11275 4cuesat1 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 -------------------------------------x 2 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 3 3 v. S1 02 Cr. 395 (JGK) 4 4 AHMED ABDEL SATTAR, a/k/a "Abu Omar," 5 a/k/a "Dr. Ahmed," LYNNE STEWART, 5 and MOHAMMED YOUSRY, 6 6 Defendants. 7 -------------------------------------x 7 8 December 30, 2004 8 9:35 a.m. 9 9 10 10 Before: 11 HON. JOHN G. KOELTL 11 12 District Judge 12 13 13 APPEARANCES 14 14 DAVID N. KELLEY 15 United States Attorney for the 15 Southern District of New York 16 ROBIN BAKER 16 CHRISTOPHER MORVILLO 17 ANTHONY BARKOW 17 ANDREW DEMBER 18 Assistant United States Attorneys 18 19 KENNETH A. PAUL 19 BARRY M. FALLICK 20 Attorneys for Defendant Sattar 20 21 MICHAEL TIGAR 21 JILL R. SHELLOW-LAVINE 22 Attorneys for Defendant Stewart 22 23 DAVID A. RUHNKE 23 DAVID STERN 24 Attorneys for Defendant Yousry 25 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11276 4cuesat1 1 (Trial continuing) 2 (In open court; jury present) 3 THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Good 4 to see you all. 5 All right. Mr. Dember, you may proceed. 6 MR. DEMBER: Thank you, your Honor. 7 Ladies and gentlemen, let me just pick up where we 8 left off yesterday. Towards the end of the day, as you recall, 9 on the second day of the May 2000 visit, Abdel Rahman dictated 10 his response to Taha. And after the visit that response was 11 provided by Yousry and Stewart to Sattar. And we talked about 12 the conversations that Sattar had with a number of people. 13 Now, I'm not going to repeat what Abdel Rahman said and 14 dictated to Yousry. You recall what that is. 15 But after that, as I said, Sattar got the response 16 from Yousry and Stewart and had conversations with Hamza, Taha 17 and al-Sirri. And he told them that -- and said to them in -- 18 as part of describing Abdel Rahman's response, he added 19 something that Abdel Rahman did not say to Yousry during that 20 visit. And what he said was, if circumstances permit the 21 carrying out of an action, there should be no objection to 22 that. 23 That wasn't what Abdel Rahman said during that visit, 24 not those words. What Abdel Rahman said during the May 2000 25 visit did not include those words. If circumstances permit the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11277 4cuesat1 1 carrying out of an action, there should be no objection to 2 that. 3 So how did that, how did the fact that Abdel Rahman 4 had no objection to carrying out a terrorist action get into 5 the message that Sattar relayed to Hamza, Taha and al-Sirri? 6 Well, the answer to that question is: One or more persons in 7 this courtroom put it in Abdel Rahman's response, one or more 8 persons in this courtroom. And they're sitting at the back 9 table here, one or more of those persons. 10 Now, make no mistake about it, when Abdel Rahman was 11 dictating his response to Yousry, his response to Taha on 12 May 20, 2000, during the last day of the visit, it was crystal 13 clear what he meant and what he intended. And what he meant 14 and what he intended was that he was calling for an end, was 15 withdrawing his support and calling for an end to the ceasefire 16 and a resumption of violence and killing. 17 Now, after that prison visit the defendants got 18 together and discussed what would go in the press release. And 19 Stewart told you in her testimony she and Yousry and Sattar sat 20 down and talked about it. And what they came up with was 21 essentially what Abdel Rahman said, even though he didn't use 22 those precise words either. And that was that Abdel Rahman -- 23 they were going to announce in the press release that Abdel 24 Rahman was withdrawing his support for the ceasefire. Well, if 25 you don't support the ceasefire -- well, he didn't anymore. He SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11278 4cuesat1 1 supported the opposite, and that was the message. He was 2 supporting an end to the ceasefire and a resumption of violence 3 and killing in Egypt. 4 Now, Stewart in her testimony claimed that not only 5 did she speak to her codefendants before the press release was 6 issued, she claimed and testified that she also spoke with the 7 other lawyers, Ramsey Clark and Abdeen Jabara. And that's an 8 interesting claim. 9 But you understand now why she would make such a 10 claim. She did it in her testimony, and it clearly was not 11 true, because she wanted to give herself some kind of 12 justification, some kind of a legitimacy to the press release; 13 as if the other lawyers also considered that type of a press 14 release to be appropriate under the SAMs and legitimate. 15 But as you well know, Mr. Jabara and Mr. Clark refused 16 to issue statements by Abdel Rahman about the ceasefire. In 17 September of 1999, when Abdel Rahman issued that -- told Clark 18 through Yousry about the fact that he no longer supported the 19 ceasefire and that the Islamic Group was absolved from it, no 20 longer bound by it, Clark refused to issue that press release. 21 And the next visit was May of 2000. And on the first 22 day of that visit, Abdel Rahman asked Jabara, Abdeen Jabara, if 23 he would issue a press release announcing Abdel Rahman's view 24 of the ceasefire, which was, of course, he was no longer 25 supporting it. And Jabara refused to issue it as well. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11279 4cuesat1 1 Now, neither of those two gentlemen would issue such a 2 statement, one, because it was a clear violation of the SAMs; 3 and, two, because it was a criminal act and they would have no 4 part of it. And they refused to, as you know. 5 How do you know that? Well, explicitly you know from 6 those two visits and the evidence we talked about yesterday and 7 we presented to you during the trial, they clearly refused to 8 do it. And you also know that when Mr. Clark testified, he was 9 asked by us on cross-examination, did you have any 10 conversations with Stewart before that press release was issued 11 in June of 2000? He said, no, he didn't recall any. In fact, 12 the first time he heard about that press release, anything 13 about it, was months after it had been released. 14 Now, would Mr. Clark have remembered hearing about the 15 press release before, months after it was released? You bet he 16 would have. And you know why. The reason is that he had made 17 extensive efforts on behalf of Abdel Rahman, numbers of trips 18 to Egypt to try to convince the Egyptian government to take 19 Abdel Rahman in a transfer. In other words, have him serve his 20 American prison sentence in an Egyptian jail. The Egyptians 21 had refused. 22 He told you, as Stewart did too, again, their main 23 objective when it came to Abdel Rahman, after his appeal was 24 denied and he was -- and his sentence of life imprisonment was 25 final, was to get him transferred back to Egypt. And certainly SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11280 4cuesat1 1 Clark understood that making an announcement, issuing a 2 statement to the press with Abdel Rahman's words no longer 3 supporting the ceasefire and now essentially -- and supporting 4 the return to violence is going to be detrimental, obviously, 5 in their efforts to get him transferred back to Egypt. The 6 Egyptians won't want him, when clearly he's advocating violence 7 against the very government that Clark is trying to negotiate 8 with. 9 So he certainly would have remembered if Stewart had 10 told him, I want to issue a press release and this is what's 11 going to be in it, and what do you think? Because he would 12 have said absolutely no, because he had himself refused. 13 There's, by the way, another reason why you know that 14 Stewart never talked to Clark about that press release. And 15 that reason is found in one of the last exhibits we introduced 16 to you during our rebuttal case. That's Government 17 Exhibit 1275X. That is -- and that's the transcript of the 18 recording. It's an English recording. As you know, it's the 19 actual recording itself when it's in English that's in 20 evidence. That's the transcript we used to aid you in 21 reviewing the recording itself. And that was a conversation on 22 August 28, 2000, after the press release had been issued and 23 after Mr. Fitzgerald had confronted Ms. Stewart and told her 24 that he now was aware of her press release and that she would 25 be cut off from Abdel Rahman and have to sign a new affirmation SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11281 4cuesat1 1 if she wanted to see him. 2 And in that conversation, Stewart is talking to 3 Yousry. And they're talking about Mr. Fitzgerald's letter of 4 August 3rd, 2000, in which he says she's going to have to sign 5 a new affirmation, that he was aware of the fact that she 6 issued a press release. He attached to the letter a new copy 7 of an affirmation. He attached articles, including Esmat 8 Salaheddin's articles announcing the press releases. 9 And she was talking about that letter with Yousry. 10 And during the conversation Yousry said, well, maybe you need 11 to talk to Mr. Clark about the letter you have there and the 12 fact that the government is going to cut you off, or require 13 you, I should say, to sign a new affirmation if you want to see 14 Abdel Rahman. 