 his approved lawyers for one hour once a week. 17 Then I'm going to skip a few words, going to the 18 middle of that line: And his first wife for 15 minutes per 19 month, the subject matter of such conversations also being 20 restricted to legal and family matters respectively. He is not 21 even allowed to ask about the weather in Egypt. 22 Let me read the next sentence for you: As a convicted 23 criminal placed directly under the Special Administrative 24 Measures issued by the U.S. general attorney herself. 25 Okay, now I'm skipping the rest of that paragraph, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11144 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 going down to the next paragraph and first sentence. We will 2 start with the first sentence there: To counter the attempt on 3 the part of the American government to silence him, the Sheikh 4 and his lawyers worked out a plan. 5 We can skip the next few words to the start of the 6 next sentence on that line: The plan was to publicize his 7 unfair treatment here and abroad. 8 Okay. Skipping down some to the next paragraph 9 beginning with the word "soon": Soon after his lawyers began 10 publicizing Sheikh Omar's condition and views, the U.S. 11 government requested that all four of his lawyers and the only 12 authorized interpreter sign an agreement not to disclose any 13 part of their conversation with the Sheikh to the media. 14 And phone calls had to be made from their office which 15 meant that the interpreter had to travel. In February of 1999 16 the U.S. lawyers found a way to circumvent some of the 17 restrictions. 18 I'm going to skip down now to the last sentence in the 19 next paragraph there, and it says: Basically news of the 20 Sheikh was disseminated by the widely-read Al-Hayat newspaper, 21 Al-Quds, Al-Arabi and Egypt's major opposition newspapers, such 22 as Al-Arabi, Al-Nasseri and Al-Sha'b. 23 Let's go back and look at it. What have I just read 24 to you? Well, some interesting stuff. Some interesting stuff, 25 meaning particularly that he is writing that the attorneys and SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11145 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 the only interpreter -- that's him -- were required to sign an 2 agreement not to disclose any part of their conversation with 3 the Sheikh to the media. 4 Well, that tells you a few things, just that line 5 alone. It tells you that in his dissertation -- first of all, 6 Mr. Yousry is lying in his dissertation, because you know full 7 well he was never required to sign an affirmation or an 8 agreement of any kind. Okay? 9 So, to begin with, he is not even telling the truth 10 about something he has absolute personal knowledge of, and 11 that's a requirement that he sign some agreement. He has never 12 signed an agreement. In fact, that was elicited in his own 13 testimony. He didn't have to sign an agreement. But, I guess 14 to make himself appear more important to the people reviewing 15 his dissertation, perhaps he added that. 16 Well, here is one piece of evidence of dishonesty on 17 the part of Mr. Yousry, something he knows full well: He 18 didn't sign any agreements. 19 But more significantly, he is writing in his 20 dissertation that he knows there is a requirement in the SAMs 21 that prevent the attorneys -- and actually him, too -- him, 22 too -- from issuing statements by Abdel Rahman. They had to 23 sign agreements saying they wouldn't do that. 24 Now, you know that first happened in May of 1998. 25 That's when the provision went into effect, the May 11th, 1998, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11146 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 SAMs. Yousry knows it, too. 2 When did Yousry know it? Well, he knew it in '98. So 3 you can draw that conclusion because he had the SAMs. We 4 talked about the part in his notebooks where he obviously read 5 the SAMs and referred to the SAMs when talking to Abdel Rahman, 6 but he clearly knows it because it is in his dissertation, 7 okay? 8 But there is more evidence as to when he knew it. 9 More significantly, the evidence is crystal clear that he knew 10 it at the very least before the May 2000 visit and before the 11 press releases that he and Stewart and Sattar issueed in June 12 of 2000. 13 How do you know that? Very simply. When we 14 cross-examined Mr. Yousry on a number of occasions during cross 15 examination, my colleague asked him about this particular 16 segment, section of his dissertation. When I say this section, 17 I'm talking about the whole exhibit, which is 550-LT4. 18 A number of times he was asked when was the last time 19 he modified that portion of his dissertation? A number of 20 times. And his answer was, late '99, early January, February 21 2000. And the only time he modified, changed anything in that 22 part of his dissertation, it had to do with Abdel Rahman's 23 early life as a youth in Egypt. 24 After late '99 or January/February of 2000, the only 25 time he made changes to this part of his dissertation involved SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11147 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 changes involving Abdel Rahman's life as a youth in Egypt. 2 Well, the section I just read to you involves Abdel 3 Rahman's life in America; not as a youth, but as a convicted 4 terrorist in prison. 5 So what Mr. Yousry told you was by this dissertation, 6 quite clearly, is that he knew well in advance -- well in 7 advance -- of the May 2000 visit, and probably as far back as 8 '98, that the lawyers could not issue statements to the press, 9 to the media containing Abdel Rahman's statements, views, 10 opinions, words. He knew it. 11 There is more evidence, as we go through the evidence 12 and talk about the different topics I have told you about, 13 which will clearly demonstrate that Yousry knew full well that 14 Abdel Rahman's statements, words and messages could not be 15 transmitted by the lawyers or anyone else to the media. 16 Another mention of Mr. Yousry and his dishonesty. He 17 told you in his testimony that the first time he saw the SAMs 18 was late 2000 or 2001. Well, just from what I have argued to 19 you and talked to you about already, you know full well he knew 20 about the SAMs well in advance and had seen the SAMs well in 21 advance of 2001. But his counsel actually restricted the 22 question to when was the first time that you saw the SAMs -- 23 saw the SAMs. 24 Well, you know he saw the SAMs before then because in 25 Government Exhibit 1063X, it is a conversation between Sattar SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11148 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 and Yousry on March 18, 2000. Mr. Sattar calls up Mr. Yousry 2 and says some person they know named Kaukab would like a copy 3 of the SAMs. And Mr. Yousry, in responding to Mr. Sattar says, 4 oh, I've got a copy here somewhere. Let me go look for it. 5 I'll find it and I will send it to Kaukab or you. But I will 6 find it because I have a copy here. 7 Again, that's March of 2000. He obviously saw a copy 8 of the SAMs before late 2000-2001 because in March of 2000 he 9 is telling Sattar on the phone he's got a copy of the SAMs in 10 his home. Then he says, if I can't find it, I will call up one 11 of the attorneys and get a copy of it. But, he said quite 12 clearly he had a copy. He thinks he has a copy in his home and 13 he will send it to him. 14 So, Mr. Yousry was not honest with you when he told 15 you he had first seen a version of the SAMs in late 2000, early 16 2001. 17 Let me make one thing perfectly clear, because I'm 18 just about through talking about Mr. Yousry's knowledge of the 19 SAMs for now. There will be more of it as we go through the 20 evidence. 21 At the end of the case when Judge Koeltl instructs you 22 on the law, he is going to instruct you on the first count. 23 The first count is a conspiracy to defraud the United States, 24 okay? And the SAMs and these restrictions have much to do with 25 that count. That count is not a conspiracy to violate the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11149 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 SAMs, firsts of all, okay? 2 And there is nothing in the Judge's instructions that 3 he will give you that says in order for Mohammed Yousry to be 4 guilty of that count, that he must have read or possessed the 5 SAMs; there is nothing like that in there, or to sign an 6 affirmation, for that matter. Nothing like that in there. He 7 doesn't have to. 8 To be a part of that conspiracy, he doesn't have to 9 have had a knowledge of all the details or the full scope of 10 what that conspiracy was about, including having detailed 11 knowledge or having read the SAMs. He doesn't have to have had 12 all complete knowledge, full knowledge to have knowingly joined 13 that conspiracy. If he is aware at the very least of some 14 basic aims or goals of that conspiracy, which was to defraud 15 the United States by passing messages back and forth, that is 16 sufficient. 17 But to the extent that the other side has suggested or 18 will argue to you it's a big deal, he wasn't required to sign 19 the affirmation, or it's a big deal because the government 20 hasn't proven he read every word of the SAMs. Nonsense. He 21 was aware of the SAMs, he knows of them. He knew the 22 restrictions, what they consisted of, and he was aware of the 23 fact that what he was doing was wrong because of those 24 restrictions. 25 Now, let me talk a little bit about Mr. Sattar and his SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11150 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 knowledge of the SAMs. 2 Well, Mr. Sattar told you much of his knowledge of the 3 SAMs, a lot about it, because he testified about it and what he 4 knew about it. But also he talked a lot about the SAMs, and we 5 will go through those calls in a minute. 6 What he testified about was he knew the SAMs. When 7 the SAMs were first imposed, he knew that only five people were 8 able to visit Abdel Rahman. He knew that they were renewed, 9 the SAMs were renewed every 120 days. 10 He also possessed copies of the SAMs. Government 11 Exhibit 2035X actually is the regulation that authorizes the 12 imposition of the SAMs. He obviously had a copy of the 13 regulation, just like Mr. Yousry as well. 14 He also had in his possession Government Exhibit 2037. 15 And what that is is the May 11th, 1998 SAMs and a signed copy 16 of the attorney affirmation that was signed by Stewart that 17 pertained to those SAMs. It was signed on May 7th, '98. 18 Both the SAMs and the affirmation were faxed to 19 Mr. Sattar by Ms. Stewart. There is a fax line on that exhibit 20 indicating that it came from Ms. Stewart's office to Mr. Sattar 21 on May 7th of 1998. 22 Interesting, if you look at that exhibit in 23 particular -- and it is on this kind of old kind of fax, kind 24 of paper you used to use when you fax; kind of very loose, soft 25 paper. But if you look at it right on -- next to on the first SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11151 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 page of the SAMs itself, the page that says Special 2 Administrative Measures and has the date May 11, 1998, next to 3 paragraph 3A, which is on that same page, the first page of the 4 SAMs, somebody wrote brackets, like a bracket that you would 5 have on a document, a bracket, handwritten on the document on 6 the paragraph alongside -- I should say, paragraph 3A. I read 7 paragraph 3A to you a few minutes ago. Let me do it again 8 quickly. 9 It says: The inmate is prohibited from passing or 10 receiving any written or recorded communications to or from 11 other inmates, visitors, attorneys, BOP staff or anyone else 12 except as outlined and allowed by this document. 13 It is in his possession, found in his home. 14 He also had in his home Government Exhibit 2063, which 15 is the SAMs that were in effect in December of 1999. And as I 16 told you, those SAMs never changed. In other words, the 17 language never changed from December 1999 on. Those were 18 the -- it is the same language that was in effect in May of 19 2000 during that prison visit when they issued the press 20 releases. 21 Well, Mr. Sattar also spoke about the SAMs as well. 22 He spoke to them on many, many intercepted conversations. When 23 we cross-examined him last week -- or is it the week before? 24 I'm losing track of time -- he was confronted with those 25 conversations. Let me just give you several examples of things SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11152 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 he said about the SAMs in conversations with other people which 2 were intercepted on his phone. 3 Government Exhibit 1002X, December 12, 1998, 4 conversation between Sattar and Muntasir Al-Zayat, the lawyer 5 from Egypt, Sattar told Al-Zayat that Abdel Rahman is not 6 allowed visits other than from his attorneys and a translator. 7 That's from the SAMs. And that Sattar is not allowed to call 8 Abdel Rahman. That's the SAMs 9 Government Exhibit 1003X, conversation two days later 10 between Sattar and Mustafa Hamza about the SAMs restrictions 11 that were imposed. He tells Hamza -- Sattar tells Hamza who 12 can visit Abdel Rahman; the fact that Abdel Rahman gets one 13 call per month for 15 minutes with his wife. He makes 14 reference to the actual federal regulation in the conversation 15 and he says -- this is now in December of 1998 -- Abdel Rahman 16 can have no contact with the media. Can't send messages to the 17 media. Sattar knows that in December 1998 18 A few more examples. Government Exhibit 1005X, a 19 conversation on January 26, 1999 between Sattar, again with 20 Hamza. Sattar explains that Abdel Rahman is under this, a law 21 that is applicable only to a few prisoners -- that's the 22 SAMs -- it restricts his communication with others and with 23 him -- meaning Sattar. 24 And then he tells Hamza that if something Abdel Rahman 25 says gets published, it could be a problem, quote, A person SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11153 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 should be very careful in, because there is -- and there is 2 some ah, ah, ahs -- and there is a very small window which is 3 still open. I don't want to close it. To reopen -- to reopen 4 it, I will go through, through legal issues which might take 5 years. Then he says, quote, that is why Ramsey Clark carefully 6 selects his words. 7 What is he saying? He is saying Abdel Rahman's words 8 and messages and statements and messages can't be published in 9 the media. There is a requirement, there is a provision in the 10 SAMs that prohibits that. It's the last paragraph that appears 11 in the SAMs, starting in May of 1998 and continues on through 12 the years. It's the last paragraph that says, no communication 13 with the media through any source, including attorneys. 14 Let me give you another example, Government Exhibit 15 1016X, an April 1999 conversation between Sattar and Yassir 16 Al-Sirri. 17 He says that -- Sattar tells Al-Sirri that a reporter 18 can't meet with Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman because he is under 19 what is called "Special Administrative Measures." He actually 20 knows the title, meaning certain measures pertaining to him. 21 He cannot meet or talk to anybody. He is isolated from the 22 media. 23 Another example, Government Exhibit 1044X, a November 24 1999 conversation between Sattar and a lawyer named 25 Hasaballah. Sattar tells him that Abdel Rahman has been under SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11154 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 these restrictions since March of '97, just one month earlier, 2 that only the attorneys and people like me can see him. 3 People like whom? Like Sattar, of course not. 4 Mr. Sattar is not honest with Mr. Hasaballah. Mr. Sattar 5 cannot see him, but he is telling Hasaballah there is 6 restrictions. He says again that Abdel Rahman only gets a call 7 for about 15 minutes per month with a family member and that 8 the restrictions come directly from the Department of Justice. 9 He seems to know a lot about the SAMs 10 Two more examples for you Government Exhibit 1071X, an 11 April 2000 conversation again with Sattar and Al-Sirri, where 12 Sattar makes specific reference to the fact that the SAMs 13 restrictions placed on Abdel Rahman -- he says, quote, they 14 imposed eight pages restrictions on him. They made a special 15 law for him. 16 By the way, the eight pages version of the SAMs is 17 that final version from December of '99 going forward, eight 18 pages. As I said, the words, letters and sentences are all the 19 same. 20 Finally, Government Exhibit 1119X, a June 2000 21 conversation with Sattar and Taha. Sattar says to Taha, the 22 lawyers have to sign papers saying they are not allowed to say 23 anything or pass anything -- meaning messages -- to and from 24 Abdel Rahman. Quote, that is why I told you that this woman 25 risked her whole career. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11155 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 What is he referring to? He is referring to the press 2 release that Stewart, he and Yousry issued, and the fact that 3 she is the one who is announcing it and whose name appears in 4 the press; and that she issued that press release declaring 5 that Abdel Rahman was no longer supporting the cease-fire; and 6 that doing that, clearly, at the very, very least, violated the 7 SAMs. And for that reason she has risked her whole career, 8 because he knows the SAMs prohibit it. 9 In fact, Mr. Sattar testified he knew, he says, as 10 early at '97, '98, that the lawyers couldn't pass Abdel 11 Rahman's messages to the media 12 Let me quickly repeat what I just said about 13 Mr. Yousry and his knowing, reading or possessing of the SAMs. 14 It is quite clear, just from the examples I have given you and 15 what you will learn as we go through the visits, the prison 16 visits I told you about, that both Sattar and Yousry knew full 17 well the various provisions of the SAMs. At the very least 18 they knew they couldn't pass messages to him. They couldn't 19 receive messages from him. And Abdel Rahman's words, messages, 20 statements could not be made or distributed to the media. They 21 all knew that. 22 Whether or not in fact Sattar read the SAMs, read 23 every word of the SAMs is not significant. It doesn't matter. 24 When you review and listen carefully to the judge's 25 instructions on Count One, the conspiracy to defraud, it is SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11156 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 quite clear -- quite clear -- that he knew the aims and the 2 objectives of that conspiracy in the most general terms at 3 least. He doesn't need to know all the details of those SAMs 4 to be a knowing participant in that conspiracy. 5 And let me just say with respect to both Mr. Sattar 6 and Mr. Yousry, to the extent they, by chance, by very, very 7 small chance they didn't read the SAMs they had in their homes, 8 and, goodness, why would they have them but for to read them; 9 but if they hadn't read them, they consciously chose not to 10 read them knowing full well what those restrictions were, they 11 consciously avoided reading them and knowing the details of 12 each provision of the SAMs, it does not matter. They knew, 13 they participated, the evidence is clear. 14 And I think it is time for a break. And when we come 15 back, we will talk a little bit about the cease-fire and the 16 Luxor massacre. 17 THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, we will 18 take a 15-minute break. 19 Please, please remember my continuing instructions. 20 Simply because we have moved to another part of the trial, that 21 does not change my instructions at all. It is very important 22 that you continue to follow these instructions throughout the 23 summations, and indeed, throughout the charge until there comes 24 a point when I send the jurors to deliberate. 25 Please, it is very important, do not talk about this SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11157 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 case at all. Do not talk about it at all. 2 Always remember to keep an open mind. As I explained 3 at the end of the last time that we were together, the 4 reason -- the reason for that, and the reason I emphasize it at 5 this point is the evidence has been concluded. We are now in 6 the process of summations, which will go on for some time, and 7 then I will instruct you on the law. 8 It is only after I have instructed you on the law, 9 when I have explained to you the various elements of the 10 various offenses that are charged in the case, that you will 11 have the entire case before you. And so it is very important 12 for you not to say anything about the case, not to do anything 13 to interfere with your ability, after I have fully instructed 14 you on the law, to begin to talk about the case at that point. 15 That's why I say, please, don't talk about this case 16 at all, and continue to keep an open mind until there comes a 17 point when I have finally instructed you on the law and sent 18 you to the jury room to begin your deliberations. 19 So, don't talk about the case, continue to keep an 20 open mind. Have a good break and I will see you shortly. 21 (Jury not present) 22 (Recess) 23 24 25 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11158 4CT5SAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 (At side bar) 2 MR. RUHNKE: There is nobody here for Mr. Sattar at 3 the moment. 4 THE COURT: We'll wait. 5 (Pause) 6 THE COURT: There was someone in the crowd who was 7 making a picture, a sketch of the courtroom and it's, you 8 really can't make out the faces of the jurors or of the -- but 9 the marshal confiscated the drawing and is going to keep it and 10 has instructed the person that they ought not to be making 11 sketches like that. 12 You are welcome to see it. I will return it to the 13 marshal. 14 Thank you, all. 15 (Continued next page) 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11159 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 (In open court; jury present) 2 THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, excuse 3 me. I brought you in while we were still coming in to the 4 courtroom, and that's my responsibility, so I regret any 5 movement that is still going on while you were coming in. 6 Again, that's -- it's my responsibility. 7 All right. Mr. Dember, you may proceed. 8 MR. DEMBER: Thank you, your Honor. 9 When we broke I told you we were going to turn to now 10 some discussion about the ceasefire. One can't talk about the 11 ceasefire without talking about the Luxor massacre in November 12 of 1997. 