15 And what does Stewart say? She says she's not 16 interested in hearing Clark's views of Pat Fitzgerald's letter, 17 the fact that she is going to be required to sign a new 18 affirmation if she wants to see Abdel Rahman. She said, I 19 don't care what Ramsey Clark has to say on this issue. I don't 20 care what Ramsey Clark has to say. 21 Well, if she doesn't care about what another lawyer, 22 her cocounsel, wants to say and get his advice and perhaps get 23 him on board with her to adopt her position in dealing with the 24 US Attorney's Office and Pat Fitzgerald with respect to the 25 press release, she's not interested in getting him on board SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11282 4cuesat1 1 then, why would she want him on board when she issued a press 2 release? She doesn't care what Ramsey Clark says. And that's 3 what she said in that recording. 4 What you learn from that, among other things, is the 5 fact that whatever Ramsey Clark did and said in the past served 6 as no precedent for Stewart, because she really didn't care 7 what he had to say or what his view was. 8 Now, as you know, the press release was issued on 9 June 13, 2000, to a Reuters reporter, Esmat Salaheddin, who 10 testified. He was here. 11 Let me just remind you of one thing. While heard 12 repeated instructions during the course of the trial that 13 newspaper articles are not in evidence for their truth, 14 Mr. Salaheddin's testimony about what Clark -- what Stewart 15 said to him during their conversation, that's in evidence. 16 Those are admissions of Stewart, and they are in evidence for 17 the truth. Those are statements that he told you she made to 18 him. That's in evidence for the truth, her admissions, 19 essentially, of her involvement in the crimes that she's 20 charged with in this case and those that involve issuing the 21 press release. 22 Now, interesting, when Sattar and Stewart spoke with 23 Salaheddin on June 13th, they all knew, both knew, of course, 24 Salaheddin was in Egypt. They were issuing this press release 25 to a Reuters reporter who was in Cairo, Egypt. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11283 4cuesat1 1 And that's significant. It's significant because 2 clearly they wanted Abdel Rahman's message delivered in the 3 Middle East. That's where the Islamic Group was. Either 4 members were in Egypt -- you know, members like Taha and Hamza 5 were in Afghanistan, that's where they were based. And whether 6 they were in Egypt or another Middle East country, their goal, 7 Stewart's, Sattar's and Yousry's goal, was to get the message 8 to the Middle East. 9 Stewart testified she knew lots of reporters here in 10 New York. In fact, she knew a Reuters reporter here in 11 New York named Jeanne King, who was on one or two of our 12 recordings we played to you. She was friends with Jeanne King. 13 But the interest and goal is to get the message to the Middle 14 East members so they know Abdel Rahman no longer supports the 15 ceasefire, is now supporting the return to violence and 16 killing. 17 The reason for that is obviously -- there's three 18 reasons that it's important. One is Abdel Rahman certainly by 19 that time, long before then, has joined the conspiracy with 20 Sattar and Taha to engage in a conspiracy of murder, killings 21 and kidnappings outside the United States. That's one. 22 Announcing the press release, which was one of the 23 goals of Sattar and Taha, was to give them legitimacy, give 24 their position, their anticeasefire position legitimacy. So 25 it's out there announced by a lawyer, not by them, by a lawyer SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11284 4cuesat1 1 representing Abdel Rahman. Gives their position the legitimacy 2 and has one other function and purpose, which is it assists 3 Taha and Sattar in convincing others in the Islamic Group to 4 join them, to end the ceasefire and resume the killings and the 5 violence. 6 Just a comment or two about the language that Stewart 7 used. We asked her about it when she testified. She didn't 8 use any soft language, like Abdel Rahman doesn't support the 9 initiative anymore; Abdel Rahman doesn't support the peace 10 initiative anymore. She came out and said, used the plain 11 language that she intended to use: He no longer supported the 12 ceasefire. A military term. A temporary halt to hostilities, 13 a stoppage of violence. 14 That's the word she used. That's the word she meant 15 to use. She's a lawyer. As you well know, having heard maybe 16 too much of us talking for a while, or hearing too much of us 17 talk, lawyers' tools, the actual essence of a lawyer's 18 practice, particularly in the courtroom, is the words they use. 19 The choice of words is significant. She understands that. She 20 understood it then. She was making the message as clear as 21 possible: End the ceasefire, start the violence and the 22 killing. 23 Interesting, when Stewart testified, she characterized 24 the press release like this, this is her testimony: It was an 25 invitation to a discussion, she said. It was a communication SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11285 4cuesat1 1 that we felt was necessary to maintain his posture within the 2 support group in Egypt. Invitation to a discussion. There is 3 nothing in Mr. Salaheddin's article about inviting anybody to a 4 discussion. It was a clear declaration: End the ceasefire, 5 start the violence and killing. 6 Maintain his posture in his support group? 7 Interesting way to describe the Islamic Group, a support group. 8 As you well know by now, they're not a support group. They're 9 a terrorist organization. But obviously Ms. Stewart can't get 10 on the stand and say, we wanted to maintain his position in 11 this terrorist organization. That's what they are. That's 12 what they were. That's what they do, commit acts of terrorism. 13 They're not a support group. They're a terrorist organization. 14 Interesting, in the press release itself and in 15 Mr. Salaheddin's article, what does Stewart say besides the 16 fact she announces his withdrawal, support for the ceasefire? 17 If you go to the second page of the article, and the article is 18 attached to Government Exhibit 9, that is Mr. Fitzgerald's 19 letter to Ms. Stewart of August 3, 2000. 20 When he announces, says to her she has to sign a new 21 affirmation and attaches a number of articles, Mr. Salaheddin's 22 article is in amongst the articles that Mr. Fitzgerald 23 attaches. And that's the article of June 14, 2000, where the 24 announcement of the withdrawal is actually in that article. 25 That's the article that Salaheddin created after his SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11286 4cuesat1 1 conversation with Stewart on the phone on June 13th. It's 2 published the next day by Reuters. 3 On the second page of that article, she says to 4 Mr. Salaheddin, they, meaning the US authorities, may bar me 5 from visiting him because of this announcement. 6 Didn't Ms. Stewart testify and say, issuing a press 7 release was perfectly proper under the SAMs? Didn't she tell 8 you that Pat Fitzgerald was too good a lawyer not to understand 9 that issuing press releases while representing Abdel Rahman was 10 lawyering, was appropriate? Didn't she say that to you in her 11 testimony? 12 Well, if that's what she really truly believed back on 13 June 13th of 2000, why is she saying to Salaheddin, my issuing 14 this press release may result in me being prevented from never 15 seeing or not seeing Abdel Rahman again? Why is she saying 16 that to Salaheddin? Because she knows full well she's 17 violating the SAMs, committed a criminal act and this bubble 18 concept, this concept doesn't exist. It only existed when she 19 walked into this courtroom before the trial started and created 20 it, because it didn't exist on June 13th when she's talking to 21 Salaheddin and saying to him, among other things, besides Abdel 22 Rahman's withdrawal of support for the ceasefire, by doing what 23 I'm doing now, I'm going to be in trouble. That's what she 24 says. Because she knew then and understood that, in fact, she 25 was violating the laws and violating the SAMs and engaged in SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11287 4cuesat1 1 wrongdoing. 2 Now, after the press release was actually issued -- 3 and you remember, Yousry wasn't present in the -- in Stewart's 4 office here in Manhattan when they spoke to Salaheddin and 5 issued the statement. But Stewart said to you he was planning 6 to be there, just couldn't make it for the big event. 7 But Yousry was still quite interested. He wasn't just 8 one of these people who translates and then goes about his own 9 business, because he has an interest in what's going on with 10 the press release, what's going on with the ceasefire, what's 11 going on with Abdel Rahman's statements. 12 And so about an hour or so after the press release is 13 issued -- and it's in Government Exhibit 1104X -- on the same 14 day, June 13, 2000, he calls Sattar on the phone and they have 15 a very cryptic conversation in which he asks Sattar, quote, did 16 Lynne do that thing? Meaning obviously issue the press 17 release. And Sattar said, yeah, she has, it's done. 18 Now, Sattar wasn't satisfied with just talking to one 19 reporter because, of course, it was important to get this 20 message out and get it published in the Middle East so that 21 other Islamic Group members and associates could get the 22 message and join Taha and Sattar in their efforts to end the 23 ceasefire and resume the violence. 24 And what happens was there's a conversation that's 25 recorded on three actual exhibits, Government Exhibits 1105X, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11288 4cuesat1 1 1106X and 1107X, also on June 13th, same day as the press 2 release, after the press release is issued to Salaheddin, where 3 Sattar talks to a reporter named Mohammed Al-Shafi'i. You 4 remember that name perhaps. 5 And he says to Al-Shafi'i, you know, we're issuing a 6 press release through Reuters. Be aware of it. Look for it. 7 You'll want to know what it's about. And then he says to 8 Al-Shafi'i -- he describes Abdel Rahman's statements, and then 9 these are his words. He says that Abdel Rahman -- this is a 10 quote -- is withdrawing his support to the initiative to halt 11 the military operations. We did not gain anything from this 12 initiative. The prisons are still full, the military courts 13 are still in process and the death sentences are ordered and 14 executed. 15 Well, Sattar makes the statement as clear as it can 16 be, okay. His -- we're withdrawing his support for the 17 initiative to halt military operations. And as we talked about 18 yesterday, "military operations" is just sort of a nice way of 19 saying terrorist acts. That's the way terrorists talk about 20 them, I guess. 21 And as you know, after the release, the press release 22 was issued to Salaheddin, it made its way into a number of 23 Arabic language newspapers in the Middle East, Asharq Al-Awsat 24 and others as well. And there was quite a reaction to the 25 press release, because, if you recall, there were a number of SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11289 4cuesat1 1 proceasefire Islamic Group members who were real upset about 2 it, to say the very least, including Salah Hashem and Hamza. 3 And there were conversations and evidence in which Salah Hashem 4 talks to Taha and essentially is debating with him, how can you 5 have issued this statement? You don't understand what the 6 conditions are like here in Egypt. 7 If you recall, Salah Hashem is in Egypt, Taha is in 8 Afghanistan or somewhere else in the Middle East. He doesn't 9 know what's actually happening in Egypt. And there's a debate. 10 You can find that, by the way, in Government Exhibit 1111X, 11 which was a June 14, 2000, conversation. And clearly Taha and 12 Salaheddin disagree strongly with one another as to whether the 13 initiative -- whether the ceasefire has really benefitted the 14 Islamic Group. Salah Hashem and apparently Muntasir Al-Zayat, 15 the lawyer, strongly believe that it has been effective and 16 that the group has benefitted in many ways. And Salah Hashem 17 describes the ways they have benefitted from it. 18 You know that after the release, press release 19 occurred, persons, most likely proceasefire Islamic Group 20 members, issued statements to the press denouncing Sattar, 21 calling him a CIA agent, a United States government agent of 22 some kind, and trying to -- and stated in their whatever press 23 releases they issued, that, in fact, the withdrawal of support 24 by Abdel Rahman was a fabrication. It was a phony story. It 25 was created by Sattar. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11290 4cuesat1 1 And you know Sattar was real upset about that and was 2 very unhappy about it. There is a couple of conversations he 3 had with Al-Zayat about it. They're at Government 4 Exhibit 1250X and 1114X, both on June 15, 2000, where he's 5 upset because he's being called a government agent and his 6 credibility is being challenged. He's all upset about that. 7 Now, you know on June 15, two days after Stewart 8 issues the press release, she has a conversation with Lisa 9 Sattar. Lisa Sattar is the wife of the defendant Ahmed Sattar. 10 Apparently Stewart was calling to talk to Ahmed Sattar about 11 the press release, and they have a -- he's not home so Stewart 12 talks to Lisa Sattar. And they're talking about the press 13 release and, more significantly, the reaction in the Arabic 14 language media to the press release. 15 They're talking about how it's the front page news on 16 the major Arabic newspapers in the Middle East. That was 17 Sattar's goal, get on the front page. It's got to be 18 important. 19 It's mentioned that it's on the television. Arab 20 language television stations are announcing Abdel Rahman's 21 withdrawal of support. 22 So Taha and Sattar have accomplished their goal of 23 getting it publicized. It's out there and it's out there in a 24 very big way; front page news on the papers, on the TV stations 25 as well. And we're going to play for you now that recording. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11291 4cuesat1 1 It's not terribly long. 2 Why don't you grab your earphones and turn them on. 3 This is the conversation, it's June 15th, 2000, 4 between Stewart and Lisa Sattar. 5 Don't forget to turn them on. 6 (Recording played) 7 MR. DEMBER: Much to talk about in this conversation. 8 First of all, one thing you know off the bat, 9 Ms. Stewart doesn't know she's being recorded. This is the 10 recording, the wiretap on Sattar's phone. That's how it's 11 being picked up. And Stewart has no idea, no knowledge that 12 her conversation is being recorded. 13 Is she talking openly and freely? Certainly. 14 Apparently she's very friendly with Lisa Sattar, is comfortable 15 with her, apparently is a friend and is talking honestly and 16 freely. She's not hindered by anything. She's not trying to 17 justify anything. She's, for all intents and purposes, we can 18 conclude, speaking honestly. 19 One thing you learn just listening to the tone of the 20 voices is Stewart is quite pleased with herself. She issued a 21 press release, it's front page news in the Middle East and 22 she's actually pleased by that. She's happy by that, okay. 23 And what does she say? She initiates this idea, I 24 can't hide this from Pat Fitzgerald. Well, hold it. If she's 25 entitled to issue press releases, that's her belief, if this is SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11292 4cuesat1 1 what she thinks is lawyering, that the SAMs allow her to do it, 2 even though the SAMs clearly, clearly prevent her from issuing 3 Abdel Rahman's statements, why is it she on her own says, oh, I 4 can't hide this from Pat Fitzgerald? Well, obviously, 5 obviously she knows what she's doing is a clear violation of 6 the SAMs. And what she's doing is illegal. 7 In fact, it appears from the conversation that Lisa 8 Sattar knows it's illegal, too, and improper, because she tells 9 Stewart that earlier that morning she had asked Ahmed -- that's 10 Mr. Sattar over here -- whether Stewart would get in trouble 11 because she issued the press release. So Lisa Sattar 12 apparently knows that that's a violation, too. Maybe she read 13 the SAMs that her husband had in their apartment on Staten 14 Island that were seized that we talked about yesterday. But 15 she knows it's a violation, too, apparently, or has a good idea 16 that it certainly is. 17 Where is -- when she says this, when Stewart said, I 18 haven't heard from Pat Fitzgerald and I can't hide this from 19 Pat Fitzgerald, where is the "I'm not concerned because there's 20 a bubble we're operating under" or "we're allowed to do this so 21 I'm not concerned"? because clearly Lisa Sattar is expressing a 22 concern that she had about Stewart that she shared with her 23 husband. And so where is the conversation from Stewart saying, 24 no, no, no, there's not a concern here? Whether she uses the 25 word bubble or not, why isn't she saying to Lisa Sattar openly SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11293 4cuesat1 1 and honestly, I'm not concerned here, there shouldn't be 2 repercussions because it's understood, of course, by Pat 3 Fitzgerald and the US Attorney's Office that I can do what I'm 4 doing, which is issue press releases with Abdel Rahman's 5 statements withdrawing his support for the ceasefire? 6 You don't hear any of that. You hear the opposite of 7 that, because this bubble concept didn't come into existence 8 until right before this trial. Didn't exist back in June of 9 2000. It's something that had to be created for this 10 courtroom, because if there is not a bubble created for this 11 courtroom, then Stewart is guilty of involving -- involvement 12 in Count 1, conspiring to defraud the United States; she's 13 guilty of Count 6, making false statements to the United States 14 government when she submitted to the US Attorney's Office the 15 attorney affirmation dated May 16, 2000, that she signed before 16 the May 2000 visit when she went to the -- before she went to 17 the prison, violated all kinds of provisions in the SAMs and 18 then, of course, violated the SAMs once again by issuing the 19 press release. 