13 As you've learned during the course of the case, in 14 1997, after years of terrorism in Egypt, murders of tourists 15 and government officials in Egypt, members, some members of the 16 Islamic Group called for a ceasefire -- unilateral ceasefire 17 with the Egyptian government intending to halt the use of the 18 violence and the killing of innocents to achieve the Islamic 19 Group's goals. Not everyone agreed with that. And as you 20 know, what preceded that ceasefire was essentially a reign of 21 terror in Egypt carried out by the Islamic Group, killing of 22 innocents, killing of tourists, killing of government 23 officials. Nothing short of cold-blooded murder. Nothing 24 depicts, represents that more than what happened in Luxor in 25 November of 1997. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11160 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 And during the course of the trial, in the early weeks 2 of the trial, we brought here for you a witness, person who was 3 actually present at that scene who saw, witnessed the massacre 4 itself, the murders that took place. That was Ekkehardt 5 Hassels-Weiler. And he told you about what happened that day, 6 what he saw, what he heard during that horrible morning on 7 November 17th of 1997. 8 He told you that he arrived at the ancient temples, 9 which are the famous tourist sites in Luxor, early that 10 morning, and that when he was approaching one of the temples he 11 heard gunfire. He turned and when he turned he saw seven to 12 ten armed men, armed with pistols and automatic weapons. He 13 saw them start to fire, fire their weapons at two guards, two 14 soldier-type individuals, guards, who were there to protect the 15 tourists visiting the site. 16 He saw those armed men gun down those two guards and 17 to continue to fire their weapons. Mr. Hassels-Weiler told you 18 that after that, seeing that, he made his way into one of the 19 temples itself and hid. And during that time he heard gunfire. 20 He heard shouting. He heard screaming. At one point in time 21 he saw an Asian woman, an Asian tourist woman and saw her shot 22 in the head, fall to the ground as he looked into the plaza. 23 He saw the gunmen chasing after other tourists. He saw havoc, 24 chaos, murder as it happened. 25 As I mentioned, he continued to hear gunfire, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11161 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 screaming and wailing of the victims for a period of almost 40 2 minutes. And after that stopped, and after he and other 3 tourists determined or believed it was safe to come out from 4 their hiding places, he emerged. And what he saw, the horrific 5 sight that he saw was Luxor, the Luxor massacre. He told you 6 he saw approximately 50 people dead, with gunshot wounds and 7 knife wounds. He saw a tourist bus ablaze, put on fire. And 8 he did what other tourists did. He did his best to get to 9 safety to get out of that location. He saw what the Islamic 10 Group had done that morning -- unadulterated, cold-blooded 11 murder of innocent people. 12 That was the hallmark of what the Islamic Group was 13 all about and how they intended to achieve their goals, killing 14 innocent people who had nothing to do with the Egyptian 15 government or the people in the Egyptian government they 16 disagreed with. 17 As you know and as each of these defendants learned 18 and knew before they did what they did in this case, they 19 learned that those responsible in the Islamic Group for that 20 massacre claimed responsibility for the massacre and they 21 learned, these defendants knew and learned that they committed 22 this massacre in an attempt to somehow win the release of Abdel 23 Rahman. And at the site itself they left pamphlets announcing 24 that they were doing, committing this horrific act in the name 25 of Abdel Rahman to force his release. Obviously they did not SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11162 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 achieve their goal. All they achieved was bloody murder. 2 And you learned during the course of this trial that a 3 person who had involvement in that Luxor massacre, perhaps 4 involved most likely involved in the planning of the massacre, 5 in its being carried out, was Atia; a name, a person we will 6 talk about quite extensively sometime either later today or 7 tomorrow. 8 Now, after Luxor there were other members, and those 9 who favored the ceasefire cried out again for others in the 10 group to join them and abide by a ceasefire. And some, in 11 fact, did. We're going to put up for you Exhibit 800. 12 Government Exhibit 800, if you recall, is a map of part of the 13 world with the names of many of the players in this case, names 14 you've known and come to know and learn about. 15 You learned after Luxor certainly, after Luxor at the 16 very least, certain members of the Islamic Group's leadership 17 certainly favored the ceasefire, including the Islamic Group 18 leaders who the -- the ones who were in prison, they were the 19 ones who first called for it. They continued to want it to be 20 enforced. 21 And you learned about Mustafa Hamza, one of its 22 leaders. And that he, he who was also known by the names 23 Eunice and Abu-Hazim, I'll always refer to him as Hamza just to 24 be consistent. You learned that he was an IG leader, living 25 outside Egypt in Afghanistan, and he was from almost the very SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11163 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 beginning of the recordings that were intercepted that we 2 played for you, a person who favored strongly the ceasefire -- 3 favored the ceasefire, wanted to remain in effect. 4 You learned about Salah Hashim, commonly referred to 5 as the engineer, or Abu Nadhara. He was also an Islamic Group 6 leader. He happened to be able to live and was living in 7 Egypt. You learned about Mustafa Al-Zayat, another name that 8 came up and has been mentioned quite prominently whose calls 9 and conversations with Sattar were intercepted. And you heard 10 he is the lawyer in Cairo, he was a person who represented many 11 in the Islamic Group and was looked at as their representative, 12 their legal representative. 13 And at some point in time you learned that, yes, even 14 Abdel Rahman supported the ceasefire for a period of time. And 15 as you well, know, that came to change at some point in time. 16 But as Mr. Sattar himself testified, there was a 17 conflict within the Islamic Group. And each side, the side 18 that favored the ceasefire and the side that favored doing away 19 with the ceasefire and resuming the violence and the killing 20 sort of struggled over Abdel Rahman. Each side wanted him with 21 them, because of his influence, because of his prestige, 22 because of his power, each side wanted Abdel Rahman with them. 23 And then there was Rifa'i Taha. Taha. Taha never 24 supported the ceasefire. As you well know now, he is and was 25 the most militant member of the Islamic Group and, starting as SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11164 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 early as 1999, did everything and whatever he could to end that 2 ceasefire, most prominently in his efforts was to win the 3 support of Abdel Rahman. And so Abdel Rahman, he sought his 4 alliance and allegiance and support. 5 Who is Taha? We learned a lot about this fellow. I 6 told you he was very important in this case. He is, without 7 question, a terrorist. He is a murderer. He is a lot of 8 things. The worst kind of terrorist a, a person who revels in 9 the killing and the soliciting of killings of others. And what 10 did you learn about him? Well, you learned about him from his 11 own statements in a recorded conversation with Sattar, 12 Government Exhibit 1161X, which was a conversation in July of 13 2000, that he certainly considered the president of Egypt an 14 infidel. He considered the government to be illegitimate and 15 quote, the government and Mubarak must be removed and will be 16 removed by armed force. He believed in the use of violence to 17 achieve his goals. 18 You know, going back a few years, that in 1998, 19 February of 1998, he joined such prestigious company as Osama 20 bin Laden in a fatwah that Bin Laden issued calling for the 21 killing of Americans and their allies, civilians and military, 22 wherever they could be found. He kept nice company, didn't he? 23 You learned that he, again, in 2000, September 2000, joined 24 Bin Laden again and Ayman Al-Zawahiri in a fatwah with Mohammed 25 Abdel Rahman, Abdel Rahman's son, calling for the release of SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11165 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Abdel Rahman. That's the recording that we played for you that 2 was from Al-Jazeera, the TV network that played the tape. 3 That's the tape in which Abdel Rahman's son is heard at the end 4 screaming that they should avenge the Sheikh, let's go to the 5 grounds of jihad and spill blood. Let us spill blood. 6 Obviously they wanted blood to be spilled in order to release 7 Abdel Rahman. 8 Taha kept company with those people. 9 And you know about Taha's book. What can one say 10 about Taha's book? One can say a great deal about his book. 11 It is a book that simply is a justification for killing 12 innocent people. He describes in his book justifications for 13 killing essentially all nonMuslims, particularly Jews and 14 Christians. It's a total explanation or attempt at justifying 15 killing, killing innocent people. Killing people he didn't 16 agree with. 17 Among the people he targeted at the top of his list 18 were Americans and Jews. This is what he said about them. 19 Quote, Kill them anywhere on the face of the earth and in any 20 possible way. Page ten of the translation, if you care to look 21 at it. It's Government Exhibit 2700 and 2700T. 22 He is the one that Sattar wisely chose because he knew 23 what Taha was all about, to write the fatwah to kill Jews. He 24 is the one who tried to use the terrorist murder of 17 United 25 States sailors on the USS Cole as a way of extorting the United SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11166 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 States to free Abdel Rahman. And, as you well know from the 2 bulk and volume of evidence in this case, he is the one who 3 made and took efforts and accomplished his effort of getting 4 Abdel Rahman to withdraw his support for the ceasefire and 5 joined Taha and Sattar in a call in a return to the violence 6 and killing in Egypt. 7 Well, you know all about Taha. And just as important, 8 you all know -- you know all about what Sattar knew about Taha. 9 He knew about the fatwah in 1998 that Taha joined with 10 Bin Laden calling for the murder of Americans and their allies 11 everywhere. He knew that Taha was a high-ranking member of 12 this terrorist organization, the Islamic Group, a group that 13 committed the Luxor massacre; a group that committed the murder 14 of 18 Greek tourists in front of their hotel in Cairo, Egypt, 15 in 1996. He knew that Taha led the bloodiest period of the 16 Islamic Group and led that group during its bloodiest period 17 from 1990 to 1997. You know that he knew, Sattar knew that 18 Taha was considered the United States' enemy. Sattar knew that 19 Taha was on a designated list of the government, the US 20 government list of designated terrorists in the world. And 21 Sattar knew all about his book, his justification for killing, 22 killing at Luxor, killing Americans, killing Jews, killing 23 Christians, killing children, killing women. He knew all about 24 that book. He had read it. And he had others read it on to 25 audio tapes so that it could be sent to Abdel Rahman. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11167 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 And no surprise, as I mentioned before, that when the 2 American government, the FBI or the Bureau of Prisons officials 3 were given these tapes and they were translated and they read 4 the translations of Taha's book, that they didn't let Abdel 5 Rahman have it. It essentially is a solicitation to murder, a 6 solicitation to violence, a solicitation to terrorism. That's 7 what the book is. 8 And Sattar knew full well, that Taha's goal, his 9 objective was to violently overthrow the Egyptian government. 10 You know full well, Taha was and is a horror, a fanatical 11 terrorist. He was and is a terrorism nightmare for the 12 civilized world. Why on earth would Ahmed Sattar talk to this 13 person, align himself with this person, deal with this person, 14 take his calls? My goodness, Ahmed Sattar should have been 15 running as fast as he could away from Taha. He should have 16 distanced himself by 1,000 miles from Taha. He should have 17 never spoken to him, knowing all that he knew about Taha. 18 But what does he do? He embraces him. He joins him. 19 He aligns himself with him. He befriends him. He becomes his 20 coconspirator. What other explanation is there for why that 21 man would talk to, do the bidding for and work with Taha, 22 knowing all he knew about him? There is one explanation, and 23 only one explanation, and that is this: He agreed with him. 24 He agreed with his vision, Taha's vision of Egypt and a 25 necessity to overthrow its government by violent means. He SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11168 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 agreed with Taha that the only way to free Abdel Rahman from 2 his prison cell in the United States in Minnesota was to 3 overthrow the Egyptian government. And that only could and 4 would be done by the use of violence. And that's why he joined 5 him. There is no other explanation. 6 When he said to you in his testimony, I am just trying 7 to help other Muslims, other Egyptians, you knew that was 8 nonsense. There are plenty of innocent, nonterrorist, 9 nonmurderrous Muslims to be helped if he was so interested in 10 giving Taha his charity. 11 There's only one reason to deal with Taha, to talk to 12 Taha, to do his bidding. There's one explanation. Your common 13 sense tells you what it is, your good judgment tells you what 14 it is: It's because he agreed with him. Because Taha is and 15 was a horror and the record is filled with evidence of it. 16 There is a time, a conversation, let me tell you about 17 it, Government Exhibit 1002X, December 12, 1998, it's one of 18 the first conversations we presented to you, it's between 19 Sattar and Taha. And Sattar tells Taha at that early stage 20 there's no chance for Abdel Rahman's release so long as the 21 political situation in Egypt is tranquil. Egypt has refused to 22 take Abdel Rahman, he said, in a transfer. That's all that 23 Taha needed to hear or know. Not that he needed more 24 justification for resuming the violence and killing in Egypt he 25 was for to begin with. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11169 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 As I said before, both Sattar and Taha looked to Abdel 2 Rahman as the final arbiter, the ultimate arbiter of any 3 dispute within the Islamic Group. And as you know, there was a 4 dispute. There was proceasefire and anticeasefire. There was 5 the dispute. And who was going to resolve it? Who was going 6 to, in their view, settle it? There's only one man: Abdel 7 Rahman. And Sattar and Taha's view was, it's time to end the 8 ceasefire. 9 As I said in a conversation, a conversation we played 10 for you, Government Exhibit 1021X, conversation on August 9th 11 of 1999, Sattar is talking to a person who can't be identified, 12 another person. But they're talking about Taha. And what does 13 Sattar say to this individual when referring to Taha? He calls 14 him, quote, my friend, the leader of the Islamic Group. My 15 friend. He moves in rather strange company, Mr. Sattar. 16 That's what he considers a friend. An enemy of America, a 17 terrorist. 18 It's time to move ahead and start talking about the 19 prison visits. The prison visits, as you have come to learn, 20 were an opportunity to pass messages from Taha through Sattar 21 to Abdel Rahman and to transfer Abdel Rahman's responses back 22 to Taha. The prison visits I referred to, March 1999, 23 September 1999, February 2000, and of course the May 2000 one, 24 the evidence about those visits relates to, ladies and 25 gentlemen, to a number of the charges in this case. Let me SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11170 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 talk about them for a moment. 2 What these defendants did in passing messages back and 3 forth violating restrictions, pertains, frankly, to Count 1, 4 which is the conspiracy to defraud the United States by passing 5 these messages, which were clearly prohibited by the SAMs. 6 These defendants participated -- with Abdel Rahman, I might 7 add -- in that conspiracy. The evidence that you're going to 8 hear and I'm going to discuss with you about these visits also 9 relates to the Counts 2 and 3 of this indictment, the 10 conspiracy to kill and kidnap persons outside the United 11 States, and which Sattar was charged with and also Count 3 12 which Sattar was also only charged with, and that is the 13 solicitation of crimes of violence. The goal, the purpose for 14 passing these messages back and forth was initially to get 15 Abdel Rahman to side with them, to work with Sattar and Taha in 16 their conspiracy to kill and in their solicitation of crimes of 17 violence. And as you'll see, that's what happened. That's 18 what happened. And this evidence about these visits relates to 19 that. 20 And thirdly, the evidence that we'll discuss, start 21 discussing in a moment about these visits relates to Counts 4 22 and 5, Stewart and Yousry are charged with, providing material 23 support to a terrorism crime; meaning conspiracy to murder that 24 Taha and Sattar entered. And Yousry and Stewart, you will see 25 from the evidence, participated by providing material support SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11171 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 and conspiring to provide material support by providing, as 2 only they could, Abdel Rahman to Taha and Sattar so they could 3 accomplish their objective and their conspiracy to kill and 4 kidnap persons outside the United States. 5 Let's talk about the March 1999 prison visit first. 6 It occurred on March 1st and 2nd of 1999. There was 7 no recording of that visit. We didn't play any -- we didn't 8 read any transcripts to you, there was no video to play of the 9 visit. It was a visit that was attended by Stewart and Yousry 10 of Abdel Rahman at Rochester in which they brought messages 11 from Taha and others to Abdel Rahman in violation of the SAMs. 12 And as with every visit, as Yousry and Stewart told you, before 13 the visit occurred, they would get from Sattar a letter from 14 Sattar and other documents and other messages and letters, and 15 before the visit itself Yousry would translate, verbatim, those 16 letters and documents to Stewart before they started the visit. 17 What's the significance of this particular visit? 18 Well, there are two major things that happened: There was a 19 message passed to Abdel Rahman seeking his view about whether a 20 political party should be established, an Islamic political 21 party. That was one of the messages. 22 And secondly, the other message was Taha's message, a 23 message which would be repeated over time in other visits, 24 which was he wanted Abdel Rahman to support him, to side with 25 him in ending the ceasefire and resuming the killing and SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11172 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 violence in Egypt. 2 What happens? Well, how do you know what happens? 3 Before it happens, let me just remind you, ladies and 4 gentlemen, that at the time of the visit, which was in 1999, 5 the SAMs in effect certainly were the SAMs, the May 11, 1998, 6 SAMs. By that time clearly there was no -- it was not 7 permissible to communicate with the media anymore and pass 8 these messages or statements, Abdel Rahman's messages or 9 statements to the media. And I'm not going to read it again, 10 but in the SAMs, right on that first page, I've read it before 11 you twice now, paragraph 3A clearly indicates, communications 12 back and forth, from Abdel Rahman with others, whoever they may 13 be, are controlled by the conditions and provisions, I should 14 say, of the SAMs themselves. That's in effect. 15 And Stewart signed an attorney affirmation, which is 16 the first page of the exhibit. She signed it on May 7, 1998, 17 and among other things she promised, because of course she 18 promised in each of these affirmations, that she would abide by 19 the SAMs. And let me just read paragraph 3 for you. It says: 20 I further understand that neither I nor any member of my office 21 shall forward any mail received from inmate Abdel Rahman to a 22 third person. Nor shall I use my meetings, correspondence or 23 phone calls with Abdel Rahman to pass messages between third 24 parties, including but not limited to, the media and Abdel 25 Rahman. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11173 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 As you will learn and as you remember, she violated 2 that provision of this during this particular visit. 3 Now, if we don't have a recording of the visit, audio 4 or video, if we don't have any live witness present at the 5 visit to tell you what happened, how do you know what happened? 6 Good question. Well, the answer is also pretty simple: You 7 look to the calls, the intercepted calls on Sattar's phone that 8 took place before the visit and after the visit and that will 9 tell you what happened during the visit. 10 Now, the only call of real relevance before the visit 11 is a call on January 26, 1999. It's Exhibit 1005X. And it's a 12 conversation between Sattar and Hamza. And during that 13 conversation Sattar says to Hamza that he's got a letter from 14 two fellows named Gamal Sultan and Kamal Habib regarding the 15 forming of a political party in Egypt. And they want -- what 16 they want is a fatwah, these two gentlemen want a fatwah from 17 Abdel Rahman on whether the Islamic Group should form a 18 political party. OK, interesting. They wanted a fatwah. They 19 want Abdel Rahman to respond to this letter. 20 And Hamza tells Sattar he would like to know Abdel 21 Rahman's view on this subject as well and to consult him when 22 he gets the answer. And just to remind you, that call is about 23 four or five weeks before the actual visit on March 1st and 24 2nd, 1999. 