20 So rather than say to you, ladies and gentlemen, I'm 21 guilty of these two counts, she has to make a story up. And 22 that's the bubble, because if there was a bubble, if she 23 legitimately really believed that she could do -- issue that 24 press release, you'd hear a different conversation here from 25 what you heard. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11294 4cuesat1 1 Rather than saying, I'm going to have to live with the 2 repercussions, why isn't she saying, oh, no, there aren't going 3 to be any repercussions because I'm allowed to do this? I'm 4 just doing lawyering. She doesn't say that. 5 Interesting, what she does say is it's the right thing 6 to do. Issuing this press release is the right thing to do. 7 Knowing what she knows about the Islamic Group, knowing what 8 she knows about the ceasefire, knowing what preceded this 9 ceasefire, knowing that Abdel Rahman's statement is a call for 10 withdrawing support for the ceasefire and resuming violence, 11 that is the right thing to do? Exposing innocent people in 12 Egypt to murder is the right thing to do? She knows better. 13 Well, I guess if you believe, like Stewart believes, 14 that like Sattar, like Abdel Rahman, that there needs to be a 15 change in the government of Egypt and the only way that's going 16 to come about is by violence, then I guess, yeah, that may be 17 the right thing to do. But that's criminal. It's a criminal 18 act. And that's what she's saying. Right thing to do? You 19 know better. 20 Then the following day, June 16, 2000, there's another 21 interesting conversation. This one is with Stewart and Yousry. 22 It's not an exhibit that the government introduced but both 23 Stewart and Yousry introduced this particular exhibit in their 24 defenses. It's -- the exhibit is LS701T or MY1713. 25 And let me sort of set the stage for you. It's up on SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11295 4cuesat1 1 the screen, we'll leave it there, but before you look at it, 2 let me tell you about it. 3 It's a conversation in the morning of June 16, 2000. 4 And Yousry and Stewart are talking about Sattar. Yousry is 5 telling Stewart that Sattar is all upset because in the media 6 he is being portrayed -- meaning Sattar, is being portrayed as 7 a CIA operative, a spy, a government agent and that he planted 8 this false story that Abdel Rahman had withdrawn his support 9 for the ceasefire. 10 And Yousry tells Stewart that Sattar is very upset. 11 He's not going to work, he's beside himself. And what happens? 12 Well, Stewart and Yousry talk about, gee, what should we do 13 about this? And one of the things Stewart says is, gee, maybe 14 I should go call the reporter again, meaning Salaheddin, and 15 clarify the situation. 16 And up on your screen on pages five to six of the 17 transcript, it's -- again, this exhibit's available for you. 18 It's -- again, these are the transcripts. The recording is in 19 English, of course, the recording is what's in evidence. But 20 they're talking about -- Stewart's talking about how obviously 21 Sattar had nothing to do with this. She's the one who issued 22 them. 23 And here's what she says about this: You know, I 24 think I've got to call him back and say, what ridiculous stuff 25 is this? SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11296 4cuesat1 1 The "him" apparently is Salaheddin. 2 Then she says, I'm risking my whole career to bring 3 this out. 4 Yousry says in response, yeah. And then they blame it 5 on -- apparently he's referring to Sattar. 6 And Stewart responds -- she responds, and then she 7 says, do you think I'm doing this lightly? Are you crazy? 8 Would I lie? It's ridiculous. And Ahmed said sorry, I just 9 happened to be around as a translator. 10 What is Stewart saying? This is the day after the 11 Lisa Sattar conversation. They're talking about the fact that 12 Sattar is being blamed for the press release, okay. They are 13 blaming him in the Arabic press for being the one who 14 fabricated this press release, fabricated Abdel Rahman's 15 statements. 16 And what is Stewart saying? What, are they crazy, the 17 people who think that Sattar did that? She did it. She has 18 risked her whole career to do it. Risked her whole career. 19 She's risked her whole career, obviously, because she knows 20 she's violated the SAMs by doing it. She's committed a 21 criminal act. That's why she's risked her whole career to 22 bring this out. That's what she's saying. 23 Why isn't she saying at that point, well, you know, he 24 didn't do it but I'm allowed to do it. There's this bubble out 25 there and this is lawyering. And I'm allowed to do this SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11297 4cuesat1 1 because the SAMs really, while they say I can't do it and I 2 promised in the affirmation I wouldn't do it, I did it anyway. 3 But even though the SAMs say I can't do it and I promised I 4 wouldn't do it, I can do it. 5 No, she doesn't say anything like that. She doesn't 6 say there's a bubble or talk about the bubble concept of, oh, 7 the lawyers can do whatever they want, even though they're all 8 required to promise to abide by the SAMs. She didn't say that. 9 She's talking to Yousry. They're friends. They know 10 each other for years. She's talking openly and honestly to 11 him, candidly with him, and saying honestly and candidly, I'm 12 risking my whole career by doing this. How can they be blaming 13 Sattar? I'm in trouble for having my name in this press 14 release and having my name in the papers. How is it that they 15 blame Sattar, she says, because -- that's as clear an admission 16 as there can be. 17 Now, what's also interesting about the conversation is 18 the Yousry response. Okay, remember Mr. Yousry? Oh, I didn't 19 know anything was wrong with issuing a press release until, you 20 know, August of 2000 or afterwards, when Stewart was required 21 to sign a new affirmation. I thought press releases were fine. 22 We've debunked that theory, that testimony, yesterday. 23 But here's another example of it. When she says, I'm risking 24 my whole career by bringing this out, meaning issuing the press 25 release, what does Yousry say? Yeah. And then they blame it SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11298 4cuesat1 1 on -- and then obviously he tails off, but he means Sattar; 2 meaning, yeah, you are risking your whole career, yes, I 3 understand you're risking your whole career because I, Yousry, 4 know what the SAMs prohibit you from doing. And what they 5 prohibit you from doing is issuing press releases with Abdel 6 Rahman's statements in them. He's saying, yeah, I understand. 7 I know what you're talking about. 8 If he at that point believed that the -- Stewart was 9 allowed to issue the press release, why isn't he saying, hold 10 it, Lynne Stewart, why are you saying this, that it's risking 11 your whole career? Why are you saying that? I don't 12 understand. I thought you guys could issue press releases 13 whenever you wanted to about anything, including Abdel Rahman's 14 words. 15 He doesn't. Because he understands. He understands 16 what she's done. Violated the law, violated the SAMs. So he 17 doesn't ask the question. 18 And just to mention briefly, a conversation that 19 Sattar has two days later on June 18th, 2000, with Taha, he 20 repeats what Stewart said to Yousry. He talks to Taha and he's 21 talking about the press release. And he says to Taha that the 22 lawyers before getting permission to visit Abdel Rahman are 23 required to sign, quote, papers saying that he is not allowed 24 to say anything or pass anything. That is why I told you this 25 woman, meaning Stewart, risked her whole future. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11299 4cuesat1 1 Where did he get that from? He got that from 2 obviously talking to Stewart. He got that because by issuing 3 the press release. He, Sattar, understood she was risking her 4 whole future, her whole career by issuing the press release. 5 Now, with others in the Arabic community, the Islamic 6 Group saying, uh-oh, this is a fabrication, it's false, it was 7 decided by Sattar and Yousry and Stewart, hmm, maybe we need to 8 issue another press release, okay, issue another press release, 9 reaffirming what Abdel Rahman has said. 10 And if you remember on the call we just played with 11 Lisa Sattar, Stewart said that there's going to be a legal call 12 on a particular day and that she was going to be present to see 13 whether the government prevented her from getting on the 14 telephone and talking to Abdel Rahman, because the press 15 release had been issued and she thinks, well, even though it's 16 in the Arabic language newspapers issued in the Middle East, 17 that the US Attorney's Office and Pat Fitzgerald may learn 18 about it and prevent her from getting on the legal call which 19 is supposed to take place on June 20th. 20 And she goes to Ramsey Clarke's office on that day and 21 is present during the legal call and gets on the phone and is 22 not prevented from doing so. And what happens then is she and 23 Yousry talk to Abdel Rahman. 24 Now, this is one visit before the start of the 25 recording of the legal calls by the FBI. They had SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11300 4cuesat1 1 authorization starting on June 23rd to record the conversations 2 between Abdel Rahman and his attorneys. This is three days 3 before that, so it's not recorded. 