25 Now, you know the visit took place and we told you SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11174 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 before, a few minutes ago, the two messages that's written, I 2 just told you about the two letters from Mr. Habib and 3 Mr Sultan seeking a fatwah about political parties but you 4 learn from the calls that follow the visit that Taha's message 5 was also communicated to Abdel Rahman during the visit by 6 Yousry and Stewart. 7 Now, how do you know that? Now, if you look at 8 Government Exhibit 1007X, it's a March 9, 1999 call, one week 9 after the visit took place. It's a conversation between Sattar 10 and Hamza and what happens is Sattar tells Hamza essentially 11 what happened, tells him what happened during the meeting, the 12 visit. 13 The first thing he says to him is, Abdel Rahman has 14 rejected the idea of a political party. No political party, 15 he's rejected that idea. And then what he tells him is, he 16 tells him something else, which can be found -- and we have it 17 up on the screen there for you on page -- I believe it's page 4 18 of the exhibit. What I'm going to do is read, from beginning 19 to end, the message. You can follow it on the screen or listen 20 to me as I read it. 21 But what's happening is at this part of the 22 conversation, Sattar is telling Hamza that there is a second 23 message that came out of the visit, OK. It's the message 24 intended for Taha. And here is what Abdel Rahman is saying in 25 response to Taha's request to end the ceasefire and resume the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11175 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 violence and killing. Let me read it for you. It's in the 2 transcript if you want either listen to me or follow along. 3 This is what he says: 4 With respect to your opinion, which is a very good 5 opinion, but you have to give some time to the brothers who are 6 in prison. There is no objection to have some differences. 7 They call for the halt of violence, and you don't agree. No 8 objection to that. This conflict should be handled in a soft 9 and flexible manner. It is possible that the brothers were 10 promised things by the government which we are not aware of. 11 Give them the chance and give the right to, to inquire until 12 something else is proved, then we can talk. No charter and 13 nothing should happen or be done without consulting me or 14 informing me. God be with you. Peace and mercy of God be on 15 you. 16 OK. That's Abdel Rahman's response to Taha's message. 17 You only have to go to the third sentence in that to understand 18 what the message was coming in. What is he saying, let me 19 repeat that sentence: They call for a halt of the violence. 20 Meaning the leaders of the Islamic Group in prison. 21 You don't agree. 22 The message is from Taha: We want to -- I want to end 23 the ceasefire. I want you to support my position to end the 24 ceasefire. But what he's saying is violence. It's halt the 25 violence, you don't agree. Taha wants to resume the violence. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11176 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Abdel Rahman says: Time out. Hold on. Give it some 2 time. He is not giving his support completely. 3 At the very end of that portion I just read, Abdel 4 Rahman is saying: Whoa, whoa, don't do anything about, 5 anything without consulting me. I'm still in charge here, I'm 6 still one of the bosses. No new charter for the group should 7 come into play. No action should happen. Nothing should be 8 done without consulting him first. 9 Hamza's response to this in the transcript is, quote, 10 this is a very good message. 11 Hamza is proceasefire. Abdel Rahman is not saying 12 abandon the ceasefire. He's saying, hey, let's give this some 13 time. 14 Hamza likes that. 15 He also tells Hamza, and it's in the transcript and if 16 you want to look at it, he lists ten points, ten points as to 17 why the Islamic Group should not form a political party. And 18 there are some notes that Yousry has that are in evidence from 19 that visit. We're not going to take the time to actually show 20 it to you, it's Exhibit 2415-6T. It's a document found in 21 Yousry's home. And it's his notes from this visit. And one of 22 the reasons listed in the notes is Abdel Rahman saying, well, 23 the halt to the violence is a tactic. It is not a principle. 24 It's a tactic. We use the tactic because it's to our 25 advantage -- what he's saying is we use the tactic because it's SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11177 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 to our advantage at this point but it's not a principle not to 2 engage in violence against the Egyptian government. 3 What's the other message? The other message is no 4 political parties. And what does that mean? Abdel Rahman is 5 saying, no, we're not going to end our dispute with the 6 Egyptian government politically, peacefully by sitting down and 7 working out differences. No. Absolutely not. That's not 8 going to happen. We're going to deal with the Egyptian 9 government as it exists with violence, not by peaceful means, 10 not by political methods. That's the message coming out of the 11 visit. 12 Now, about two weeks after the call with Hamza, Sattar 13 has another conversation with Taha. It's Government 14 Exhibit 1009X. It's on March 22, 1999. And, clearly, Sattar 15 had sent, in e-mails to Taha, alerting him to what happened 16 during the visit. They refer to it as two letters. And 17 Taha -- or Sattar actually asks Taha, did you get those 18 messages? Basically. 19 And Taha responds and says, quote, yeah, two letters. 20 Both are good but I wanted the second one, which is the one for 21 me a little stronger. 22 Well, the one for him is his efforts to get Abdel 23 Rahman to declare an end to the ceasefire and a resumption of 24 violence, that's the one for him. He wanted that stronger. 25 And how does his pal, his buddy, his coconspirator SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11178 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Sattar respond to that? His words: Quote, this is what we 2 could do for the time being, what we could do for the time 3 being. Because we, Sattar and Taha, are linked together. 4 They're joined forces, they are together with respect to 5 wanting Abdel Rahman on their side to end the ceasefire, resume 6 the violence. 7 Now, step back for a moment. Step back for a moment. 8 We know what Sattar and Taha wanted, we know they know what the 9 messages are but you also know something else. Stewart and 10 Yousry also know that's the message coming in. The message 11 they brought in to Abdel Rahman on that visit was, Taha wants 12 to resume the violence. And they got the message from Taha's 13 pal and partner, Sattar. They know they brought in a message 14 from Taha through Sattar soliciting Abdel Rahman to join them, 15 to support them in their call for violence. They know it. 16 That's the kind of message they brought in on that visit. It 17 just so happens Abdel Rahman's response at this point in time 18 is, hold on, don't do anything, let's wait and see what's going 19 on. 20 Were they engaging in a conspiracy to defraud the 21 United States by sending such a message in? Of course they 22 were, that's what they were doing, knowing full well this 23 message had nothing to do with Stewart being a lawyer 24 representing Abdel Rahman or any legal matter she could 25 possibly deal on his behalf with. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11179 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 This visit also proves one other thing that's very 2 important and that is, as I'll point out as I go through this 3 summation, Stewart and Yousry were dishonest with you. They 4 weren't straight with you when they testified about this visit. 5 When we questioned Stewart about the visit, what did she say? 6 Oh, all we did was ask about political parties but the only 7 reason we asked that was because Yousry wanted to know about it 8 for his dissertation. That was the only reason. Nonsense. 9 She was smuggling in letters and she didn't want to admit it. 10 And there's no videotape or transcript or recording of the 11 visit so she can get away with it. 12 You know full well from the evidence, the strong 13 evidence, she was dishonest with you. She was dishonest about 14 this visit. And when we asked her, gee, were there any 15 messages about ending the ceasefire, anything from Taha? Oh, 16 oh, no, nothing. I can't remember anything like that. 17 You think you'd forget a message like that? Of course 18 not. But she knew, she knew there's no recording, so she's 19 dishonest with you about what happened during that visit. 20 We asked Mr. Yousry about the visit as well. What did 21 he tell you? Well, he said, hmm, nothing about a ceasefire 22 there. No, we didn't talk about that. Obviously. 23 Where did Mr. Sattar get the information to tell Hamza 24 and Taha about the message? Where did he get it from? He got 25 it from them, Stewart and Yousry, they were there. He knows SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11180 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 full well that's where it came from. What does he tell you in 2 his testimony? He told you, oh, gee, when we asked about 3 political parties, that was because it was for my dissertation 4 and gee, Mr. Jabara, one of the other lawyers got some letter 5 some time beforehand and Jabara asked me to clarify that. 6 Nonsense. Nonsense. It's there in the evidence. 7 They passed messages through Sattar to them, including Taha's 8 message. And both Yousry and Stewart were dishonest with you, 9 concealed from you the fact that what they -- those messages 10 included was a call by Taha to resume the violence. That's 11 what they did. They were dishonest with you. 12 In fact, it got so bad with Yousry in his testimony 13 and being dishonest with you that when he was confronted -- and 14 we're going to put up for you another one of Mr. Yousry's 15 exhibits, OK. This is Mr. Yousry's Exhibit 550LT4, and it's 16 from his dissertation. And he is asked, he was asked about, as 17 I said we asked him about what messages came in that day during 18 that visit, what came out that day. Here's what he wrote in 19 his dissertation: On March 2, 1999 -- it's in front of you -- 20 well, March 2, 1999 is one of the second days of the visit, but 21 he's very specific in his dissertation. 22 On that day the Sheikh was asked to reconsider his 23 position by leaders who oppose the initiative. 24 Taha. 25 He replied, quote, Let's wait and see what they would SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11181 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 accomplish before reconsidering our position. 2 On the same day, he was asked by Mr. Kamal Habib and 3 Gamal Sultan about forming a Muslim party and competing in the 4 election. This made the Sheikh angry. He kept asking God to 5 give him patience and replied, no, citing several reasons, we 6 were discuss in detail when Sheikh and democracy. 7 Well, there he is writing his dissertation what 8 actually happened on the day of the visit. And if there's any 9 question as to whether he was there, Mr. Yousry was there on 10 March 2, 1999, all you need to look at is Government 11 Exhibit 306, which is the form Mr. Yousry filled out before he 12 was allowed to enter the facility on the day of that visit. 13 It's dated March 2, 1999. It's got his name on it and his 14 signature. He's there. And that's why he writes that in his 15 dissertation. When he's confronted with the fact that these 16 messages were passed that day, he goes, oh, no, that didn't 17 happen that day, that's a mistake. 18 Nonsense. It happened that day. You know it happened 19 that day. And perhaps, more significantly, you know once again 20 that Yousry and Stewart were dishonest with you. 21 Well, what happens? Taha and Sattar send their 22 message in but they don't accomplish what they had hoped to 23 accomplish. They don't get Abdel Rahman's support. But 24 there's always another visit. And what they do on the next 25 visit is the same thing. September 1999, prison visit. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11182 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Now, the difference here was that Stewart's not on the 2 visit, she's not there. This time Ramsey Clark goes on the 3 visit. Ramsey Clark is on the visit with Yousry. And what's 4 the significance of this visit? Well, this is real 5 significant, OK. Once again, Taha sends in his message looking 6 for Abdel Rahman to support him in ending the ceasefire. And 7 what happens is -- and we'll get to it -- Abdel Rahman issues a 8 very strong statement supporting Taha. Something else happens. 9 Ramsey Clark refuses, refuses to issue a press release based on 10 Abdel Rahman's response. He refuses to. He refused to, as 11 you'll see, for legal reasons. Legal reasons. And you know 12 what they are: Doing such a thing is a clear violation of the 13 SAMs. More significantly, doing so is a criminal act. That's 14 why he refuses. 15 Let's go to the evidence. Again, this is not a 16 recorded visit. So the way we learn about this visit and what 17 happened on this visit, what preceded the visit is to go to the 18 recordings that preceded it. 19 Something very important in this case happens during 20 this visit. And that is -- or before the visit, I should say, 21 and that is a man named Farid Kidwani is caught by the Egyptian 22 authorities and killed. Farid Kidwani. 23 Now, if you're thinking, did we hear his voice on any 24 of these recordings or did we see his name on any of these 25 transcripts, the answer is no. You didn't. But you did learn SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11183 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Farid Kidwani, at the time, was the head of the military wing 2 of the Islamic Group. And he was in Egypt. 3 Now, the head of a military wing sounds kind of 4 official, you know, like secretary of defense, state department 5 secretary, minister of this, minister of that. But the leader 6 of a military wing in an organization, a terrorist 7 organization, he's the guy in charge of orchestrating and 8 carrying out planning the terrorist acts. They call that 9 military. But it's simply what you know as acts of terrorism. 10 And that's what he was responsible for and in charge of. And 11 his name's going to pop up again when we talk about Mr. Atia 12 later in the case. 13 But what you learn, what you learn from Mr. Sattar's 14 testimony and from the recordings that precede this 15 September 18, 1999 visit is that when Sattar and Taha learn 16 that Kidwani gets killed, they are upset and they are angry and 17 they have more impetus to obtain Abdel Rahman's support, more 18 impetus to end the ceasefire and resume the violence and 19 killing. 20 Sattar tells you he was angry in his own testimony. 21 And then you also get it from recordings, recordings that we 22 introduced to you during the course of the testimony. And they 23 all seem to occur on one day, September 13, 1999, which was 24 five days before the visit. 25 In Government Exhibit1023X Sattar is talking to Hamza, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11184 4CTESAT3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 and they're talking about the Kidwani killing. And Sattar 2 clearly indicates he is upset and unhappy about it. 3 And then there's Government Exhibit 1027X, which is a 4 conversation that Sattar -- actually a call that Sattar 5 connects Taha to Muntasir Al-Zayat on. And Taha and Al-Zayat 6 discuss the Kidwani killing and Taha is upset. I'm not going 7 to read actually the quote for you, it will take a little bit 8 too much time. But he's very upset during the course of that 9 conversation. He says about himself that he has been staying 10 home -- let me read you a little bit of the quote. 11 And he says -- in referring to himself he says, he no 12 longer can do anything, something on this effect, for your 13 information, I have nothing to do with anything since the Luxor 14 incident; which of course is the Luxor massacre. 15 He is unhappy with the fact that other leaders are 16 supporting the ceasefire. And he asks at the end of part of 17 his conversation with Al-Zayat, how long are we going to 18 continue with what we have now? What they have now is the 19 ceasefire. 20 He is upset. He is angry. He wants an end to the 21 ceasefire, and the killing of Kidwani by government forces has 22 just made it worse. 23 (Continued on next page) 24 25 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11185 4CT5SAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 MR. DEMBER: And so, on that very same day in Exhibit 2 1025X, Taha talks to Sattar and he says to him, Taha says to 3 Sattar to, quote, deliver the things you have to Abdel Rahman. 4 Well, the things he has is, as always, Taha's messages 5 to get Abdel Rahman to support him. 6 And in a conversation also on that very same day, 7 September 13, 1999, Taha tells Sattar that if Abdel Rahman 8 issues the desired statement favorable to Taha, quote, frankly 9 this will strengthen him among the brothers, the other brothers 10 whom support the cease-fire, this will strengthen Taha with 11 them, get them to side with Taha, side with an end to the 12 cease-fire and resumption of the violence. 13 What happens is there is the visit -- and it's not 14 recorded so we don't have any transcripts. We don't have any 15 videotape for you. But Sattar told you -- he prepared his 16 usual letter with Taha's message in it, gave it to Yousry and 17 the attorney and they went in. And what you will learn from 18 the calls that follow the visit is that Ramsey Clark and Yousry 19 delivered Taha's message. How do we know? Because we just go 20 to the recordings and transcripts that follow the visit. 21 On September 19th, 1999, the day after the visit -- it 22 was only a one-day visit now -- in Government Exhibit 1028X 23 Sattar and Yousry have a brief telephone conversation. And 24 Sattar asks Yousry, who is just back from the visit where the 25 visit was fruitful, and Yousry's response was, yes, very. And SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11186 4CT5SAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 that Ramsey Clark had discussed everything with him, meaning 2 Abdel Rahman. 3 And the next day, it was expected, by Yousry and 4 Sattar, that Abdel Rahman was going to -- excuse me, Clark was 5 going to issue a statement to the media announcing what Abdel 6 Rahman had told him during the visit. And you know that 7 because of Government Exhibit 1029X, a conversation on 8 September 20th, 1999, in which Sattar spoke with Taha. And he 9 tells him, he reports to Taha on the visit by Clark and Yousry. 10 He told him it was a one-day visit, it was useful, and that 11 Clark -- the lawyer, has says, will issue a statement today 12 about his -- meaning Abdel Rahman's -- feelings about the 13 general situation, which is the cease-fire. 14 And then Sattar reads to Abdel Rahman -- excuse me, 15 reads to Taha Abdel Rahman's statement. And it's here in the 16 exhibit, we have it up there for you. Let me read it for you. 17 This is Abdel Rahman's statement in response to Taha's message 18 from this visit: 19 The Islamic Group has committed itself to the 20 suspension of operations initiative which was launched two 21 years ago by the brothers from their jails in spite of the 22 Egyptian government's continued killing of the innocent people 23 and conducting unjust military trials. This initiative was 24 made to protect the Muslims and to unify all the lines to face 25 the real enemies of the nation. However, the initiative left SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11187 4CT5SAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 some people thinking that it was initiated out of weakness or 2 an abandonment of the fundamental principles of the group, 3 which is basically a Da'wa jihad group. The latest thing 4 published in the newspapers was about the Egyptian regime's 5 killing of four members of the group. This is -- this is 6 enough proof that the Egyptian regime does not have the 7 intention to interact with this peaceful initiative which aims 8 at unification. I, therefore, demand that my brothers, the 9 sons of the Islamic Group, do a comprehensive review of the 10 initiative and its results. I also demand that they consider 11 themselves absolved from it. 12 Absolved from what? Absolved from the initiative. 13 Abdel Rahman is saying to members of the Islamic Group 14 and Taha, they are no longer bound by this cease-fire. They 15 are absolved of it, he says. 16 That's exactly what Taha and Sattar had been trying to 17 get Abdel Rahman to say. He is saying it. They are where they 18 want to be, just about, except for one thing. What they need 19 is somebody other than themselves to say Abdel Rahman is saying 20 these things. They need it to be said publicly. And, as I 21 just mentioned, Sattar tells Taha that he believes that Clark 22 will be issuing a press release with what I have just read to 23 you in it, Abdel Rahman's view of the cease-fire. 24 But something happens. Clark decides, as he should, 25 as he did, he can't do such a thing. It violates the SAMs. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11188 4CT5SAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 More significantly, it would be criminal to do so. And Clark 2 refuses to do it. 3 And Sattar tells Yousry about this in Government 4 Exhibit 1030X. We are going to put that up there for you, just 5 a segment of it. Here is the exchange. 6 Sattar speaks and he says, I believe it's -- he 7 says -- first of all, he tells -- Sattar tells Yousry Clark 8 refuses to issue a statement. And then Sattar tells Yousry, he 9 probably figured it out from its legal angle. 10 That's okay. If he sees it this way, fine. I thought 11 he was going to put these words in a communique and send it to 12 the press or something. 13 And then Yousry responds: He should have written to 14 the press. 15 And Sattar responds: I don't believe is he going to 16 do that. And I am not going to do that either. 17 Take a look at this transcript. I am not going to 18 read it all for you; that would take too long. Take a look at 19 this transcript when you start your deliberations. 