4 But from the evidence and the testimony in particular 5 you know what happened during the call. They obviously talked 6 to Abdel Rahman about the press release. And Stewart said in 7 her testimony that they read to Abdel Rahman the newspaper 8 accounts of the press release; let him know what's going on 9 because they're thinking, we need to issue a second press 10 release, and he needs to know what the newspaper articles are 11 saying about the first press release. And they're obviously 12 trying to give him, or going to have him reaffirm what he's 13 already said, which is he's withdrawing his support for the 14 ceasefire. He wants an end to the ceasefire, a resumption of 15 the violence. 16 Now, what's interesting about the reading of the 17 newspapers is this: Stewart told you in her testimony that she 18 didn't know a thing about Taha until this trial, until this 19 case. Didn't know anything about him, despite the fact that 20 she's helped smuggle in a statement by Taha, about the al-Azhar 21 student uprising and is referred to in Taha's message in 22 Sattar's letter, she claims, oh, I didn't know who Taha is, 23 didn't know who this Abu Yasir guy was before the May 2000 24 visit. 25 Well, that's of course nonsense. She knew quite SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11301 4cuesat1 1 clearly who he was because she was there and had both of those 2 documents, the Sattar letter with Taha's message in it and the 3 statement by Taha, read to her before the visit. She knew who 4 he was. And she had also delivered his message seeking an end 5 to the ceasefire with Yousry to Abdel Rahman back during the 6 March 1999 visit. So she knew exactly who this guy was. But 7 it's further confirmation certainly that she knows who he is 8 during this telephone call. 9 What happens is they read him newspaper articles, 10 okay, and a number of those newspaper articles we put into 11 evidence. They were found in Yousry's home. And each and 12 every one of those newspaper articles is dated either on 13 June 20th, 2000, or beforehand. Each indicates, approved by 14 Lynne Stewart for reading, which, as you know, indicates that 15 Yousry can read them to Abdel Rahman. 16 And you also know Stewart never would approve anything 17 without Yousry reading articles, letters, newspapers to her 18 verbatim. So she knew exactly what was in them. And as we 19 briefly put each one of these newspapers on the screen, I'll 20 summarize what they say. 21 The first one's Government Exhibit 2312-45BT. It's a 22 June 19, 2000, Al-Hayat article. And as you see on the top 23 left-hand side, approved by Lynne Stewart, 6/20/2000. No doubt 24 before the legal call that day. And essentially -- and by the 25 way, look at the article during your deliberations, if you SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11302 4cuesat1 1 like, and read it. I'll summarize it for you. 2 The article reported that Taha was Abu Yasir. It 3 actually said that in the article, Taha is Abu Yasir, 4 obviously. And it also says that the Islamic Group will 5 reconsider the ceasefire in light of Omar Abdel Rahman's 6 withdrawal of support. Wow, that's exactly what Taha and 7 Sattar wanted. It also talks about how the Luxor massacre was 8 committed by the Islamic Group seeking to free Abdel Rahman. 9 Okay. Let's go to the next article. It's Government 10 Exhibit 2312-49T. It's a June 15, 2000, article in Al-Hayat, 11 once again, approved by Stewart. And it talks about the 12 following: It contrasts the majority of the Islamic Group, 13 which is led by Hamza, that wants to maintain the ceasefire 14 with the Taha wing of the Islamic Group that rejects the 15 ceasefire and wants to return to violence. 16 And it indicates that Abdel Rahman's statements 17 clearly favor Taha's faction of the Islamic Group. Well, of 18 course it does. You know that it does. You have a newspaper 19 reporter apparently reading it, the statement, the press 20 release, and saying clearly, obviously, it favors Taha. That's 21 what was the intention that Taha and Sattar had, and Yousry and 22 Stewart for that matter. 23 Let's go to the next article, Government 24 Exhibit 2312-47BT. It's a June 16, 2000, Al-Hayat article, 25 once again, approved by Stewart as indicated on the translation SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11303 4cuesat1 1 of the article. And it describes that Abdel Rahman's support 2 for the ceasefire in 1997 made it happen. 3 And what that tells you is, according to at least the 4 newspapers, Abdel Rahman is an influential guy. He's an 5 important person. Even though he's in jail in America spending 6 the rest of his life in jail, he still has the power and the 7 influence to influence other people within his group to 8 actually, back in '97 at least, support the ceasefire. 9 But now, in June 2000, he's going in the other 10 direction. He's no longer supporting the ceasefire. And 11 obviously that's a concern to everyone who favors the 12 ceasefire. 13 And the last article I want to talk about is 14 Government Exhibit 2312-45 AT. It's an undated article written 15 by Mohammed Al-Shafi'i. We've mentioned his name before. It 16 indicates on the top it's approved by Lynne Stewart, also on 17 June 20th, 2000. It's the date of this call. And it's 18 entitled, "Islamic Group threatens Washington with an imminent 19 action." 20 Okay. In the article Taha threatens the United States 21 and talks about ending the ceasefire in light of Abdel Rahman's 22 withdrawal of support. Now, all of these articles are read to 23 Stewart either on June 20th or beforehand. Before they're read 24 to Abdel Rahman. 25 One thing you learn about that, you know about that SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11304 4cuesat1 1 is, well, hold on, didn't Stewart say in her testimony she 2 didn't know a thing about this guy Taha until this case or this 3 trial? Yeah, well, these articles prove the lie to that, put a 4 lie to that statement by her. 5 She knew about Taha. She knew all about him. What I 6 just summarized for you, which appears in those articles, is 7 what you knew about him as well. She knew who Taha was. She 8 knew that Abu Yasir was Taha. And when she testified here in 9 court, she was dishonest with you when she said she didn't know 10 who Taha was. 11 Now, you know who -- what Taha is, who he is. You 12 know what he's all about. So it's not surprising that she 13 would want to distance herself from Taha as best she could. 14 He's the bad news. He's a bad guy. He's a militant terrorist. 15 He's the worst type of terrorist that exists. Not surprising 16 that she doesn't -- she wants to distance herself from him. 17 In fact, when Yousry testified, if you recall, we 18 asked him on cross-examination about his knowledge of Taha. 19 And initially he tried to minimize how much he knew and when he 20 knew it. But with further cross-examination, he conceded that 21 he learned about him early on, knew about the fact that he was 22 a leader of the group. Knew about the fact that he was in 23 charge of the military wing or training for terrorist 24 operations in Afghanistan. He knew a lot about this guy and he 25 knew about it well before 2000. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11305 4cuesat1 1 But not surprising, Yousry, like Stewart, wants to 2 distance himself from Taha as best he can, because Taha is 3 nothing short of very bad news. 4 On the other hand, then there's Sattar. He can't 5 distance himself from Taha. As much as he probably, sitting 6 there right now, would like to and would like to before this 7 trial started, there's too many conversations, too many 8 incriminating, damaging conversations with Taha; aligning 9 himself with Taha, working with Taha for violence, working with 10 Taha to issue a fatwah, working with Taha to end the ceasefire. 11 He is married to the guy. As he told one person on 12 the telephone, they're friends. They're more than friends. 13 They're coconspirators, cocriminals in the same criminal 14 enterprise, same criminal conspiracy. 15 And all Sattar could tell you on the witness stand 16 about it was, I'm just trying to help Egyptians and other 17 Muslims. That's all I was trying to do. Well, you know 18 better. 19 The press release -- what comes of this telephone call 20 with Abdel Rahman on June 20th is a second press release. And 21 in the second press release, Abdel Rahman reaffirms what he was 22 saying in the first press release, reaffirms that what he said 23 on May 20, 2000, during the second day of that visit in 24 Minnesota was, I am withdrawing my support for the ceasefire. 25 I support a resumption of violence and killing in Egypt. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11306 4cuesat1 1 That's what he's doing. 2 And by the way, if you want to actually look at what 3 the press release looks like, it's Government Exhibit 2663. It 4 was found in Stewart's office. She conceded that's what it was 5 and that she had issued it. Once again, violating the SAMs 6 among other things. 