20 What is fascinating about this conversation is this: 21 If you read it -- and there is two sections of it where this is 22 quite evident -- while Sattar is saying, no, he is not going to 23 do it, I'm not going to ask him to do it any further, Yousry -- 24 remember him, I'm just the translator? Remember him, I only do 25 what the lawyers tell me to do? Remember all that testimony? SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11189 4CT5SAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Yousry is trying to convince Sattar to get Clark to issue this 2 press release. He is not satisfied that Clark won't do it. He 3 is not satisfied and says things like, well, I'm going to see 4 Clark in a day or so and I will talk to him. Abdel Rahman 5 wants this issued. 6 When we have the next legal call, he will tell him 7 that. Yousry is not satisfied. Yousry, who told you that he 8 only did what the lawyers said could be done, is trying to 9 convince Sattar that Clark should be issuing this press 10 release, when Sattar says to him he ain't doing it and I'm not 11 going to make him do it. 12 So much for just being a translator. 13 Well, what becomes crystal clear from this visit -- 14 crystal clear, remember, this is September 1999 -- is that both 15 Sattar and Yousry know and understand that issuing a press 16 release with Abdel Rahman's statements and messages in it 17 causes legal problems, violates the SAMs, violates the criminal 18 law. 19 Now, there is a real interesting exhibit that both of 20 those two people, both of these defendants have their hands on, 21 their hands in. It is Exhibit 2312-40 and 40T, the 22 translation. We will put it on the screen first. Going to the 23 bottom of the exhibit first, and it's apparently a letter. It 24 is a letter. Not apparently, it's a letter, and it is from Abu 25 Omar. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11190 4CT5SAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Who is Abu Omar? Sattar is Abu Omar. That's Sattar. 2 And it's dated 9/21/1999. That is three days after the visit 3 and around the time that Sattar had his conversation with Taha 4 saying, the words from Abdel Rahman are good, and they're 5 coming. And he is going to issue a press -- and Clark is going 6 to issue a press release. Okay. 7 Let's go to the top of the letter now. 8 Oh, by the way, it is a letter found in Yousry's home, 9 Sattar's letter found in Yousry's home during the search, okay? 10 And you can tell from the upper left-hand corner the 11 reason it is in Yousry's home is because it was approved for 12 reading by Ramsey Clark, clearly to Abdel Rahman, at some point 13 in time after 9/21/2000, on that day or maybe sometime 14 afterwards. 15 So, this letter from Sattar in Yousry's home was read 16 to Abdel Rahman. 17 Who is it addressed to? Beloved brother. Well, the 18 beloved brother is Taha, and here is how you know: Let's read 19 the first paragraph, skipping the first line, and go down to 20 the next paragraph. Here is what it says: 21 I met with the male lawyer today. 22 Who is that? 23 Sattar met with Ramsey Clark; he says. 24 As I told you this morning, he will issue a statement 25 to express the disappointment of the Sheikh and what is SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11191 4CT5SAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 happening in Egypt and at the initiative. Stop. 2 That's the conversation I just described for you 3 between Sattar and Taha where Sattar says Clark is going to 4 issue a communique, a press release that day on Abdel Rahman's 5 statement. That's what he is saying here to Taha. 6 Let's read further: But after the meeting and in 7 light of the discussion of the issue from all sides, 8 calculating the pros and cons here at least, we elected not to 9 issue this statement. It can cause a negative reaction, 10 particularly from the legal side here. 11 Bingo. Bingo. Not only has Sattar told Yousry in 12 that conversation I just talked about that Clark is not doing 13 it because of the legal angle; Sattar, in his letter to Taha -- 14 that's who he is referring to the conversation he had with him 15 where he said it is going to be issued, Taha he is writing to. 16 He is telling Taha, even though I told you it is going to be 17 issued, it is not going to be issued because of the legal side 18 here, which is it violates the SAMs. It's a criminal act. It 19 can't be issued. Clark won't do it. Clark won't do it. 20 This is a letter Yousry read. He read it to Abdel 21 Rahman at some point in time, obviously in '99 or in 2000, 22 early, but more likely '99. Why? Because Abdel Rahman 23 expected his statement to be published, put out there in the 24 media for all to know. 25 And it's Sattar's letter, so they both know, having SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11192 4CT5SAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 read this letter and Sattar having created the letter, it's 2 illegal to be making Abdel Rahman's statements or issuing Abdel 3 Rahman's statements to the press. It's criminal to be issuing 4 a statement in which Abdel Rahman says, essentially -- not 5 essentially -- the Islamic Group is absolved of the cease-fire, 6 no longer bound by the cease-fire. Because what that means is 7 what preceded the cease-fire is the violence and killings, and 8 that's what they can now return to. That's what Abdel Rahman 9 is saying. And both of these defendants know it. 10 There is one more interesting part of this letter you 11 should look at, it's item number six. Remember, this is Sattar 12 writing to Taha. 13 And he says: He understands your position. 14 Well, the "he" is Abdel Rahman. 15 He understands your position and point of view. He is 16 in total agreement with you. 17 Abdel Rahman is in total agreement with Taha. 18 He thanks you and prays a lot for you. He tells 19 you -- and this is the kicker -- do whatever you think is 20 appropriate. 21 Telling Taha to do whatever he thinks is appropriate 22 is further confirmation that Abdel Rahman is saying, end the 23 cease-fire, return to the violence and the killing. 24 And then the next line is, point number six was said 25 as personal, this is why I didn't include it with what I read SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11193 4CT5SAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 to you this morning. 2 That's why when I read you that portion that I read to 3 you, that wasn't in it, because Sattar says that was personal. 4 He is sending it to him in the letter. 5 Well, as I said, both these defendants understand full 6 well what could and couldn't be issued with Abdel Rahman's 7 statements. 8 Interesting, when Mr. Yousry testified, do you 9 remember what he said about this visit? Think hard. Well, 10 don't think so hard because if you think hard and you have a 11 really great memory, an incredible memory, you are going to 12 remember he said nothing about this visit. He avoided it like 13 the plague. And why did Yousry avoid this visit like the 14 plague? Because part of his defense is, gee, I just follow 15 what the lawyers do and follow their directions. 16 Well, number one, not true. The phone call I referred 17 to, he is trying to convince Sattar to go back to Ramsey Clark 18 and convince him to issue the press release. 19 Maybe more significantly, or a significant part of his 20 defense is, my goodness -- and he said this -- I didn't know 21 there was anything wrong with issuing press releases with Abdel 22 Rahman's statements in them until June of 2000, or after he 23 issued that press release in June of 2000 announcing Abdel 24 Rahman's withdrawal of the support for the cease-fire. And 25 then all that trouble happened because of it, meaning Lynne SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11194 4CT5SAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Stewart being cut off from Abdel Rahman. 2 It wasn't until then that he told you that he realized 3 hmm, I guess we can't be issuing statements to the media with 4 Abdel Rahman's statements. 5 Well, the reason he avoided talking about this 6 particular visit is because this puts the lie to that claim 7 that he made. He knew at the very least by the end of this 8 visit and the days that followed it, that issuing statements to 9 the press with Abdel Rahman's statements in them was a no-no. 10 You couldn't do it. You couldn't do it. It was illegal and it 11 violated the SAMs. 12 There is one other really important part of this visit 13 that's significant, and that is what you learn about what 14 Ramsey Clark thought about Abdel Rahman's statement and the 15 thought of issuing a press release with his statement in it, 16 and that is this: Clearly, Ramsey Clark didn't think that 17 issuing a statement to the press with Abdel Rahman's statement 18 in it where he is saying, okay, end the cease-fire, end the 19 cease-fire, you are absolved of being bound, you are no longer 20 bound by the cease-fire; issuing a statement like that, Ramsey 21 Clark clearly didn't believe had anything to do with his 22 lawyering on behalf of Abdel Rahman. It had nothing to do with 23 his view of vigorously representing and defending Abdel Rahman. 24 It had nothing to do with any legal issue or matter that he 25 could possibly be representing Abdel Rahman on, clearly. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11195 4CT5SAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 It also indicates that he, clearly -- clearly -- 2 didn't think there was some magical bubble out there in which 3 we lawyers operate under where they could do whatever they 4 wanted to do and issue statements from Abdel Rahman that had 5 nothing to do with -- that had certainly something to do with 6 violence. He didn't believe that. He didn't operate under 7 some bubble. That's because the bubble in this case that you 8 heard about is a total fabrication. 9 He understood full well if his goal, Stewart's goal, 10 their goal was to get Abdel Rahman transferred back to Egypt, 11 issuing a statement from Abdel Rahman, besides being illegal, 12 evidence of a crime, violation of the SAMs, was totally 13 contrary to that goal. 14 If you issue a statement from Abdel Rahman saying 15 Abdel Rahman supports violence against the Egyptian government, 16 the Egyptian government is not going to take him back. They 17 don't want any part of him. That would totally defeat that 18 objective. 19 And certainly Ramsey Clark, who had spent what he 20 described as significant efforts trying to get the Egyptian 21 government trying to take Abdel Rahman back, wasn't going to 22 issue a statement where Abdel Rahman wants to engage in 23 violence and wants violence to be revived against that 24 government. It would be ridiculous. 25 Well, what do you have at the end of this visit? SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11196 4CT5SAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Well, before the visit you had Sattar and Taha in their 2 conspiracy. They're working together to end the cease-fire. 3 Important to them is they've got a new member to the 4 conspiracy, Abdel Rahman. He has joined forces with them. Not 5 physically; he can't get out of jail. But that's what we talk 6 about when we talk about a jail break. He is with them. He is 7 part of the conspiracy. And they know his words, his support, 8 mean everything because he is powerful. He is influential, and 9 they now have him in their camp. 10 Not only that, when they announce, when they finally 11 can announce to the world Abdel Rahman no longer supports the 12 cease-fire, it's a great tool to convince others within the 13 group to join their forces. And that's what they're doing. 14 Let me at least start with the next visit. The next 15 visit is very short, or what I have to say about it is very 16 short, thank goodness. It's the February 2000 prison visit. 17 Now, what you have learned up to this point is now 18 Sattar and Taha have Abdel Rahman on their side, but that's not 19 good enough. 20 Taha and Sattar are saying to the world, oh, Abdel 21 Rahman is with us now. He's against the cease-fire. He wants 22 to resume the violence. It isn't going to mean very much. 23 People will accuse him, as you later learn, accuse Sattar of 24 being a spy and falsifying information. Taha is a known 25 proponent of violence and returning to the murders and SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11197 4CT5SAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 killings. So his saying it doesn't have any credibility. They 2 need somebody. And who can it be? Other than a lawyer 3 representing Abdel Rahman, to announce to the world Abdel 4 Rahman is no longer supporting the cease-fire, that's what they 5 need. 6 Ramsey Clark isn't going to do it. He refuses to do 7 it. So, there is the next visit, the next attempt by Taha and 8 Sattar to get a lawyer to get the word out. 9 Unfortunately for them, the person going on their 10 visit is Abdeen Jabara. And it is a visit that takes place on 11 February 18th and 19th of 2000. It is a two-day visit. 12 The second day of the visit is the day when, with 13 Court authorization, the visit is recorded. It is, I believe, 14 only audio recorded, so you only have sound. We didn't play it 15 for you. It is mostly in Arabic, so it doesn't serve a purpose 16 to play it for you. We read the transcript to you. 17 What is the significance of this visit? Well, two 18 things, two things these defendants learned: One is Mr. Jabara 19 refused -- refused to issue a statement to the media on behalf 20 of Abdel Rahman, with his statement calling for an end to the 21 cease-fire or withdrawing his support for the cease-fire. 22 Refused to do it. 23 What he also refused to do during the course of the 24 visit was when Abdel Rahman wanted to dictate a letter to the 25 Islamic Group, he refused to allow it to happen. He refused to SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11198 4CT5SAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 allow it to happen. 2 Obviously Yousry is with him once again, and he 3 understands, quite clearly, what happened. 4 Now, prior to the visit there are a few calls of note 5 that indicate what was happening and what was sought in that 6 visit. And Mr. Sattar told you in his testimony that he 7 prepared his usual letter to Abdel Rahman with Taha's message 8 in it to be read to him, including Taha's message which was 9 asking, once again, for Abdel Rahman's support in opposing the 10 cease-fire. 11 And in Government Exhibit 1051X, a conversation on 12 January 29th, 2000, Taha told Sattar, quote, the poetry line I 13 told you about long ago will be good for the man in your area, 14 that he wants his greetings conveyed and that poetry, if he 15 could confirm it. 16 Well, we know Taha is an author, but he is really not 17 a poet, not from the writings that you can feel free to look 18 at, Exhibit 2700 and 2700T. He is not a poet. The poetry 19 lines are obviously a code for, you know, end the cease-fire, 20 resume the violence. Send the message in again, we need his 21 support, we need it announced. That's what it is. 22 And in February -- Government Exhibit 1053X, which is 23 a February 3rd, 2000, conversation, Taha talks to Sattar again. 24 And he tells Taha in that conversation, which is a couple weeks 25 before the visit, he says to him. He lets him know there is SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11199 4CT5SAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 going to be a visit in two weeks, Sattar tells Taha that. And 2 he says, quote, so before that the things should be sent -- in 3 other words, send your messages to me, what you want me to 4 correspond to, and tell Abdel Rahman so I can put in my letter, 5 you know, so that the lawyer and translator, Yousry, can take 6 it to the visit and give your message to Abdel Rahman. 7 And in the subsequent call on May 7th, Government 8 Exhibit 1059X on February 7th, 2000, Taha tells Sattar that he 9 is certainly looking to increase the pressure on the Egyptian 10 government. And of course he wants Abdel Rahman's support. 11 Now, as I mentioned, there is two days to the visits. 12 And the first day is not recorded, but Mr. Yousry was nice 13 enough to tell us what happened, at least for a small part of 14 that visit. And what Mr. Yousry said, or what Mr. Yousry said 15 in his testimony was at some point in that first day, he tells 16 you, Abdel Rahman says to Jabara, Mr. Jabara -- that he wants 17 Mr. Jabara to have a press conference after the visit and 18 announce Abdel Rahman's views of the cease-fire. 19 Well, you know what his views are now. Well, why is 20 he asking Jabara to do it? He clearly had asked Clark to do it 21 on the previous visit. The reason he is now asking Jabara to 22 do it is because sometime before this visit, the last letter I 23 read to you -- this is the letter from Sattar to Taha telling 24 Taha that Clark will not issue the press release for legal 25 reasons -- this was read, clearly, to Abdel Rahman before the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11200 4CT5SAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 February 2000 visit. 2 And that's why he is asking Jabara, because Clark 3 won't do it, he wants Jabara to do it. Abdel Rahman knows that 4 this Government Exhibit 2312-40 and 2312-40T, he knows that 5 Clark refused to issue the press release and, therefore, he 6 wants Jabara to do it. And Abdel Rahman knows, because Yousry 7 read the letter to him. It says approved. And Yousry read the 8 letter to Abdel Rahman sometime before this visit. 9 And what is Jabara's response? Absolutely no. Will 10 not do it. 11 And in the second day, it is clear why he is not doing 12 it. He tells us in the second day during that call -- during 13 the visit -- and it is recorded -- that he had a conversation 14 with Ramsey Clark before the visit. And Clark told him, don't 15 do anything during this visit. Don't agree to do anything 16 during this visit that will get you removed or will result in 17 you being removed from the list of attorneys who can visit 18 Abdel Rahman, like, for example, issuing press releases with 19 Abdel Rahman's statements in it. 20 So, that doesn't happen. Now, of course, when Jabara 21 tells Abdel Rahman, I'm not issuing, I'm not holding a press 22 conference and I'm not issuing a statement, this is nothing new 23 to Yousry. This is further confirmation that -- Mr. Yousry 24 knows that lawyers are not going to issue Abdel Rahman's views 25 of the cease-fire, which obviously he no longer thinks it SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11201 4CT5SAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 should be in effect and the Islamic Group should return to 2 violence and killings, because it is illegal. It is violation 3 of an act, violation of the SAMs, and Yousry knows that because 4 he knew it after what happened in September of 1999 after that 5 visit and Clark's refusal. So, this is nothing new. 6 On the second day there is not a lot that happens, but 7 here is what does happen. 8 At some point during the visit Mr. Jabara goes and 9 gets some coffee. And when he does that, Abdel Rahman says to 10 Yousry that he can't translate to Jabara. He can't dictate a 11 letter with Jabara being there. 12 Now, what you know about Mr. Jabara is he speaks 13 Arabic, okay? And clearly what Abdel Rahman wanted to do was 14 dictate a letter that Jabara was not going to allow to be 15 delivered, probably that letter to the Islamic Group, to the 16 Islamic Group talking about his view of resuming the violence 17 in Egypt. 18 So, Abdel Rahman tells this to Yousry. And what 19 happens is when Jabara gets back with his coffee, it's time for 20 Abdel Rahman to go to the mens' room, and so he leaves. And at 21 that point Yousry says to Jabara, and we have it up there on 22 the screen, it's Government Exhibit 1701X, page 34, lines 3 23 through 9. You can follow along or just listen to me read it. 24 He says: Mr. Abdeen, when you went to ask them about 25 the coffee -- he, meaning Abdel Rahman, told me he wants to SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11202 4CT5SAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 dictate a letter to Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya. 2 And now that you are experts -- and Jabara's response 3 is no. The response is simply, no. There is no further 4 discussion at that point. 5 Now that you are experts in Arabic, you know that 6 Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya is Arabic for the Islamic Group, okay, 7 the terrorist organization we have been talking about. 8 And Jabara says, quite simply, no. Absolutely, no. 9 It's not going to happen. 10 Because he knows full well that Abdel Rahman can't be 11 communicating with the Islamic Group or terrorists or, for that 12 matter, lots of people where he wants to communicate terrorist 13 messages. 14 And what happens is at that point, or a moment or two 15 later, Jabara says to Yousry that he talked to Clark about this 16 before the visit, and Ramsey Clark said he couldn't do anything 17 to get cut off from the visits; meaning Jabara can't do 18 anything to get cut off from the visits. And Yousry's response 19 to Jabara was, quote, absolutely, no. You're right. 20 Yousry doesn't challenge Jabara and say to him, I 21 don't understand. Why can't Abdel Rahman write a letter to the 22 Islamic Group. Isn't it permissible? Why doesn't Yousry ask 23 that question? Why does he say, oh, absolutely, you're right? 24 Because Yousry knows full well by that time, certainly, that 25 Abdel Rahman can't be writing letters to the Islamic Group. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11203 4CT5SAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 If there is anyone in the world or any group of people 2 he can't be writing to is a convicted terrorist writing to a 3 designated terrorist organization. That's a big no-no. He 4 can't be doing that sort of thing. And Yousry knows this and 5 doesn't challenge him on it. In fact, he agrees with him just, 6 once again, proving that Yousry knows exactly what can and 7 can't be done under the SAMs. 8 Now, after the visit in -- let me try to finish up 9 before we take the lunch break, if we can. 10 THE COURT: Whenever is convenient. 11 MR. DEMBER: Let me try to visit this visit up if I 12 can. 13 After the visit there is a number of recorded meetings 14 and in them Sattar is livid. He is angry because Jabara won't 15 let Abdel Rahman dictate a letter to the Islamic Group. And 16 Jabara won't let Abdel -- he won't issue a press release, a 17 statement to the press with Abdel Rahman's statement in it, and 18 he is angry at Jabara because of it. And he testified to that 19 effect here in court. 