7 Now, as you know, the second press release was also 8 issued. There were conversations with everyone's favorite 9 press agent, Yassir al-Sirri, from London. And the statement 10 got out and it was published. And as you know, word got out 11 and there were other articles published in the Government 12 Exhibit 9. In one of the articles attached to Mr. Fitzgerald's 13 letter to Stewart is Salaheddin's second article about the -- 14 which talks about the second press release. And you can read 15 it right there. 16 Let's talk a little bit about Pat Fitzgerald and the 17 government learning about what Stewart and Yousry and Sattar 18 were doing. 19 Mr. Fitzgerald testified that back in June of 2000 he 20 read press reports that Abdel Rahman had issued this statement 21 withdrawing his support for the ceasefire, read it in a Reuters 22 article, obviously Mr. Salaheddin's article. And you know this 23 is the first time that Pat Fitzgerald or anyone in the United 24 States Attorney's Office learned about any of the defendants' 25 conduct in this case, anything about what they had done. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11307 4cuesat1 1 And all he learned at that point was that a press 2 release had been issued. He didn't know about messages being 3 passed back and forth, who they were being passed back and 4 forth. All he knows is what he's reading in the papers, okay, 5 and that is that Lynne Stewart issued a press release 6 announcing Abdel Rahman's withdrawal of support for the 7 ceasefire. 8 And you know that this is the first time -- the reason 9 why this is the first time Pat Fitzgerald learns about the fact 10 that, gee, something must have happened during either calls or 11 visits to Abdel Rahman, because this is the first time it's 12 publicized. What happened back in March of 1999 during that 13 visit, September of '99, February of 2000 was never publicized. 14 All the things we talked about yesterday during those visits 15 were never publicized. So he didn't know about them. 16 Now, you learned from Mr. Fitzgerald that his initial 17 instincts were, gee, maybe I better start a investigation here, 18 criminal investigation. It sounds like obviously issuing press 19 releases with this terrible message may be criminal. And his 20 first thoughts are, let me maybe start or initiate a criminal 21 investigation. And that was his plan to do so. 22 And he told you that he had participated in a meeting 23 with the FBI on June 19th, 2000, obviously after the issuance 24 of the first press release. At that meeting he was told to 25 stand down, and he discussed that fact with his boss, Mary Jo SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11308 4cuesat1 1 White, who was the US Attorney at the time, United States 2 Attorney. And a decision was made to stand down, meaning not 3 to start an investigation. 4 Now, you folks know clearly that there was an 5 investigation already under way. You know that. At that time 6 when Mr. Fitzgerald planned to do an investigation, a criminal 7 investigation having to do with the issuance of the press 8 release, you know there was an investigation that preceded that 9 that was ongoing during all this time. 10 In fact, you know that that investigation started at 11 the very least back in 1996 and continued until these 12 defendants were arrested. You know that because we read and 13 played for you all kinds of recordings starting in 1996, in 14 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001. All these recordings were being 15 intercepted by the FBI. An investigation existed. 16 Obviously Pat Fitzgerald and the United States 17 Attorney's Office was not a part of that investigation. If 18 they were, they wouldn't say, and Pat Fitzgerald wouldn't like 19 to say I -- 20 MR. TIGAR: I object to this, your Honor. 21 THE COURT: All right. Sustained. Stricken. 22 MR. TIGAR: Stricken. 23 THE COURT: Sustained, stricken. Jury is instructed 24 to disregard. 25 MR. DEMBER: You know, ladies and gentlemen, an SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11309 4cuesat1 1 investigation existed. And that investigation, that 2 investigation certainly was picking up information and 3 intelligence about Sattar, Yousry and Stewart, but you know 4 from having been reviewing the transcripts, hearing the calls, 5 that that investigation was also picking up information about 6 some other rather dangerous people: Taha, Atia, Hamza. He was 7 also gathering information about them, wasn't he? 8 You knew and you know at that time Taha, Atia were 9 Islamic Group leaders, officials. Held high positions. You 10 knew Taha and Hamza were in Afghanistan. You know that Atia 11 was a fugitive in Egypt being looked for by Egyptian security 12 forces. Certainly Pat Fitzgerald at that time started a 13 criminal investigation and filed charges, that other 14 investigation from which these recordings which we've -- 15 MR. TIGAR: I object to this, your Honor. 16 THE COURT: Sustained. Sustained. Stricken. 17 MR. TIGAR: I'd like to be heard at the recess. 18 THE COURT: Jury is instructed to disregard. This 19 might be a convenient time to take a break. 20 Ladies and gentlemen, please, please remember my 21 continuing instructions. Please, don't talk about this case at 22 all. Always remember to keep an open mind until you've heard 23 all of the evidence, I have instructed you on the law, you've 24 gone to the jury room to begin your deliberations. 25 (Continued on next page) SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11310 4CUMSAT2 1 THE COURT: Please be seated, all. 2 MR. TIGAR: If your Honor please, the matter now being 3 discussed by counsel for the government was first brought to 4 the Court's attention during the hearing on September the 28th 5 and 29th of 2003 when Mr. Fitzgerald testified. There was that 6 memorandum. It was a classified memorandum. There was 7 extensive discussion of it. It remains sealed for various 8 purposes. That's the procedural history. 9 I made the deliberate tactical decision not to open up 10 certain matters and I made that decision and therefore not put 11 in play that memorandum. The government counsel knows that. 12 They were here for that. This piece of summation was not only 13 improper. I submit it was deliberate misconduct. It was 14 trespassing on what we all have been working on for this whole 15 trial. I move for a mistrial, or, in the alternative, that the 16 prosecutor be admonished in the presence of the jury for doing 17 it. 18 MS. BAKER: I would like to respond so Mr. Dember can 19 have a break since he is doing all of the speaking over the 20 last couple of days. 21 This issue, when it came up during Mr. Fitzgerald's 22 testimony, was an issue of whether the government could 23 establish that the investigation that had been going on was an 24 intelligence investigation, and the Court ruled that we 25 couldn't, and we didn't. What Mr. Dember has now sought to SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11311 4CUMSAT2 1 argue is fair inference from evidence that is in the record and 2 that evidence is Scott Kerns and other FBI personnel introduced 3 into evidence recordings made by the FBI starting in 1996. The 4 first recording that the government put into evidence was from 5 1996. Others were put into evidence from 1998, 1999, early 6 2000, all prior to the time that Pat Fitzgerald testified that 7 he thought about starting an investigation and then was called 8 into a meeting with the FBI. 9 So the obvious inference from the recordings that are 10 introduced into evidence is that the FBI was conducting an 11 investigation of some sort. Granted, there has never been any 12 testimony that it was an intelligence investigation. That was 13 what the Court precluded in response to objections by the 14 defense. But clearly there was an investigation by the FBI 15 starting in 1996. And then Mr. Fitzgerald testified clearly 16 during his testimony that he first learned what the FBI was 17 doing after the issuance of the press releases in June of 2000. 18 And then he conferred with Mary Jo White and decided not to 19 take additional steps on his own or through the U.S. Attorney's 20 Office. 21 But these defendants raise the issue in their opening 22 statements that the government, knowing what the defendants 23 were doing, didn't act. And in light of those arguments that 24 were previously made by the defense and in light of all of the 25 evidence that is in the record that supports the argument that SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11312 4CUMSAT2 1 Mr. Dember has now made, his argument is a fair one. And we 2 would respectfully ask the Court to reconsider the ruling 3 sustaining the objection and to allow the argument to stand in 4 Mr. Dember's summation, allow him to finish making the 5 argument, and deny any further relief sought by Ms. Stewart. 6 MR. TIGAR: If your Honor please, if we look back over 7 the transcript, what Mr. Dember said is not only there was 8 another kind of intelligence investigation -- 9 THE COURT: He never said intelligence. 10 MR. TIGAR: Thank you. May I start again. He told us 11 that this investigation was picking up information about some 12 other rather dangerous people, Taha, Atia, and Hamza. He was 13 gathering information about them, wasn't he? You knew and you 14 know at that time. You knew Taha was in Afghanistan. You know 15 Atia is a fugitive in Egypt. I don't know how you know Atia is 16 a fugitive in Egypt except Mr. Sattar was asked about it on 17 cross-examination, that there were recordings that were 18 admissible only against Mr. Sattar. That's a separate issue. 