20 Government Exhibit 1062X, a February 28th, 2000, 21 conversation, Sattar tells Hamza about the visit. And he says 22 that Jabara was scared during the visit. But he reminds 23 Hamza -- by the way, Abdel Rahman agrees with Taha's view of 24 the cease-fire. He just throws that in. 25 He also leads Hamza to believe, Sattar leads Hamza to SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11204 4CT5SAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 believe that Sattar could have been on the visit as well. He 2 misleads him into believing that he could have been there, but 3 it made no difference because the lawyer controls what goes on 4 during the visit, another example of Mr. Sattar being dishonest 5 to somebody else. 6 And he says, Sattar tells Hamza that Jabara said he 7 would not allow Abdel Rahman to respond to the Islamic Group 8 because he had signed papers, meaning Jabara had signed papers, 9 meaning the attorney affirmations. And if the government, 10 quote, felt anything like this, they can terminate all visits. 11 They'd cancel everything. So he said, no, I can't risk 12 something like this, proving once again that Sattar knows what 13 can and can't be done under the SAMs. 14 And Sattar tells Hamza, quote, I am very angry with 15 him. 16 Well, what did you learn about this visit? Well, like 17 Ramsey Clark -- like Ramsey Clark, Abdeen Jabara understands 18 that both issuing a press release with Abdel Rahman's statement 19 and views of the cease-fire is -- and also allowing Abdel 20 Rahman to write to the Islamic Group has nothing to do with 21 being a good lawyer and lawyering, in general. 22 It also proves, by Mr. Jabara refusing to do those two 23 things, that neither issuing a press release or allowing Abdel 24 Rahman to write to the Islamic Group has anything to do with 25 vigorously representing or defending a client like Abdel SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11205 4CT5SAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Rahman. And it has nothing to do with any legal issues or any 2 legal matters having to do with Abdel Rahman. And this 3 so-called bubble that we heard about from Ms. Stewart certainly 4 didn't exist in the world of Ramsey Clark and Abdeen Jabara. 5 While she told you, we heard testimony that the 6 lawyers all operated in this bubble that we could issue these 7 press releases with these statements in it, these are two clear 8 examples of where they weren't going to do that, they didn't 9 live in that mythical world that she lived in because, frankly, 10 it didn't exist. The bubble was a fabrication. 11 And what Clark did after the September 1999 visit, 12 what Jabara had refused to do at the February 2000 visit only 13 confirms further that that bubble that Stewart testified about, 14 that the SAMs didn't prevent her from issuing statements from 15 Abdel Rahman because it was lawyering, is nonsense. 16 Well, where do we find ourselves after this visit? We 17 find ourselves as follows: 18 Sattar and Taha clearly still have Abdel Rahman's 19 support but they still need that support and Abdel Rahman's 20 statements to be made public, to be issued so that one, they 21 can now act with credibility in trying to end the cease-fire 22 and resume violence; they can recruit others to join them in 23 ending the cease-fire and resuming violence; and they are, 24 again, continuing to conspire or to engage in a conspiracy I 25 should say, to commit murder, conspiring to murder and kidnap SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11206 4CT5SAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 others outside the United States. 2 Thanks to Abdeen Jabara and Ramsey Clark, Sattar and 3 Taha have come close but they still haven't got what they 4 really want. But there is always the May 2000 visit, the 5 fourth time. The fourth visit, as you well know now, turned 6 out to be the charm. And that's where it happened. As you 7 know, from all the evidence in this case, that was and is 8 probably the most pivotal event in this case. 9 Your Honor, is it time for lunch at this point? 10 THE COURT: Yes. 11 MR. DEMBER: Okay, we will pick up from there after 12 lunch. 13 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, we will break for 14 lunch. Please remember to follow my continuing instructions. 15 When we broke earlier today I gave you a lengthy 16 instruction in which I explained to you why it is so important 17 to follow my instructions. It's not likely that I will give 18 that lengthy instruction each time but you should apply it each 19 time, it is so very important. Please, don't talk about this 20 case at all and always remember to keep an open mind until I 21 have finally instructed you on the law and you have gone to the 22 jury room to begin your deliberations. 23 We will break for lunch until 2:15. Have a very good 24 lunch and I look forward to seeing you after lunch. 25 All rise, please. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11207 4CT5SAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 (Jury not present) 2 THE COURT: While the jury is leaving, I asked my 3 deputy to turn the temperature down a bit in the courtroom, it 4 is a bit warm. 5 Have a good lunch. Please be back at five after 2:00. 6 Have a good lunch. 7 (Luncheon recess) 8 (Continued on next page) 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11211 4CTESAT5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 (Pages 11208 through 11210 sealed by order of the 2 Court) 3 (In open court; jury present) 4 THE COURT: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. 5 Good to see you all. 6 All right. Mr. Dember, you may proceed. 7 MR. DEMBER: Thank you, your Honor. 8 Ladies and gentlemen, when we left off, we started to 9 talk about the May 2000 visit. Let me clarify one thing, which 10 should be clear to all of you at this point. By September of 11 1999, not only was Sattar and Taha a partnership involved and 12 connected in their conspiracy to commit murder; by that time, 13 but after that September 1999 visit, they were joined in a 14 conspiracy by Omar Abdel Rahman, whose statement issued to 15 Ramsey Clark and Yousry during that visit made it quite clear 16 that he had joined their view that the ceasefire, in fact, 17 should be ended and that the violence and the killing should 18 resume again, and that is why he said when he said that the 19 Islamic Group was absolved from the ceasefire and the 20 initiative, that's what he meant. 21 So, by September of 1999 is the three of them: 22 Sattar, Taha and Abdel Rahman, in a conspiracy to murder and 23 kidnap persons outside the United States. 24 As I mentioned before the break, the May 2000 visit 25 was perhaps and is the pivotal event in this case. It is the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11212 4CTESAT5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 pivotal event, as you well know by now because, once again, 2 messages from Taha were sent in to Abdel Rahman during the 3 course of that visit and Abdel Rahman, again, issued a 4 statement in support of Taha. And you know full well now that 5 after that visit Stewart and Sattar and Yousry issued a press 6 release; what Taha and Sattar needed to announce to the world 7 that, in fact, Abdel Rahman was now with them, supported them, 8 was a part of their conspiracy and gave them the justification 9 they needed and the authority to end the ceasefire and resume 10 the violence and killing. 11 As you well know, the visit itself took place on 12 May 19th and 20th. You know that Stewart and Yousry are the 13 ones who went. It was in Rochester, Minnesota. Again, it was 14 a two-day visit. And, as you well know, both days of the visit 15 were recorded. What happened during the course of the visit? 16 We're going to go through it with you now. 17 Let me summarize for you. You know at some point 18 during the visit on the first day it was brought to Abdel 19 Rahman's attention that a terrorist group in the Philippines 20 named Abu Sayyaf had taken hostages, innocent tourists, school 21 children, people of that sort, and was holding them. And as 22 part of their demands for the release of those hostages they 23 wanted the release of Abdel Rahman. And you heard, we'll play 24 for you again, that brief conversation in which Stewart 25 indicates her position on the taking of hostages and what that SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11213 4CTESAT5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 meant, and what it meant for Abdel Rahman's case. 2 You also know, of course, that Sattar's letter was 3 brought in to the prison with Taha's message. It was read to 4 Abdel Rahman. Abdel Rahman responded to it, once again 5 supporting Sattar and Taha. And you know during the course of 6 the visit because you saw it and it was read to you as well, 7 that during the course of the visit Stewart and Yousry took 8 action to distract the guards and conceal from the guards in 9 the prison what they were doing, bringing in a prohibited 10 message in Sattar's letter, a terroristic message that 11 obviously had the prison officials been able to read that 12 letter and review it would never have let it into the facility. 13 And what you also learned during the course of the evidence in 14 that case is that all three of the defendants were involved in, 15 of course, defrauding the United States by what they did. 16 This was, again, evidence of Defendant Sattar's 17 involvement in a conspiracy to murder and his solicitation of 18 crimes of violence and it was, in fact, once again, Stewart and 19 Yousry making or providing material support to the conspiracy 20 to murder and kidnap by making Abdel Rahman once again 21 available to Taha and Sattar in their conspiracy. 22 Well, as you know, prior to the visit, prior to the 23 visit -- actually, about a month before the visit itself the 24 latest version of the SAMs were issued and sent to Stewart. 25 They are under many numbers but I'll give you just one, it's SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11214 4CTESAT5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Exhibit 6, as well as other exhibits which were found in the 2 Stewart search with 2600-number numbers on them. And you know 3 that it was actually sent with a cover letter dated April 5, 4 2000, and accompanying the SAMs themselves was of course 5 attorney affirmations for Stewart to sign and review, which she 6 did. 7 Let me just review with you, to start with, Government 8 Exhibit 6 and a few of the provisions in the SAMs in effect. 9 Now, those SAMs had the date December 1999 on them. As you now 10 know quite firmly, the SAMs that were issued with dates of -- 11 in December 1999 were the final form; the SAMs reissued every 12 120 days after that contained exactly the same language and the 13 same provisions. And the first section I would refer to is 14 Exhibit -- is paragraph 3A, I've read that to you a couple of 15 times, and it's the sort of omnibus provision which makes clear 16 to all who read it that essentially nobody can communicate with 17 Abdel Rahman except as allowed in other parts of the SAMs 18 themselves. And we'll skip over to paragraph 7 which deal with 19 the mail, the mail itself, what can come in and what can't come 20 in and how it must be treated. 21 And one of the provisions, I don't even think we read 22 to you during the course of the trial but I'll read it to you 23 now, involves the mail. It actually mentions legal mail. And 24 it's 7A and 7A Roman numeral I, (i) or (ii) I should say, and 25 let me just read 7A(i) for you. And it says: In signing this SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11215 4CTESAT5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 SAM acknowledgement document -- which is the affirmation -- the 2 inmate's attorneys will acknowledge the restriction that only 3 inmate case-related correspondence prepared in their office 4 will be presented to the inmate, and that the attorneys will 5 not forward third-party mail that the inmate may present to the 6 attorneys. 7 Well, if you can't forward third-party mail, then 8 certainly Mr. Sattar's letter with Taha's message in it can't 9 come in to the visit. That's for certain. And that's crystal 10 clear in the remaining part of paragraph 7. 11 Paragraph 7B, I'll just summarize it for you, which we 12 have up there now, is the provisions that talk about the 13 screening process that must go through when anyone -- anyone -- 14 including Mr. Sattar, wants a letter sent in to Abdel Rahman or 15 any kind of correspondence sent to him. It requires the 16 screening that Stewart and Yousry had just decided they would 17 ignore. And, of course, at the very end in the last paragraph 18 of the SAMs is, as always, the section that explicitly says 19 that Abdel Rahman cannot communicate with the media by any 20 means, including through his attorneys. 21 Now, we're going to put up Exhibit 7 now, which is the 22 affirmation that Stewart signed. And interestingly enough, it 23 was signed by Stewart, and it's signed -- go to the very 24 bottom -- on May 16, 2000. As you know, that's three days 25 before the visit occurred that she signs it. And she promises SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11216 4CTESAT5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 in the first paragraph of the provision, which I'll summarize 2 for you instead of reading it, that essentially she's going 3 to -- she does promise to abide by all terms of the SAMs, which 4 is Exhibit 6 we just reviewed. 5 And then in paragraph 2 it's -- let me read it just 6 for you, it's not very long, she promises: I also understand 7 that during any visits to inmate Abdel Rahman at any prison 8 facilities I shall again employ only cleared 9 translators/interpreters and shall not leave such 10 translators/interpreters alone with inmate Abdel Rahman. 11 Moreover, I shall only be accompanied by translators for the 12 purpose of communicating with inmate Abdel Rahman concerning 13 legal matters. 14 Well, you folks all know that there is nothing in 15 Sattar's letter that would be considered legal matters. What 16 you know quite clearly by now is that Sattar's letter with 17 Taha's message involved illegal matters, criminal matters, 18 matters of terrorism, matters of ending a ceasefire and 19 resuming violence and killing. Nothing legal about that. 20 And by the way, when Stewart testified she at no time 21 tried to convince you or in any way offered an explanation how 22 Sattar's letter with Taha's message was in any way a legal 23 matter. It was not and you know it's not. 24 Let's go down to paragraph 3, if we can and I'll read 25 it briefly. Ms. Stewart says in that part of her affirmation: SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11217 4CTESAT5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 I further understand that neither I nor any member of my office 2 shall forward any mail received from inmate Abdel Rahman to a 3 third person. Nor shall I use my meetings, correspondence or 4 phone calls with Abdel Rahman to pass messages between third 5 parties (including, but not limited to, the media) and Abdel 6 Rahman. 7 And certainly when she issued the press release 8 several weeks later, she, in no uncertain terms, violated that 9 part of her promise. I won't go back and read the last 10 paragraph of the SAMs themselves, but even as Stewart conceded 11 and had to concede in her testimony, that paragraph prohibiting 12 her or anyone else from passing Abdel Rahman's statements and 13 messages and communications to the media was clear and 14 unambiguous. Her words. Clear and unambiguous. And this is 15 the promise she made to abide by those SAMs. 16 In fact, she testified, she considered her 17 affirmation, the affirmation she signed before that visit, 18 quote, I saw it as an oath. Yes, a promise to abide by the 19 plain language of the SAMs. And then she went on about a 20 little bubble. 21 Now, what did she promise to do? Just those things as 22 I mentioned. She promised to abide by the SAMs. And just to 23 jump ahead a little bit, and this is rather important, Stewart 24 never -- did not provide this affirmation to the government 25 prior to the visit. The visit again was on the 19th and 20th. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11218 4CTESAT5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 It was signed on the 16th. She told you she took it along with 2 her on the visit, no doubt, because if she was confronted at 3 the prison she wanted to show them, no, I've signed the most 4 current affirmation. 5 But what she did do, ten days after she signed it, was 6 mail it to the US Attorney's Office. And as you see, the 7 second page of Government Exhibit 7 -- and the actual Exhibit 7 8 is the original affirmation she signed with the original cover 9 letter, which is the second page of our exhibit here -- she 10 sent it to the US attorney's office ten days after she signed 11 it. And the significance of that is this: What she was saying 12 when she sent it -- because once she sends it to the US 13 Attorney's Office, it's her statement. It's her statement once 14 it's made to the US Attorney's Office when it's sent. If it's 15 only in her possession, she hasn't sent it yet. But once she 16 sends it, it's her statement to the US Attorney's Office and 17 United States government. And what is that statement? The 18 statement is, as of May 16th, the day she signs that promise 19 and oath, that affirmation, as of May 16th, I promise to abide 20 by the SAMs. All the provisions of the SAMs. 21 She knew full well on May 26th, when she sent it to 22 the US Attorney's Office with this cover letter, that she had 23 violated the SAMs in a whole bunch of ways. She knew that full 24 well. But her statement, as you look at it, the first page, 25 the affirmation itself, as of May 16th, because that's when she SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11219 4CTESAT5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 signs it and dates it, she has made that commitment and promise 2 to the US Attorney's Office saying, I have abided by these SAMs 3 as of May 16, 2000. And she sent it on the 26th of May knowing 4 full well that what she did on May 19th and 20th was violate 5 those SAMs in a whole bunch of ways. And you know it. 6 Now, before this visit, like all the other visits, 7 both Stewart and Yousry told you that they got Sattar's letter 8 from Mr. Sattar and other matters that Sattar wanted to present 9 to Abdel Rahman. Like all the other visits most -- all the 10 time Sattar's letter was always in Arabic. Not in English, 11 always in Arabic. And the other matters, materials that were 12 sent, were in Arabic. Sure, it's his native language, maybe he 13 prefers to use that, but it sure is easier to get such a 14 document and such documents past the guards when you come into 15 the prison when they knew full well that the guards don't speak 16 Arabic and don't read Arabic. So, whatever they're bringing in 17 is pretty safe, it's pretty safe to bring it in because, as 18 Stewart and Yousry knew, there were no Arabic speakers on 19 staff, they had to bring in translators or interpreters in on 20 occasion. 21 And what both Yousry and Stewart told you was, either 22 on the plane ride or in the airport or before they went to the 23 facility, Yousry translated all the materials, all the 24 correspondence to Stewart so she could approve or not approve 25 what would be read to him. And the translations they both said SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11220 4CTESAT5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 were verbatim, word for word. So you know before they go and 2 talk to Abdel Rahman on May 19th, both Stewart and Yousry know 3 quite well what's in Sattar's letter, and specifically, what 4 Taha's message is in Sattar's letter. 5 Well, they go on the visit and there's conversation 6 about Abu Sayyaf early on. Now, you know from a number of the 7 calls that Sattar had before the visit that -- you know from a 8 number of calls before the visit actually took place that 9 Sattar had conversations with various people he knew and in 10 those conversations he was talking about the latest news that 11 this terrorist group, Abu Sayyaf, had kidnaped innocent 12 hostages, was holding them, and that one of their demands was 13 that Abdel Rahman be free from his American prison. And just 14 so -- let me just give you those numbers, it's Government 15 Exhibits 1080X, 1081X, 1082X. And those were calls in early 16 May or April, a few weeks before the visit itself. 17 In one of those calls, I should say, 1082X, Sattar is 18 talking to Nabil Elmasry, a friend of his, and states, quote, 19 this is a good thing, in reference to the fact that innocent 20 people were taken hostage, and then demanded Abdel Rahman's 21 release. 22 But that's consistent with a person who's engaged in a 23 conspiracy to commit murder with a person like Taha. Not 24 surprising there. 25 Now, as I say, on the first day of the visit, Yousry SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11221 4CTESAT5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 and Stewart bring up this fact to Abdel Rahman. They let him 2 know, gee, there is a group out there called Abu Sayyaf and 3 they have taken kidnaps -- they have taken victims and we're 4 going to play for you now the portion of that visit. It's 5 relatively short but before we do, let me just -- and before 6 you put your headsets on, let me just tell you briefly what 7 happens. 8 What happens is Yousry is reading this account about 9 this hostage taking to Abdel Rahman, and at some point he turns 10 to Stewart and says that the group has taken hostages and 11 demanded the release of Abdel Rahman. 12 And Stewart says, gee, I didn't know about that. I 13 didn't hear about that. Good for them. 14 Good for them? Who's the them? Obviously. Good for 15 Abu Sayyaf. They've taken hostages and they're demanding my 16 client's release. Good for them. That certainly reflects upon 17 her knowledge, her intent about the use of violence on behalf 18 of Abdel Rahman, does it not? Yes, it does. It's a very brief 19 portion, why don't we play it now. 20 Are we ready to do that? If you can, put your 21 headsets on. We'll listen to it. 22 (Recording played) 23 MR. DEMBER: Why don't you take them off for a moment. 