19 Although he didn't use the words intelligence investigation, it 20 couldn't be clearer. He is attempting to justify a 21 prosecutorial decision not to proceed. That's what he is 22 saying. They knew about it, but they decided not to proceed. 23 Now, if that is the issue and if Ms. Baker's position 24 is to be sustained that that's in play, fine, we will argue it, 25 that in 2000, in the year 2000, the government decided to stand SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11313 4CUMSAT2 1 down. When Janet Reno was Attorney General, it required an 2 Attorney General far more reckless than her to get a case like 3 this begun. If that's what is in practice, that's what is in 4 practice. I respectfully submit what was done here was 5 improper and it was done to take advantage of a whole series of 6 decisions that were made to exclude this very issue from 7 evidence. 8 MS. BAKER: Your Honor, Mr. Tigar is very cognizant of 9 the distinction between an intelligence investigation and a 10 criminal investigation, as are we all, because it relates to 11 certain legal issues that were litigated earlier in the case. 12 The jury has never heard that distinction drawn. Mr. Dember 13 was very careful in his arguments just now not to use the word 14 intelligence investigation. 15 The only thing the jury knows is that the FBI was 16 investigating. Then Mr. Fitzgerald, on behalf of the U.S. 17 Attorney's Office, learned of certain events. He considered 18 taking some additional action, met with FBI and then the U.S. 19 Attorney's Office through Mr. Fitzgerald, did not take action. 20 That is what was proved to the jury through the evidence at 21 trial. That is all that Mr. Dember has argued and for that 22 reason we would ask the Court, as I said earlier, to reconsider 23 the ruling on the objection. 24 MR. TIGAR: Not to prolong this, your Honor, but your 25 Honor sustained an objection to a question to Mr. Fitzgerald SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11314 4CUMSAT2 1 about what he was told. And the reason the objection was 2 sustained was that we weren't going to get into the hearsay. 3 He was told something. He had a conversation and he made a 4 certain decision. This whole line of argument is an attempt to 5 infer from the existence of the inadmissible and never received 6 hearsay what the conversation was and the considerations were. 7 That's the problem. Had that objection not been sustained, 8 then, of course, we would have had a compulsory process right 9 to put those agents on the stand and find out what really 10 happened, and not what Mr. Fitzgerald decided that he wanted to 11 tell us when he got it. 12 MS. BAKER: Your Honor sustained an objection to 13 certain additional testimony that we sought to elicit from Mr. 14 Fitzgerald about what he was told. The answer by Mr. 15 Fitzgerald about standing down was permitted and was given and 16 is evidence that is in the record. And Mr. Dember has not 17 argued anything beyond that. He has not argued anything that 18 would rely on anything that was sought and successfully 19 objected to as hearsay through Mr. Fitzgerald. 20 MR. RUHNKE: Your Honor, I want to say I join the 21 objection on behalf of Mr. Yousry. It also seems very plain 22 that there was an effort, deliberate on the part of Mr. Dember 23 to say to himself, how close can I come to telling the jury 24 that this was an intelligence investigation without saying the 25 words this was an intelligence investigation? For that reason, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11315 4CUMSAT2 1 I join Mr. Tigar's application. 2 MS. BAKER: Your Honor, I rise because that is unfair 3 to Mr. Dember and I want to note the government's objection to 4 that for the record. As I said earlier, everything that 5 Mr. Dember argued is supported by evidence in the record, and 6 however your Honor ultimately rules. And as I said, we ask you 7 to reconsider, there is no basis for these sorts of attacks on 8 Mr. Dember. 9 If your Honor is looking for the testimony, I can 10 provide you with the citation to Mr. Fitzgerald's testimony. 11 THE COURT: I have a recollection of the testimony, 12 based upon what the parties have said. 13 First of all, the motion for the mistrial is denied. 14 There is nothing that the government said that is so 15 prejudicial that the prompt and curative instructions that the 16 Court gave sustaining objections and striking the line of 17 argument are not wholly sufficient. Indeed, what the 18 government had been saying at that point was to repeat evidence 19 that, in fact, is in the record. 20 The government's application that I allow the line of 21 argument to continue is denied. The line of argument is, in 22 fact, irrelevant. All of the recordings are in evidence. Why 23 the recordings were made and the nature of the investigation, 24 which the government did not mention, is itself irrelevant. 25 The evidence is there from the recordings. It is also true, so SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11316 4CUMSAT2 1 far as I can tell, but I'll certainly listen to the parties. 2 And if any defendant raises this in summations, then, of 3 course, I would have to reconsider it. 4 When this issue initially came up, the government 5 argued that, if memory serves me right, that the government 6 should be permitted to argue something about the nature of the 7 investigation in order to counter what the defendants were 8 suggesting in opening, which is if this were such a big deal, 9 why didn't the government do something about it? But I did not 10 allow that and I stopped that for a variety of reasons which 11 are all reflected in the record, over the government's 12 objection. But I stopped that. And so having stopped it 13 there, summations should not be the time to open that up unless 14 the defendants for some reason begin to make those kinds of 15 arguments in their summations. 16 It is also reinforced by a couple of other things. 17 Why Mr. Fitzgerald stood down is irrelevant. The evidence is, 18 he stood down, further, again, unless the parties argue to me 19 that there is something there that I am not -- that I don't see 20 from all of the evidence in the case and the arguments of the 21 parties. 22 The second somewhat related issue is, as you already 23 know from the draft of the charge, whether the government was 24 even misled by this admission of any of the documents at issue 25 is itself irrelevant so that whether Mr. Fitzgerald in fact SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11317 4CUMSAT2 1 knew about anything would be removed from what the jury has to 2 decide in the case. So the government's application that I 3 reconsider my prompt sustaining of the objections and striking 4 that argument is denied. And my only question which I 5 addressed to the parties is whether, in view of all of the 6 evidence, should I give the additional instruction which is, 7 why Mr. Fitzgerald stood down is irrelevant to any matter that 8 you have to decide. 9 MS. BAKER: Your Honor, we would ask that you not give 10 such an instruction, and I want to respond to what the Court 11 has stated in announcing its decision just now. The defendants 12 squarely in their openings raised the issue, argued, 13 essentially, that the jury should infer that there was no real 14 risk of violence here, that the government never thought that 15 there really was a conspiracy to kill or kidnap or a 16 solicitation of violence going on, or materials supporting of a 17 conspiracy to kill or kidnap. And this argument was made most 18 clearly by Sattar's counsel in his opening. 19 Because had the government really thought that there 20 was any risk of violence, the government clearly would have 21 acted immediately in arresting people, charging people, but 22 they didn't do that. And so this issue, which was squarely 23 raised by the defendants in openings, is broader than just the 24 Count 1 conspiracy to defraud the U.S. And so the Court's 25 point that as a legal matter it is legally irrelevant because SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11318 4CUMSAT2 1 the U.S. doesn't actually need to be misled doesn't address 2 this issue as it relates particularly to Counts 2 and 3 and as 3 it was squarely raised by Sattar's counsel in his opening. 4 And the issue here is essentially that there was an 5 FBI investigation going on prior to the time in 2000 when Mr. 6 Fitzgerald learned of the press releases. He hadn't known of 7 that investigation. He learned of the investigation, which was 8 being done by the FBI and had been going on for a while. He 9 learned of it after he learned of the press releases; and then 10 after learning of that investigation, didn't pursue criminal 11 charges. 12 But the FBI's investigation continued, which is also 13 proved by the evidence in this case, evidence in evidence, 14 because additional recordings made by the FBI are in evidence, 15 recordings made all throughout the rest of 2000 and into 2001. 