24 Now, as you may have seen in the transcripts that were put on 25 your screens beforehand just a moment ago, towards the very end SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11222 4CTESAT5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 of that portion of the recording there's a dispute as to what 2 was said. Ms. Stewart's version is, oh, she said that it was 3 sad, so sad. 4 I don't know how that -- how you can say it's -- and 5 the government's version of that is it's inaudible, you can't 6 tell what she's saying. Listen to it as often as you like 7 during deliberations. What is crystal clear is good for them, 8 good for the Abu Sayyaf group for taking innocent hostages and 9 demanding my client's release is not consistent with, 'that's 10 sad.' And if she said it she said it very low because she 11 didn't believe it and didn't want Abdel Rahman to hear it. 12 But, frankly, listen to it as often as you like. She 13 didn't say it, I'm so sad or that's so sad. It's impossible to 14 tell what she said. But a person who says good for them in 15 response to learning that this terrorist group has demanded her 16 client's release as a result of taking hostages, totally 17 inconsistent with that. 18 Now -- by the way when she said, amazing, she was 19 referring to clearly amazing about the fact that the New York 20 Times didn't pick up the fact that the Abu Sayyaf group had 21 demanded her client's release. That's what she was referring 22 to. 23 Interesting, did you hear her at any point in time 24 when we reviewed that transcript, play the recording say, gee, 25 this is a bad thing. We really shouldn't have my client's name SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11223 4CTESAT5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 associated with violence. That's not good for him, it's not 2 good for his case. Which you would expect somebody, a lawyer 3 to say about a client who they want transferred to Egypt as 4 their goal. They wouldn't want the client's name associated 5 with a terrorist act, such as what Abu Sayyaf said. 6 Did Stewart say that at any point during that 7 conversation? No. She was totally happy, pleased to hear that 8 Abu Sayyaf wanted her client released as a condition to 9 releasing their hostages. 10 Now, this is not the end, ladies and gentlemen, of the 11 references in this recording to what Abu Sayyaf had done in 12 terms of demanding the release of Abdel Rahman. In terms of a 13 page or two later in the transcript, a matter of a minute or so 14 later, the conversation comes back to Abu Sayyaf, at least in 15 Stewart's mind it comes back to Abu Sayyaf and she continues to 16 explain what value she sees in a terrorist group using violence 17 on behalf of Abdel Rahman. Well, why don't we listen to it, 18 it's not very long, and then we'll discuss it itself. 19 Again, put on your headsets, turn on the volume. 20 (Recording played) 21 MR. DEMBER: Well, that last part is a mouthful. 22 Let's dissect it a little bit, examine it, try to figure out 23 what it means. Not very hard, actually. 24 Abdel Rahman had asked, gee, what's the future of my 25 case. Then she sort of goes into this third-world economies SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11224 4CTESAT5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 and accumulation of wealth. And I think Yousry sort of gets 2 her back on track, he's really talking about his case and what 3 Stewart says is fascinating, very interesting. She says she 4 looks for what happened in Ireland, in Northern Ireland as 5 something similar to his case, when people were allowed to form 6 their own governments. 7 Well, what was she talking about, forming another 8 government? The government in Egypt is what it is. What is 9 she referring to? What she's referring to and telling him is 10 if the Islamic Group took over the government in Egypt, then 11 that would benefit him. That would get him transferred or 12 freed or transferred back to Egypt, or freed, so she thinks, or 13 so she's telling him. Change in government. 14 Well, isn't that what withdrawing of the support for 15 the ceasefire is all about, is resuming the violence in Egypt? 16 The resumption of the violence in Egypt isn't just for the sake 17 of violence, it's because the Islamic Group doesn't vote in the 18 Egyptian government, doesn't support the Egyptian government, 19 wants to overthrow the Egyptian government and its President 20 Mubarak. What she's saying to him is she's looking for a 21 change in Egyptian government. And what change? A change like 22 the Islamic Group. 23 She's talking in English, OK. She's concerned about 24 being heard. She's concerned about sneaking messages in and 25 out as you'll see when we get to the reading of Sattar's letter SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11225 4CTESAT5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 to Abdel Rahman. She can't say, gee, I think your terrorist 2 group, the Islamic Group, they should be taking over the 3 government of Egypt. She can't talk about it in those kind of 4 terms outwardly in English where somebody on the outside of the 5 room where they're visiting might hear so she's subtle about 6 it. 7 And then what does she say after that? What she says 8 after that is, what happened in the Philippines is good. Now, 9 what is she talking about? She's talking about the Abu 10 Sayyaf's group's taking of innocent hostages and demanding 11 Abdel Rahman's release. She's saying, that's good. It may be 12 futile -- her words, futile -- but it's still important, keeps 13 his name out there for the mujahadeen, mujahadeen, jihad 14 warriors, that's the translation, jihad warriors. It's out 15 there. And what she's telling him is it's important for his 16 people, his terrorist group to keep hearing his name mentioned. 17 And, gee, just because there is innocent hostages taken in the 18 Philippines, that's OK, because it's good for him. 19 And what's the message, what's she telling him? 20 Violence used by others on behalf of Abdel Rahman is a good 21 thing. It's good for your case. It's good for you. And even 22 if it's going to be futile, not going to result in your 23 release, it's still good. This is a good thing. The use of 24 violence on Abdel Rahman's behalf is a good thing. That's what 25 she's telling him. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11226 4CTESAT5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 A person not interested in providing somebody a 2 support to a murder conspiracy would say this is a horrible 3 thing, a lawyer representing Abdel Rahman who legitimately 4 wanted to have him transferred back to Egypt would say, this is 5 bad, Abdel Rahman's name associated with violence, associated 6 with terrorism is a bad thing. Does she say it? She says the 7 opposite. She tells Abdel Rahman the opposite. Violence and 8 Abdel Rahman are a good thing. That's what she's telling him. 9 It also shows you and proves to you, as you know, that 10 Stewart favors the use of violence if it will benefit Omar 11 Abdel Rahman. It's her own words. They're as clear as day. 12 Now, before I get to Mr. Sattar's letter that was 13 brought in, let me make a comment about letters in general. 14 During the course of the visit, if you might remember, 15 not only did they smuggle in to the prison, meaning Yousry and 16 Stewart smuggled in Sattar's letter with Taha's message, 17 terrorist message; they also brought in a couple little 18 letters, OK, letters from Nasser Ahmed and his wife. And they 19 were read to you as part of the, you know, the whole meeting 20 that particular first day. And you might remember them being 21 innocuous. They were innocuous. There was no terroristic 22 message, there was nothing coded in those letters. They were 23 innocuous letters. 24 And why do I mention that? Well, I mention them for 25 this reason: There is the provision in the SAMs requiring SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11227 4CTESAT5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 screening of letters is there, as I mentioned earlier today, to 2 ensure that no messages, coded or otherwise, got into Abdel 3 Rahman. And certainly none came out. 4 And, clearly, when Stewart and Yousry brought those 5 letters in, they clearly violated the SAMs, no question about 6 it and, again, defrauded the United States by smuggling those 7 other letters in. Now, as I said, they're innocuous, it's just 8 them talking about their lives, how they miss him, wished he 9 was OK, wished he was back with them, things like that. But 10 what do those letters demonstrate? They demonstrate a number 11 of things, but before I actually get to that part, what happens 12 right after Yousry reads to Abdel Rahman those two letters from 13 Nasser Ahmed and his wife, I think her name is Salwa or -- if 14 I'm correct, right after he finishes reading her letters, Abdel 15 Rahman says to Yousry, and this is a quote, that Yousry was, 16 quote, dragging us into a disaster. Right after the reading of 17 the letters. 18 What he's saying is you're reading me -- those letters 19 are a violation of the SAMs. Abdel Rahman knows it's a 20 violation of the SAMs to read such letters to him and bring 21 them in the way they were brought in. 22 And by the way, it's crystal clear that Abdel Rahman 23 is a part of the conspiracy to defraud the United States. I 24 mean, his messages being brought in for him and taking his 25 messages out are a part of defrauding the United States. But SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11228 4CTESAT5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 if you recall, towards the early part of the case, we 2 introduced and played for you a recording, it's Exhibit 370 if 3 you want to look at it again, in which it's dated I believe -- 4 it's April of 2000. And it's -- the prison officials at 5 Rochester had brought in an interpreter or translator and had 6 him, as best he could, translate the SAMs for Abdel Rahman in 7 Arabic. Now, the translation wasn't verbatim. It wasn't a 8 word-for-word translation. But the substance of the SAMs were 9 certainly read to him at that point. It was clear about mail, 10 clear about visits, clear about Abdel Rahman talking to the 11 media. All the essential and important provisions were laid 12 out for him. And at the very end of the recording you might 13 remember the prison official, the woman who was with the 14 translator, asked the translator to ask Abdel Rahman if he had 15 any questions for her, the prison official. Her name was Jean 16 Smith. And Abdel Rahman's response was why would I have a 17 question for this woman here in the prison? If I have any 18 questions about this, I'll ask Janet Reno. 19 He knew who Janet Reno was, knew that she had issued 20 the SAMs, and he was kind of being a wise guy at the time. 21 There were other times where the SAMs were read to Abdel 22 Rahman, either in English or other times, where they actually 23 had translations. That was important because that translation 24 was a month before this visit. So Abdel Rahman certainly knew 25 and had known for -- since '97 that these restrictions were in SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11229 4CTESAT5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 place and that he was to live under them. 2 What's the significance of those letters again, the 3 innocuous letters that I've referred to? Well, when Stewart 4 testified, and we questioned her about those letters, she said 5 to you, well, those letters really were part -- they were 6 privileged letters, part of the attorney-client relationship 7 and communication. And she said they were part of that 8 relationship and communication because after they were read and 9 before they were responded to, they would be discussed with 10 Abdel Rahman. 11 Well, if you go back to those transcripts, the 12 transcripts of any of the visits, the July 2001 visit and this 13 May 2000 visit, whenever innocuous letters are read to Abdel 14 Rahman, you never hear Stewart before or after the letter is 15 read discussing the letters with him. In fact, she never 16 talked to him about any of those letters, not during the 17 May 2000 visit, not during the July 2001 visit. 18 So her explanation, while it might sound good, doesn't 19 hold water, because she never talked to him about the letters. 20 In fact, and we'll get to it in a few minutes, when Yousry 21 reads to Abdel Rahman Sattar's letter with Taha's message in 22 it, that first day, and the second day when Omar Abdel Rahman 23 responds to Taha's messages and Sattar's letter, during that 24 entire visit, those two days, Stewart never talks to Abdel 25 Rahman about Sattar's letter or Taha's message. Never. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11230 4CTESAT5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 So, when she says, oh, yes, this is all part of the 2 attorney-client privilege, and once I discussed the letters 3 with my client, they became part of the privileged 4 communications, it's nonsense because she never spoke to him 5 about the innocuous letters or the Sattar letter, which was far 6 from innocuous. All she was doing was playing postal worker, 7 postal service employee, delivering these letters and taking 8 back the responses and simply ignoring the requirements of the 9 SAMs. 10 Now, again, for the innocuous letters, well, what's 11 the importance of that? The importance of that is this: It 12 just demonstrates for you Stewart's utter contempt for the 13 SAMs, her absolute total disregard for the requirements of the 14 SAMs and how her promises, which are reflected in the attorney 15 affirmations she signed, are meaningless; that when she signed 16 them, she had no intention of abiding by the SAMs, not before 17 the May 2000 visit, not before any of the visits that she ever 18 made to Abdel Rahman. She didn't care. She thought she was 19 above it, it didn't apply to her. 20 Those letters and those messages could have been sent 21 through normal channels. There was nothing time-sensitive 22 about those innocuous letters. As we discussed before, they 23 could have been put on recordings and sent through the system 24 and the FBI and Bureau of Prisons could have reviewed them and 25 sent them on, if they wanted to actually hear -- have Abdel SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11231 4CTESAT5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Rahman hear the voices of Nasser Ahmed or other people. 2 They chose not to. They chose to do it their way and 3 chose to violate the SAMs. 4 Now, during this first day of the visit, a couple of 5 things happened, OK, right up -- leading to the reading of 6 Sattar's letter. One of them is Yousry and Stewart read or 7 have read to Abdel Rahman a statement issued by our man Taha 8 about some demonstrations and some unrest that occurred at 9 Al-Azhar University in Egypt. 10 And Abdel -- and Taha's statement did appear in a 11 newspaper, it was on a separate piece of paper that Yousry read 12 to him. It was rather inflammatory, and he at some point in 13 the letter at the end called for the students of al-Azhar to 14 rebel against the government and overthrow the government. And 15 that's not surprising coming from Taha. 16 It's not surprising also that in the letter, if you'll 17 recall, Abdel Rahman is a graduate of Al-Azhar University. And 18 whether they decided to read him this statement from Taha, 19 which Taha had issued criticizing the government calling for a 20 revolution against the government, was meant to sort of prime 21 Abdel Rahman up for Sattar's letter, it's anybody's guess. But 22 it did. 23 What's interesting also about that statement is that 24 at the very end of that statement -- and we'll show it to 25 you -- we'll show it to you now. It's part of the transcript, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11232 4CTESAT5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 and this is where Yousry is translating it for Abdel Rahman. 2 At the very end of what Yousry translates is at the end of this 3 message, it has his name, Rifa'i Ahmad Taha, one of the Islamic 4 Group leadership members in Egypt. It's got apparently an 5 Arabic date and the date May 14, 2000. 6 Now, what's the significance of that? Well, 7 eventually when -- in a moment or two when Yousry turns to the 8 Sattar letter and reads it, and says, of course Taha's name 9 isn't in the letter itself, he's constantly referred to as Abu 10 Yasir in Sattar's letter. But the letter itself that Stewart 11 had translated for her specifically makes reference to the fact 12 that Sattar is sending along with a letter Taha's or Abu 13 Yasir's statement about what happened at al-Azhar. 14 So when Stewart got on the witness stand and told you 15 during her testimony, gee, I didn't know who this Abu Yasir guy 16 was, I didn't know anything about Taha until this case, until 17 this trial, she wasn't telling you the truth. She knew full 18 well -- and during the last part of the day when we were 19 questioning her on cross-examination, we asked her, well, did 20 you know who Abu Yasir was? Did you ask who he was? Did you 21 ask Yousry? Did you ask Sattar? Did you ask anybody who he 22 was, who this guy was? She kept saying no. 23 Well, she knew because in Sattar's letter, he makes 24 clear reference to the fact that they're saying all along in 25 Abu Yasir's statement about what happened at al-Azhar SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11233 4CTESAT5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 University. And that statement has Taha's name on it. She 2 knew at that point in time who Taha was. He was an Islamic 3 Group leader, obviously terrorist group. 4 But let's not forget, she knew who Taha was back in 5 March of 1999. In March of 1999, the first visit we talked 6 about, she and Yousry brought in Taha's first message to Abdel 7 Rahman, you know, to continue or resume the violence. And 8 Abdel Rahman's response was, well, part of the group wants to 9 put a halt to violence, you don't agree. That was Taha's 10 message back in March of '99. 11 She knew who he was back then. So when she told you, 12 gee, I don't know who this guy is, she wasn't being truthful 13 with you. 14 (Continued on the next page) 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11234 4ct5sat6 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 MR. DEMBER: She knew about it and she certainly knew 2 it back in March of '99, she certainly knew it in the visit in 3 May 2000. 4 By the way, while Yousry reads Taha's message to Abdel Rahman, 5 what is Stewart doing? She knows this is an inflammatory 6 statement from a terrorist leader who is connected to Abdel 7 Rahman. So what does she do? Well, she distracts the guards. 8 She disguises what they're doing because she knows full well 9 that if the guards found them with Taha's statement, there 10 would be trouble. 11 So, she wants to conceal what they're doing because it is 12 trouble. And during the course of the reading, if you 13 remember, she starts uttering some words that have nothing to 14 do with what Yousry and Abdel Rahman are talking about. She 15 says things like chocolate and heart attack and, gee, I can win 16 an Academy Award for what I'm doing. What she was doing was 17 making believe that she was part of a conversation with Yousry 18 and Abdel Rahman when, in fact, what she was trying to do was 19 conceal what they were doing, which was passing an 20 inappropriate message, a terroristic message in to Abdel 21 Rahman. 22 Now, after Taha's statements about Al-Azhar was read, there 23 was a statement, a student's statement. It referred to 24 students' injuries that students had suffered during the course 25 of demonstrations and the government reaction to them during SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11235 4ct5sat6 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 that time. 2 And then we get to the most significant part of the visit, the 3 time when Yousry begins to read and goes to Sattar's letter and 4 Taha's message in it. And what happens is Stewart actually 5 carried the letter into the prison, because earlier in the 6 visit, on the first day of the visit, what happens is Yousry 7 asks her for the visit -- for the letter itself, for Sattar's 8 letter or Ahmed's letter. And you can actually see on the 9 videotape Stewart reaching into her legal pad sort of in the 10 back, concealed, stuffed behind there, pulling it out and 11 handing it to Yousry. 12 Back then, at that point, they know at first when they pull it 13 out, Yousry asked Abdel Rahman whether he wants to be read this 14 letter right now or what have you. Abdel Rahman is not ready 15 for it quite yet. But right before the end of the visit both 16 Yousry and Stewart sort of remind each other, we need to read 17 this letter to Abdel Rahman because he needs to think about his 18 response overnight so they can get his response the next 19 morning. 20 They both, obviously, Stewart and Yousry, know the 21 content of the letter. It is, once again, a solicitation by 22 Taha for Abdel Rahman's support. They want to continue to have 23 it, and it is important. Stewart knows its importance. Yousry 24 knows its importance. And they want to make sure they read it 25 to him so that he can think about his response overnight. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11236 4ct5sat6 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Now, what happens is -- clearly, both of these defendants 2 appreciate its importance and its significance by doing that. 3 And what happens next is, right before they're about to read 4 the letter, a very interesting little conversation takes place, 5 very short, between Yousry and Stewart 6 Yousry, if you remember how the room was set up where the 7 meeting took place, it is sort of a conference room. There is 8 a window, and their table where the three of them are seated is 9 right in front of the window. So it's Abdel Rahman, Yousry and 10 Stewart. And obviously they can look out the window into a 11 hallway where the guards were to watch -- you know, keeping 12 watch on what's happening in case there is an emergency, a 13 problem, in case there is need for them, whatever 14 What happens at that point is Yousry tells Stewart that there 15 is apparently a guard outside the window and tells Stewart she 16 should say something. What happens is Stewart says the 17 following, after Yousry says, Lynne, I think you should talk to 18 him because they are looking at me. 19 And clearly what he is referring to is the guards are looking 20 at him through the window. 21 And then Stewart says: If he finds out what this is, 22 then we're -- 23 And Yousry says: In trouble. 24 Yousry has the letter in front of him. He's about to read 25 Sattar's letter, specifically the Taha portion of the letter. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11237 4ct5sat6 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 And Stewart says: If he -- meaning the guard on the 2 other side of the window -- finds out what this is, "this" 3 being the letter, then we're -- and before Stewart can finish 4 the sentence, Yousry does her the favor and does it -- we're in 5 trouble. 6 It's very brief, let's put our headphones on and listen to it. 7 (Recording played) 8 MR. DEMBER: It is very brief. 9 Take your head phones off. Clearly, obviously, 10 Ms. Stewart and Mr. Yousry know what they're doing is improper, 11 illegal, criminal, but they laugh about it. Why? Because 12 they're getting away with it. Because they know full well the 13 guards don't speak Arabic, the letter is in Arabic, the guard 14 really can't hear what they're saying. And so if -- but if he 15 had knew what this is, they would be in trouble, because 16 they've smuggled a terrorist's message in to Abdel Rahman to 17 get his response. 18 And that's what he says, in trouble. In trouble. 19 They'd be in trouble but they're getting away with it, so why 20 not laugh about it. 21 Now, after that happens Yousry starts reading the 22 letter to Abdel Rahman. And what I'm going to do for you is 23 read the letter. What we are going to do is put it up on the 24 screen. 25 Now, the reading of a tape takes a number of pages SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11238 4ct5sat6 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 because Stewart is interrupting. Stewart is interrupting, 2 obviously, to conceal the illegal nature of what they are 3 doing. So she interrupts and she says things that have nothing 4 to do with the letter, nothing to do with anything, nothing to 5 do with legal matters, certainly, just to make it appear as if 6 she is part of a conversation they are having so nobody will 7 suspect they are violating the law and violating the SAMs. And 8 the guards will be distracted. And that's what she does. 9 Now, what I'm going to do is read the letter itself 10 from beginning to end. If you like, simply listen to me read, 11 or you can try to follow along in the transcript. But because 12 there is interruptions in the transcript, it may be a little 13 hard to follow, but if you would like to try, go ahead. 14 Some of the interruptions, by the way, are some 15 irrelevant things, like Lynne Stewart saying -- talking about 16 eating and talking about food. And we certainly know there is 17 nothing in Sattar's letter about eating and food, but she is 18 making it look as if she is part of what they're doing. She, 19 of course, is not. She's just concealing their illegality. 20 Let me start and I will read the letter to you. You 21 can listen or you can follow along. Here it is. 22 This is now Sattar's letter, Sattar writing and 23 including in his letter Taha's message. This is that portion 24 of the letter: 25 My communications increased during the past year. I SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11239 4ct5sat6 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 have semi-constant contact with Abu Yasir -- this is Sattar 2 talking now -- who obviously is Taha; Abu Hazim, who is Hamza; 3 and a number of other people, Abu Hartih, Abu Khalid, Abu 4 Mustafa and many other brothers, thank God. If there is 5 anything, please notify. 6 Number 10: Abu Yasir called me the day before 7 yesterday -- that's Taha, of course. He still asks for Your 8 Honor's moral support to his position, particularly at this 9 time, after three years have passed since the initiative that 10 he did not -- that did not produce big results was issued. I 11 had explained to you, sir, his viewpoint before -- obviously in 12 past letters smuggled into prison in the past visits we talked 13 about -- back then, you asked him to commit himself and to give 14 his brother a chance. Up until now the man is committed, but I 15 don't think he will be able to remain quiet longer than that. 16 I sent to you, sir, the statement that he issued on Al-Azhar 17 University incidents which exposed him to the criticism of some 18 brothers, particularly because of his -- of its strong 19 language, which exposed him to strong language, criticism of 20 some brothers, though he didn't say anything other than what is 21 supposed to be said. He, therefore, asks for your 22 straightforward opinion, sir, especially that you know that the 23 man has his massive weight among many brothers. In addition, 24 if the regime worries about anyone, it is Abu Yasir. I had 25 told him and the other brothers about your request, sir, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11240 4ct5sat6 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 concerning the evaluation of the initiative. He had the same 2 opinion. It is clear, though, that those who push to go by the 3 initiative are the brothers in Liman, even though they are very 4 few. 5 And then articulating, as he corrects himself -- no, 6 the brothers in Liman and very few others outside. 7 Abu Yasir is of the opinion that the group has to well 8 utilize the initiative paper. The least to do is to allow 9 media escalation and to demonstrate disgust at the way the 10 situation ended up, esspecially that the most they allow now is 11 some improvement in prisons, permission of visits, and release 12 of some prisoners. Bear in mind, though, that those they 13 released had nothing to do with anything to start with, and 14 that there are so many others the government refuses to even 15 discuss their future, like those detained for more than 10 16 years without any charge, like -- and I'm going to skip the 17 names, the number of names there -- and many others. Even our 18 brothers who served the sentences they had in Sadat's case more 19 than five years ago are still in jail. 20 Since 1992, the brothers, who were pronounced 21 innocent, in any case, are still under detention. They were 22 not released. Brother Abu Yasir and many other brothers think 23 that all these things need you to have a more forceful 24 position. No objection to the formation of a team that calls 25 for cancellation of the initiative or makes threats or SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11241 4ct5sat6 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 escalates things. Please, your Eminence, say your opinion 2 about this, dictate some points we can announce in a press 3 conference with Lynne. And if you don't want to announce them, 4 please let Lynne know that. 5 Now, what do you learn from the letter? Well, 6 obviously Abu Yasir, of course, is Taha. We all know that. 7 And it says, we still ask for Abdel Rahman's support. He has 8 had it in the past and still wants it. 9 What he is referring to is the past messages he 10 received after the March '99, and certainly September '99 11 visits. 12 Now, the way Sattar describes Taha is he is -- he has massive 13 weight among many brothers, which of course means he is very 14 influential and powerful amongst his fellow Islamic Group 15 members. And that if anyone, if the regime worries about 16 anyone, it is Abu Yasir, because he is the most militant, the 17 most violent in the group. That's why the Egyptian 18 government -- that's the regime, as they describe it -- is 19 concerned about him, because he is the one that advocates 20 violence. He is the one that advocates a return to the 21 pre-ceasefire days. 22 And what they're asking for in the letter, the least -- the 23 least they want to be able to do, they say, is media 24 escalation. But later in the letter, what he says, Sattar 25 says, and it is Taha's message, is that Abu Yasir wants the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11242 4ct5sat6 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 formation of a team to call for the cancellation of the 2 initiative, or make threats and escalate things. 3 The message is clear. Whether you knew who Taha was or not, 4 what he wants to do is end the cease-fire. That's what the 5 whole message is about, once again, being sent in to Abdel 6 Rahman by Sattar through Yousry and Stewart. 7 You don't have to actually know who Taha is to understand that 8 what he wants to do from that, that part of the letter that I 9 have read to you, is end the cease-fire and resume the 10 violence. 11 And, as I said before, during the March '99 visit, they 12 delivered the message to Abdel Rahman that Taha wants to resume 13 the violence while the other brothers want to halt the 14 violence. 15 By the way, when Mr. Yousry was cross-examined by us and he was 16 asked about his interviews with FBI agents in September of 2001 17 and asked whether he had ever -- or he, with the attorneys, 18 ever delivered messages from Islamic Group leader or Taha, what 19 did he say? He said, oh, no, we didn't do this at all. He was 20 lying at the time. He knew full well this was Taha's message. 21 He knew it was Taha better than anybody else because of his 22 knowledge of the group. 23 Well, that is the message that went in, that they snuck in, 24 they they slipped in and smuggled in. And what was the 25 response? What happened the next day? SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11243 4ct5sat6 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Well, the response was shorter. It's a part of the transcripts 2 which are Government Exhibit 1710X. It's on page 48, I 3 believe, and that's where, on the next day -- the next day is 4 when, in fact, Abdel Rahman requests -- excuse me -- Abdel 5 Rahman has thought about what Taha has asked him, through 6 Sattar, the day before, and the next day is when we get Abdel 7 Rahman's response to Taha's message. As I mentioned, that's 8 Exhibit 1710X. 9 Your Honor, would the Court like to take a break at this time? 10 THE COURT: Okay. Ladies and gentlemen, we will take 11 10 minutes. Please, remember my continuing instructions. 12 Please, don't talk about the case at all. Always remember to 13 keep an open mind until I finally have instructed you on the 14 law. 15 (Recess) 16 (Pages 11244-11245 SEALED by order of the Court) 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11246 4ct5sat6 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 (In open court; Jury present) 2 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Dember, you may proceed. 3 MR. DEMBER: Thank you, your Honor. 4 When we left off, I was talking about the second day 5 of the visit and the fact that Abdel Rahman, in fact, did 6 respond to Taha's message. And what we will do for you now is 7 display that portion of the transcript. It's Government 8 Exhibit 1710X. 9 And, if you would like, you can try to follow along 10 with the transcript. I'm going to read it directly, just, in 11 fact, what Abdel Rahman says in response. But, as I said, you 12 can follow along in the transcript, if you like. 13 Here is his response: Brother Muntasir, what use is 14 the initialtive when the government continues to arrest the 15 Islamic Group members, puts them to military trials, continues 16 to execute and rearrest them? What use is this initiative! 17 What did it do, other than division of the group lines? Tell 18 the brothers in your area, as long as we did not gain anything 19 from the government, the least you can do is to allow the other 20 voice, which calls for the continuation of the -- allow this 21 voice to speak up, to be loud. Do not stop it or silence it. 22 Do not stop it or silence it, and so far, the government did 23 not do anything other than increasing its violence. 24 Also, tell them that they should give Abu Yasir his 25 natural right as the head of the Group. If they don't want to SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11247 4ct5sat6 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 do so, the least is to have the person in charge consult with 2 him. If they don't -- unintelligible at that point -- that, 3 the least is to have the person in charge consult with him. 4 This is my advice. Give the man -- give the man his true 5 measure, especially as he is the beloved friend of Sheikh 6 Muntasir. 7 Well, the first thing to note about the response is 8 Abdel Rahman is addressing it, apparently, to Muntasir 9 Al-Zayat, who obviously is connected to the other Islamic Group 10 members in Egypt. 11 But when he talks about giving the other voice, not to 12 silence the other voice, to let it speak up, he of course is 13 talking about the voice that is against the cease-fire, that 14 wants to resume the violence, and that's the voice of Taha. 15 And indicates to the group that he should be given his right, 16 as leader of the Group, but if the Group doesn't want him as 17 its leader, the leader should at least consult with him. 18 He is, again, clearly siding with Taha with respect to 19 the cease-fire, and says the cease-fire has given the Group 20 nothing except an increase in violence, in his view, by the 21 Egyptian government. 22 Right after the dictation is over, Yousry asks Abdel 23 Rahman whether the letter for -- or Abdel Rahman asks Yousry 24 whether the letter should be given to Sattar to pass on to 25 Muntasir Al-Zayat, and Yousry tells him that Sattar will do SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11248 4ct5sat6 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 that. 2 And as I have said, the letter usually is mentioned, 3 it is addressed to Muntasir Al-Zayat. Yousry realizes that 4 before the end of this visit -- and he mentions this, in fact, 5 to Abdel Rahman -- that, well, you've not given the message, or 6 do you want this message passed on to Taha? 7 And what happens is Abdel Rahman seems a little 8 confused and he says -- and Yousry tells him Sattar wants the 9 message for -- to go to Taha. That's who is sending the 10 message in reality, and the message should be sent to him, and 11 he makes that clear. 12 And Abdel Rahman says, yes, it can obviously -- a copy 13 of the letter should go and be presented or given to Taha. 14 But during this part of the conversation something 15 interesting happens. What that is is that Abdel Rahman says, 16 well, hold it. Let me see the original letter, the original 17 letter that Yousry had read to Abdel Rahman the day before. 18 That's Sattar's letter with Taha's message in it. 19 And Abdel Rahman wants to see the letter, wants Yousry 20 once again to read him the letter so at least in Abdel Rahman's 21 mind, it is clear who he should be writing do. 22 What happens is a rather interesting part of the 23 conversation at that point, because -- and we are going to put 24 it up on the screen for you. It's Government Exhibit 1711X, 25 page 31, line 17, to page 32, line 7. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11249 4ct5sat6 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 And here is what the conversation consists of, and I 2 am going it read it right from the screen. 3 Abdel Rahman says: Yeah. But I want you to read it, 4 can you get it from Ahmed's letter? 5 Meaning the Taha portion of the message. And the 6 Ahmed is obviously Sattar. 7 And then Yousry says: Lynne told me to leave it in 8 the car. 9 And Abdel Rahman goes: Yeah? 10 And Yousry says: Yeah. 11 Stewart then jumps in and says: Talk to me. 12 And Yousry says to her: No, about Ahmed's letter. 13 And she says: Yeah. 14 And then Yousry responds: I said I left it in the car 15 as you told me. 16 Stewart says: Yes. 17 And Yousry says to Abdel Rahman in Arabic: Sir, Lynne 18 said that we had it yesterday -- and then we skip down -- and 19 if they find it with us today after we go out, she told me to 20 leave it in the car. 21 Well, look what Yousry just did in that last sentence. 22 His thought was he didn't finish -- he didn't finish his first 23 thought. 24 What did he say? He said if they find it, meaning the 25 letter, with us today, they -- who are "they"? The prison SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11250 4ct5sat6 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 guards. If the prison guards find Sattar's letter with Taha's 2 message in it today after we go out -- after we leave him and 3 proceed out of the prison -- and he stops his train of thought. 4 He stops what he is saying. 5 What is he saying? What is missing? You know it from 6 the first day of the visit. If they find that letter on us, if 7 the guards find or the prison personnel find that letter on us 8 when we go out, we're in trouble. That's what he is saying. 9 We're in trouble. He just doesn't finish the sentence. 10 What else would fit? Nothing else would fit. That's 11 what Stewart and Yousry said the day before. If the guards 12 knew what we had here, what this letter was about, we would be 13 in trouble. And they laughed. 14 And so, on the second day, as to avoid any possibility 15 of being in trouble, obviously Stewart says, leave it in the 16 car. 17 Do you think the letter was all that heavy that they 18 couldn't lift it up with all the other papers that they had in 19 Stewart's red weld with Yousry, a big guy who can lift up 20 papers? Do you think it is too heavy to bring in where they 21 leave a piece of paper in the car? No. 22 They knew full well that Sattar's letter was 23 forbidden, was a message from a terrorist to a convicted 24 terrorist. And to be super safe, they had smuggled it in the 25 first day. Why chance it the second day? And that's why SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11251 4ct5sat6 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Yousry is saying to Abdel Rahman, if they found it on us today, 2 the second day when we leave, we would be in trouble, so we 3 left it in the car. 4 Afterwards Abdel Rahman makes it clear that one 5 version of the letter should go to Muntasir Al-Zayat. Now that 6 it is clear that Taha's message that came in to him and clear 7 in his mind, he says another copy of the letter should go to 8 Taha. And that is what's done. 9 Now, interesting. During the course of that two-day 10 visit, if you watch the video -- and certainly you are able to 11 do that during the deliberations, but if you saw it during the 12 course of the trial and was watching the video, during a lot of 13 the conversation going on between Yousry and Abdel Rahman 14 during the visit, you see Stewart writing a lot. She is 15 writing and she has papers she is reviewing. 16 And she told you when she testified she was doing 17 legal work; not legal work for Omar Abdel Rahman and his famous 18 lawsuit that somehow just never gets filed on his behalf, legal 19 work on other cases she had for other clients. 20 Stewart had come all the way from New York City to 21 Rochester, Minnesota to meet with her client. If you listen 22 and view those tape recordings, the recordings of the visit on 23 May 19th and 20th, from beginning to end and add up the 24 substantive conversations that Stewart had with Abdel Rahman, 25 you wouldn't find very much of substance there at all. She SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11252 4ct5sat6 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 barely spoke to the guy. She barely had any kind of 2 conversation. 3 And she had essentially no legal conversations with 4 him at all. And the only legal work she did on a two-day visit 5 was legal work for clients who weren't even there. She is 6 there to do -- as supposedly the lawyer for Omar Abdel Rahman, 7 to represent him and defend him vigorously. And she does 8 nothing that relates to legal work. She does nothing on behalf 9 of his famous lawsuit that never gets filed. 10 She travels all that way to do legal work for clients 11 in New York. So, why is she there? Why did she go? Simple: 12 The only way to get Taha's messages in to Abdel Rahman is with 13 a lawyer. The only way to get a response from Abdel Rahman to 14 Taha and his need, his desire, his interest in getting Abdel 15 Rahman to support him is with a lawyer. No other way to do it. 16 The only way to do that is with a lawyer. Ramsey 17 Clark won't issue that press release. Abdeen Jabara won't 18 issue that press release. Lynne Stewart is all too happy to 19 issue that press release -- a press release that has absolutely 20 nothing to do with any legal matter that relates to Abdel 21 Rahman. She was there to deliver Taha's message and other 22 messages that shouldn't have been brought in the way they were 23 brought in. And she was there to help smuggle out Abdel 24 Rahman's message to Taha. That's the reason she is there, the 25 only reason she is there. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11253 4ct5sat6 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Now, what happens after the visit? Well, after the 2 visit we learn, according to Yousry and Stewart, that Yousry 3 translated any correspondence, any dictation that Abdel Rahman 4 gave him in terms of letters from different people -- 5 including, of course, the message from Taha to Sattar about his 6 position on the cease-fire, as well as the innocuous letters. 7 And Yousry says -- and Stewart says Yousry translated them 8 verbatim. 9 Now, what's interesting is Mr. Yousry has this famous 10 notebook he keeps, or notebooks he keeps of the visits and the 11 legal calls that he helps translate for the attorneys. Well, 12 when it came to the message for, the message in response to 13 Taha's message that Abdel Rahman dictated, he didn't put it in 14 his notebook. He didn't put it in his notebook. He put it on 15 a separate piece of paper. Why did he do that? For obvious 16 reason. It is a highlighted item. It is a prohibited item. 17 He certainly doesn't want to holding on to it at any point in 18 time and be caught with it. 19 So, he writes it on a separate piece of paper and when 20 he gets back from Minnesota he hands it off to his pal Sattar. 21 It's all yours, take it. Do what you want with it, take it. 22 What does he tell us Sattar does after the visit? He 23 meets with Yousry after the visit and Yousry tells Sattar -- 24 this is right from Mr. Sattar himself -- Abdel Rahman has 25 withdrawn his support for the cease-fire. That's what Sattar SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11254 4ct5sat6 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 testified to the other day. He is withdrawing his support of 2 the cease-fire. 3 And after -- by the way, after Yousry had translated 4 the letter to Stewart he retained it and, as I said, passed it 5 on to Sattar. 6 Now, there is a couple of very interesting 7 conversations that take place after the visit, conversations 8 between Sattar and three people, conversation with Hamza, 9 conversation with Taha, conversation with Al-Sirri. 10 Now, we all know that Hamza is a big proponent, a big 11 supporter of the cease-fire. That conversation takes place 12 first. And what you learn from those conversations is that 13 Sattar and Stewart and Yousry do a little editing -- a little 14 editing of Abdel Rahman's message. They do a little editing. 15 The editing that they do makes the message from Abdel 16 Rahman stronger, more anti cease-fire, more violent. Let's 17 review it. 18 The first one is the conversation with Hamza, that's 19 Government Exhibit 1093X, it's a May 28, 2000 conversation, 20 eight days after the visit, between Sattar and Hamza, and Hamza 21 apparently called Sattar, asks him if Sattar has the things 22 that the Sheikh issued and his statements that he has issued. 23 Sattar tells him, yes. 24 And what he does, what Sattar does is read to Hamza 25 the letter; the letter that I read to you just a few minutes SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11255 4ct5sat6 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 ago, the letter that Abdel Rahman had dictated to Yousry. And 2 it starts the very same way: 3 Dear Brother Muntasir, what use is the initiative? 4 What good is it, the government is continuing their violence, 5 what has come of this. 6 That sort of thing. 7 And then I will put up on the screen for you this 8 section, it's Government Exhibit 1093X, he is reading the 9 letter to the, the message to Hamza, and here is the portion 10 that the defendants add to Abdel Rahman's dictation. Here is 11 what it is. After he says in the letter: And if the 12 circumstances allow the other voice to talk, do not interrupt 13 him. 14 And he is talking about Taha's voice, don't interrupt 15 him, he has a different point of view, let it be heard. 16 Then he writes: If the circumstances allow to, you 17 know, or what, if the circumstances do not allow, the least is 18 to be prepared for confrontation and media escalation. 19 Now, you know we heard this media escalation in Abdel 20 Rahman's dictation to Yousry but what did we hear about 21 confrontation? We didn't hear about confrontation. But the 22 defendants have done some editing. 23 Now, remember, Hamza is very much in favor of the 24 cease-fire and he is hearing the whole letter -- I'm not going 25 to read the whole letter but that's the edited part, the rest SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11256 4ct5sat6 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 of the letter is very much like what Abdel Rahman dictated and 2 Hamza hears what Sattar is telling him and he is very 3 concerned. 4 (Continued on next page) 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11257 4CTESAT7 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 MR. DEMBER: And he says, or he asks Sattar, quote, 2 but this evaluation is very strange. Who conveyed this picture 3 to the Sheikh? 4 Apparently Hamza doesn't agree with whatever -- what 5 was described to Abdel Rahman is reflected in Abdel Rahman's 6 response is not Hamza's view of what the reality is in Egypt 7 and with the Islamic Group. And he's saying, who relayed this 8 picture? It's not accurate, he's saying. And then Sattar lies 9 to Hamza. What does he do? He says -- he responds, nobody, 10 the newspapers are read to Abdel Rahman, quote, almost every 11 day. 12 Well, that's not true. You know, maybe twice a week 13 during legal calls. What Sattar is telling Hamza is nobody's 14 painting a picture for him. Abdel Rahman is taking his point 15 of view, established his point of view, come to his point of 16 view, I should say, because newspapers are read to him. What 17 Sattar specifically does is lie to Hamza. Sattar knows full 18 well how Abdel Rahman is getting his view, his view or what is 19 going on in Egypt. He's getting it from Taha's messages, which 20 Sattar is sending in with Sattar's letter. Sattar is -- did it 21 in March of 1999 during that visit. He did it in 22 September 1999 in that visit. And he certainly did it this 23 time, too. He keeps sending in Taha's messages to Abdel 24 Rahman. And by the way, he also did it during the 25 February 2000 visit with Mr. Jabara. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11258 4CTESAT7 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Sattar knows full well that Abdel Rahman is getting 2 his view of how things are in Egypt with the Islamic Group and 3 the government because he, Sattar, is sending in Taha's view of 4 things, his anti-ceasefire view of things. And Abdel Rahman is 5 simply accepting it and believing it. 6 And Hamza is saying, what's going on, how does he get 7 this point of view? And Sattar lies to him and conceals the 8 fact that he, Sattar, repeatedly, every single visit, presents 9 to Abdel Rahman Taha's view. Why is Sattar not presenting the 10 other side's view, the view of those members of the Islamic 11 Group who are in favor of the ceasefire? Good question? 12 Perhaps. Very good question. 13 The answer? Actually simple. The answer is Sattar 14 isn't interested in presenting the pro-ceasefire view of 15 things, because Sattar is against the ceasefire. He is with 16 Taha and Abdel Rahman, as you know. He is in favor of ending 17 the ceasefire, resuming the violence, resuming the killing, 18 resuming, the kidnapping, resuming terrorism. So, why on earth 19 would Sattar send in the other side's message? He's on a 20 mission, he's working with Taha. He's his pal, his partner, 21 his coconspirator. That's why he's doing it. And he is lying 22 to Hamza about it because he wants to appear to be the neutral, 23 impartial, objective conduit through whom messages go to Abdel 24 Rahman and come out; because if the pro-ceasefire people -- 25 Hamza, Salah Hashim, Muntasir Al-Zayat get wind of the fact SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11259 4CTESAT7 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 that Sattar is with Taha, word will get around, don't talk to 2 Sattar. Don't communicate through Sattar because Sattar is 3 with Taha. He wants violence. He wants the killings to 4 continue. And Sattar maintains his credibility and his 5 standing as this special person, the only person through whom 6 anybody on the outside in the Islamic Group can communicate 7 through to Abdel Rahman. And he likes that position and he 8 likes that kind of power and he likes that control and he wants 9 to maintain it. So he lies to Hamza about this. 10 Well, Hamza is pretty upset. And he says essentially 11 during that conversation, this really should be kept within the 12 group. This shouldn't be publicized, this shouldn't get out. 13 And Sattar says, gee, I can't control other people's views. I 14 can't control this. The lawyer is supposed to make a 15 statement, she's supposed to issue a statement. I can't stop 16 that from happening. 17 My goodness, he could have stopped it from going in. 18 He certainly could have stopped it from going out if he wants 19 to, but he doesn't want to. He wants it out there and he wants 20 the statement issued in the media for all to know. 21 Now, there's another conversation that happens the 22 next day. It's Government Exhibit 1094X. It's on May 29, 23 2000. It's a conversation with Sattar and Taha. And in the 24 conversation Sattar is relating to Taha what happened during 25 the May 2000 visit. He opens up the conversation with Taha by SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11260 4CTESAT7 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 saying to Taha, quote, the whole world is buzzing. He mentions 2 to Taha that Hamza called and that Hamza essentially wants to 3 stop the message from getting out. He wants to mitigate the 4 message because it's so damaging to the pro-ceasefire folks. 5 And Sattar tells Taha that Stewart is going to meet with the 6 reporters and announce, quote, announce the current points of 7 view of Abdel Rahman. 8 And what happens next is during the course of this 9 conversation is Sattar reads to Taha Abdel Rahman's message. 10 But of course, as I told you before, he and Stewart and Yousry, 11 they do a little editing of the message, OK. We'll put it up 12 there for you. It's on page 6 of 1094X. Again, I'm not going 13 to read the whole letter for you. It starts, Dear Muntasir, 14 what is the use of the initiative, just like the one that's 15 depicted by Abdel Rahman. It talks about giving the other 16 voice, or the voice be heard, that's obviously Taha's voice. 17 Do not obstruct it. 18 And here is the part he adds: And if the 19 circumstances permit to do work, this is work among the people. 20 There is no objection. And if the circumstances don't permit, 21 at least prepare for the confrontation and the escalation with 22 the media. 23 Hmm. If the circumstances permit to do work. What 24 does that mean? Doing work, as it will become obvious in a 25 moment or two, is take an action. Commit a terrorist action or SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11261 4CTESAT7 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 act. That's what doing work is. It will be clear in the next 2 part of the conversation, another conversation I get to. It 3 will be clearer even as we go through the rest of the evidence. 4 Doing work is a nice way of saying let's return to violence. 5 Let's do some violence. Let's do a terrorist act. That is 6 doing work. 7 Do you remember when we read to you the dictated 8 letter that Abdel Rahman dictated to Yousry on May 20th, the 9 second day of the visit? Abdel Rahman saying, do work, prepare 10 for the confrontation if you can't do the work? No. They've 11 added it. They've made it stronger, stronger for the 12 anti-ceasefire forces, because that's where Sattar is. And 13 that's what they like. 14 Now, the next conversation of this trio of 15 conversations isn't found in an exhibit that the government 16 introduced. You'll find it in an exhibit Mr. Sattar 17 introduced. And its number is AS4-T. And it's on page 5 of 18 that exhibit. And what's happening in this conversation, it's 19 a conversation on June 14, 2000, between Sattar and Al-Sirri, 20 Yassir al-Sirri, he's the fellow in London who we'll hear more 21 about as I move forward, who whenever Sattar wants to issue a 22 public statement, he usually consults with al-Sirri. He must 23 be some sort of media expert fellow, runs the Islamic 24 Observation Center, a guy who Sattar likes to confer with 25 whenever he, Sattar, or his codefendants want to issue SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11262 4CTESAT7 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 statements about Abdel Rahman. 2 And during this part of the conversation, once again, 3 Sattar is reading to al-Sirri Abdel Rahman's message that was 4 dictated to Yousry on May 20th, the second day of the prison 5 visit. And we've got it there on the screen, a part of it. 6 But again, this -- it's actually just one section itself on 7 page five of the transcript. And it starts just like the other 8 ones, Dear brother Muntasir, or Brother Muntasir; and talks 9 about, you know, the same kind of language about letting the 10 other voice be heard and that sort of thing. And it says, he 11 asks of course what good is the initiative, it's produced 12 nothing. Let the other voice have expression and be loud, do 13 not hijack it, that's the word he uses, and then we get to the 14 part, the edited part that the defendants added to Abdel 15 Rahman's statement, and it reads like this: If circumstances 16 permit the carrying out of an action, there should be no 17 objection to that. But if circumstances do not permit, the 18 least that should be done is to be prepared for confrontation 19 and escalation through the media and through other information 20 outlets. 21 We've gone from work to permit an action, carry out -- 22 excuse me, permit the carrying out of an action, a terrorist 23 act. No objection to that because the government, according to 24 Sattar and Taha and Abdel Rahman, has done nothing in response 25 to the ceasefire, the group, the Islamic Group has not SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11263 4CTESAT7 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 benefitted in any way from the ceasefire. In their point of 2 view the government has gone and committed acts of violence so 3 if circumstances permit the carrying out of an action, there 4 should be no objection to it. An action is a response, a 5 violent action, a terrorist action. 6 In a conversation that Sattar has with a fellow named 7 Usama Al-Tubji, I think he may be the chicken salesman you 8 heard about once in a while, after the press release is issued 9 and Al-Tubji calls or speaks with Sattar on the phone -- it's 10 Government Exhibit 1116X on June 15, 2000 -- and this is -- 11 we'll get to this. I'm sorry. I'm getting ahead of myself, 12 but this is after Sattar, the press release is issued and 13 Sattar is being accused in the Arabic language newspapers of 14 being a spy, being an agent of the government and he's angry 15 and he tells Al-Tubji that -- because the press release, as you 16 remember the wording of the press release is Abdel Rahman is 17 withdrawing his support for the ceasefire, and Sattar is saying 18 to him that Abdel Rahman's actual words were much stronger than 19 the ones released by Stewart. He's telling him that. 20 Well, actually, Abdel Rahman -- Abdel Rahman's words 21 edited by these defendants was much stronger than the press 22 release where Stewart tells the Reuters reporter, 23 Mr. Salaheddin, that Abdel Rahman is withdrawing his support 24 for the ceasefire. These defendants made Abdel Rahman's 25 statement much stronger. Why? We know why Sattar did it, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11264 4CTESAT7 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 because that's the view he has, that the ceasefire should end, 2 there should be a return to violence, a return to the killing. 3 And you know just from the limited statements we've 4 heard so far and talked about, that when it comes to Abdel 5 Rahman, violence in Egypt is not a bad thing, because, you 6 know, if that government -- the government of Egypt is 7 overthrown violently by the Islamic Group, who benefits? Omar 8 Abdel Rahman. That's who. 9 Just to sort of sum up the visit in May 2000, you have 10 all the elements. You have the smuggling in of messages and 11 smuggling out Abdel Rahman's message, clearly acts which 12 incorporate and are part of a conspiracy to defraud the United 13 States. The same acts are Sattar -- excuse me, Stewart's and 14 Yousry's efforts to provide Abdel Rahman as material support to 15 Taha and Sattar in their efforts to end the ceasefire and 16 return to violence. 17 Now, we know that in June, on June 13, 2000, a press 18 release is actually issued. You know all about that. And as I 19 said before, the message from Abdel Rahman was passed from 20 Yousry to Sattar in a physical document itself. Yousry told 21 Sattar that Abdel Rahman was withdrawing his support for the 22 ceasefire when he gave him the document. And a period of time 23 passes, though, from the end of that visit to the issuance of 24 the press release. The last day of the visit is May 20th. The 25 press release is June 13th. Not surprising there would be a SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11265 4CTESAT7 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 period of time where people would have to think about a press 2 release, because these three defendants, certainly by May of 3 2000, appreciated that issuing a press release that Abdel 4 Rahman was withdrawing his support for the ceasefire was a 5 violation of the SAMs but far more significantly, it was a 6 criminal act. And before they did that, before they issued the 7 statement, they'd have to come to grips with what they were 8 going to actually say, how they were going to do it, who's 9 going to do it, when they were going to do it. And so, there's 10 a number of conversations to let you know what's going on and 11 that these defendants all were participating in it. 12 For example, on May 30, 2000, Government 13 Exhibit 1100X, Yousry and Sattar have a brief conversation. 14 And in the conversation Yousry tells Sattar that he left a 15 message for Stewart; that they need to get together to discuss 16 what's going to be said to the reporter and for a meeting with 17 the reporter. 18 Now, just to backtrack for just one second, during the 19 May 2000 visit, during that visit Yousry says to Abdel Rahman 20 that they're going to have a meeting with a reporter after the 21 visit. So certainly anything you tell us to say, we can say 22 the reporter. And he confirms and turns to Stewart during the 23 visit and says, well, anything he wants us to say to the 24 reporter we can say, right? And Stewart says, yeah, of course. 25 Yes. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11266 4CTESAT7 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 So, after the visit Yousry is running around trying to 2 arrange a meeting with Stewart and Sattar and him so they can 3 talk about, gee, what are we going to say to this reporter? 4 OK, he's very active, not just the translator, he has more of a 5 role than that. He's trying to get them together and tells 6 Sattar about his efforts. That wasn't successful at that point 7 in time. 8 And on June 4, 2000, there's a conversation between 9 Sattar and Taha, it's Government Exhibit 1101X. And during the 10 conversation Sattar says that once they release Abdel Rahman's 11 statement, it's going to have an impact but not on him. He 12 says, quote, it will have an impact on a person who issued the 13 statement. A person whose name is attached to the statement. 14 Because, obviously, there's all kinds of legal violations to 15 issuing such a statement, and Sattar knows it and he's telling 16 Taha such a thing exists and not Sattar, because he's not going 17 to issue the statement, but clearly he's referring to Stewart, 18 will have legal complications because of it. 19 And there's an interesting call, I'll just refer to it 20 briefly, on June 5, 2000, Government Exhibit 1102X, a 21 conversation between Sattar and Yousry again where they're 22 discussing about the fact that they have been talking amongst 23 themselves and they're not sure really what they're going to 24 say yet. And this is sort of an interesting part of the 25 statement, at some point they said, well, you know, Stewart SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11267 4CTESAT7 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 certainly spoke to Abdel Rahman. Yousry says to Sattar that, 2 well, Stewart should know what to say because she spoke to 3 Abdel Rahman during the visit. 4 Now of course she didn't, she didn't participate at 5 all in discussing Sattar's letter or Abdel Rahman's response to 6 it. 7 Now, again, this is all before the actual issuance of 8 the press release. There's an interesting conversation, it's 9 Government Exhibit 1268X. On June 11, 2000, it's a 10 conversation between Sattar and his friend, Yassir al-Sirri, 11 the fellow in London, the fellow he talks to whenever he's 12 contemplating issuing a statement or participating in the 13 issuance of a statement on the behalf of Abdel Rahman. 14 And it's a very interesting conversation because 15 they're talking about the timing and when this press release 16 with Abdel Rahman's statement in it should be released. This 17 is a statement in which they're going to announce to the world 18 that Abdel Rahman doesn't -- is withdrawing his support for the 19 ceasefire which now favors a return to violence. And they 20 start talking about when is the best time to do it. And one of 21 their problems in coming to an appropriate day to issue it is 22 that the president of Syria, President Asad of Syria, it turns 23 out, had just passed away and obviously that was big news in 24 the Arab world. It would get a much coverage in the Arabic 25 language newspapers. And Sattar was very concerned, very SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11268 4CTESAT7 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 concerned because he didn't want to have to battle with media 2 coverage with that big news item in the Middle East. He didn't 3 want to have to compete with news about the funeral for 4 President Asad of Syria. And he discusses this with his sort 5 of media expert Al-Sirri, and they come to the conclusion that 6 they will wait and not issue the statement until the news 7 coverage of the president of Syria's funeral is over with and 8 done with because, as they indicated, they didn't want the 9 case, the story that Abdel Rahman had issued this statement 10 changing his position or now publicly, I should say, changing 11 his position on the ceasefire, even though he had had that 12 position since September of 1999 withdrawing his support, they 13 didn't want it buried on the seventh or eighth page but on -- 14 they wanted it on the front page of the Arabic language 15 newspapers. And so they decided that's what they would do. 16 They would hold off. 17 And interesting, the second part of that conversation, 18 which is Government Exhibit 1103X on June 11, 2000, Al-Sirri 19 asks Sattar, you know, are there going to be negative 20 consequences by issuing the statement? And Sattar says, quote, 21 many negative things. Chances are everything including water 22 and electricity can be cut off after that. But he goes on to 23 say, but not for him -- meaning Sattar individually -- I am 24 talking about the man -- meaning Abdel Rahman -- they can say 25 no more lawyer, nobody whatsoever. Obviously he's not SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11269 4CTESAT7 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 literally referring to the fact that Abdel Rahman will have no 2 electricity or water in his prison cell. What they're talking 3 about is this is such a damaging and serious violation of the 4 SAMs and the laws, there will be serious consequences and 5 Sattar knows full well that these are, at the very least, 6 violations of the SAMs, and that's what he's saying in that 7 conversation. 8 And you know -- your Honor, does the Court want to 9 break at this point? 10 THE COURT: All right. This is a convenient time for 11 us to break. 12 Ladies and gentlemen, we'll break for the day. By the 13 way, in terms of our schedule, it's about not quite 4:30 today. 14 We'll go tomorrow until about 4:30. Beginning on Monday we'll 15 be breaking at 4:00, but tomorrow we'll sit until 4:30. 16 Ladies and gentlemen, it's very important, please, 17 remember to follow my continuing instructions. Please, don't 18 talk about this case at all. Don't talk about it among 19 yourselves or with anyone else when you go home. Don't talk 20 about this case at all. 21 Remember not to look at or listen to or read anything 22 to do with the case. If you should see or hear something 23 inadvertently, please, simply turn away. Don't look at or 24 listen to anything to do with the case. 25 Finally, always remember to keep an open mind until I SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11270 4CTESAT7 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 have finally instructed you on the law and you've gone to the 2 jury room to begin your deliberations. Fairness and justice to 3 the parties requires that you do that. 4 With that, have a very good evening. I look forward 5 to seeing you tomorrow morning at 9:30. 6 (Jury excused) 7 (Pages 11271 through 11274 sealed by order of the 8 Court) 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300