16 Indeed, the latest one that we put into evidence was 2002. So 17 the issue here is that the defendants have squarely raised this 18 issue in their openings that the government didn't act and that 19 the jury should infer from that that the government thought 20 that there wasn't any criminal activity going on, or wasn't any 21 potential for violence. 22 And the government's only way to address that within 23 the context of what has been admitted into evidence in this 24 case is essentially what I just said, not to talk about an 25 intelligence investigation, what the investigation was called, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11319 4CUMSAT2 1 or what was specifically said or not said to Mr. Fitzgerald, 2 but rather to say, the FBI had been investigating, Mr. 3 Fitzgerald didn't know that, so he thought about doing a 4 criminal investigation. Then he learned of the FBI's 5 investigation. He didn't do a criminal investigation. The 6 FBI's investigation continued. All of that is supported by 7 what was admitted into evidence at this trial, and that is the 8 only way that the government can rebut, address an issue that 9 has already been raised by the defense. 10 MR. TIGAR: Your Honor, we would request that you give 11 the instruction that you mentioned a few moments ago that you 12 thought might be appropriate. I must disagree with counsel. 13 It is true that when this issue came up beginning at page 2350 14 of the transcript, Mr. Morvillo asked leave to explore what was 15 said to Mr. Fitzgerald at the meeting. And your Honor said, 16 2350, line 4: Relevance, question mark. Then we excused the 17 jury so we could have more argument. And the Court at the end 18 of the day said: No, it is not relevant. 19 On the weight of that, Mr. Morvillo said: Well, the 20 fact that this case arose from an intelligence investigation is 21 going to come into evidence at some point one way or the other. 22 And then he described the ways in which that could happen, that 23 it could come into evidence. He then argued specifically that 24 Mr. Paul in opening had opened the door and, therefore, this 25 could come into evidence. Your Honor, even after that inquiry, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11320 4CUMSAT2 1 at the close of that day, sustained the objection. Mr. 2 Fitzgerald stood down, that's enough, no more. That's where 3 the record stood. 4 Now, if it is argued that the reasons why Mr. 5 Fitzgerald stood down, which the Court said could not come into 6 evidence, have suddenly become relevant, then, of course, there 7 would have to be evidence in the record as to the reasons Mr. 8 Fitzgerald stood down, which, after the Court excluded it, 9 because you sustained the objection, the government, despite 10 Mr. Morvillo's promise that Mr. Moore would be forthcoming, 11 never arose. Closing argument is not the place, we 12 respectfully suggest, to revisit these matters; the government 13 having elected, after the Court's ruling, to do nothing. And, 14 therefore, in addition to that, that's why I argued, I hope I 15 did -- not very coherently -- in addition to the relevance 16 point, the fact that what counsel was doing is going beyond the 17 record that under the Court's supervision the parties have 18 developed in the presence of the jury. 19 THE COURT: Mr. Paul. 20 MR. PAUL: Yes, your Honor. 21 I believe your Honor had ruled initially when the 22 government tried to go into this area, and tried to utilize my 23 opening as a way to go through what they claim was a door being 24 opened. Your Honor ruled that was not the case. 25 THE COURT: One question is whether Mr. Sattar would SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11321 4CUMSAT2 1 intend to argue in summation that the fact that the government 2 let all of this go on is an indication that it is all not very 3 serious. 4 MR. PAUL: Absolutely not, your Honor. I think the 5 evidence is what I would be arguing. I will not be making any 6 argument to the jury in my summation that seven years went by 7 and the government listening and never put a stop to this. And 8 obviously that inference to be raised as a result, they didn't 9 believe anything serious was happening. That is not going to 10 be an argument in my summation. 11 THE COURT: Or after Mr. Fitzgerald became aware of 12 the investigation that nothing was then done, that the 13 investigation continued for a period of time. 14 MR. PAUL: Your Honor, I don't believe I even 15 mentioned the name Fitzgerald in my summation, nor do I mention 16 anything about the prosecutors or their branch of this 17 investigation as this is nothing happening. That will not be 18 referred to in my summation. 19 THE COURT: I will give the additional instruction to 20 the jury. Because it is for the government to make the 21 determinations with respect to the conduct of an investigation 22 and the balancing of investigative priorities. I stopped that 23 in the evidence because of the irrelevance to why Mr. 24 Fitzgerald decided to stand down. It was sufficient that he 25 stood down. He had a meeting and he stood down. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11322 4CUMSAT2 1 At this point then it is irrelevant why he stood down, 2 and so I'll give the additional instruction. 3 MS. BAKER: Your Honor, a couple of points. First, 4 the argument that was had back at the time of Mr. Fitzgerald's 5 testimony about whether a door had been opened through 6 Mr. Sattar's opening, as the government understands that 7 argument and recalls the various points in the transcript where 8 it occurred, there was specifically the issue of whether 9 Mr. Sattar had opened the door to testimony that it was an 10 intelligence investigation because, in fact, in Mr. Sattar's 11 opening, the phrase intelligence investigation was used. 12 So the somewhat broader issue that is presented here 13 now was not what was being addressed back at the time during 14 Mr. Fitzgerald's testimony about whether or not a door had been 15 opened. The government had argued that the door to 16 "intelligence investigation" had been opened, and that was the 17 argument that the Court rejected at that time. So I want the 18 record to be clear about that. 19 Second, I would ask the Court to inquire of counsel 20 for Stewart and Yousry whether they also do not intend to make 21 this sort of argument. 22 THE COURT: Yes. That's fair. 23 MS. BAKER: Finally, as to the instruction that the 24 Court has indicated that it will give to the jury, the 25 government would ask that the Court add to that instruction the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11323 4CUMSAT2 1 sentence that the Court stated about a minute ago at lines 4 2 through 6 of page 45 of the Live Note transcript of today which 3 sentence was: "It is for the government to make the 4 determinations with respect to the conduct of an investigation 5 and the balancing of investigative priorities. 6 Because that sentence essentially explains the 7 rationale for the Court's ruling and basis for sustaining the 8 objection that Mr. Fitzgerald's decision making is irrelevant. 9 If your Honor just gives the additional instruction 10 that your Honor has proposed to give, without adding that 11 additional sentence that we are requesting, it will come across 12 to the jury as an additional rebuke of Mr. Dember which, the 13 government submits, respectfully, is not warranted for all the 14 reasons that I've already argued. 15 MR. TIGAR: If your Honor please, we do not agree with 16 the government's characterization of the earlier argument. We 17 suggest that the additional language is not appropriate. There 18 is a lengthy -- not lengthy, but there is an appropriate-length 19 discussion in the Court's final charge of the ways in which 20 government investigative techniques are not the concern of the 21 jury. 22 THE COURT: I've taken that out at the moment, unless 23 the government asks for it. 24 MR. TIGAR: They didn't ask for it? I'm sorry. I 25 don't have it in front of me. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11324 4CUMSAT2 1 THE COURT: Where law enforcement techniques were at 2 issue, there was an instruction. And I said that I would give 3 the instruction as it was drafted, except the government then 4 said: Well, we don't want to an instruction unless we think 5 there is something raised in summations that leads us to want 6 to give it. And so I said, all right, I'll take it out, so it 7 is not in the charge, unless I'm asked after summations to give 8 such an instruction with respect to law enforcement techniques. 9 MR. TIGAR: I stand corrected, your Honor. I have the 10 instructions in front of me. 11 In that case, your Honor, I make the same request. I 12 don't think it is appropriate to discuss this. We have not 13 even given our summations yet. We have not said that the 14 government has -- doesn't have those kinds of choices. The 15 purpose of my objection was to make an objection to two 16 specific remarks of government counsel. I have asked the Court 17 to instruct the jury in the language that the Court gave 18 earlier addressed to the narrow issue raised by the 19 government's conduct and not to the very broad issue about 20 investigative techniques. 21 THE COURT: There was a fair request from the 22 government. I've already posed it to Mr. Sattar's counsel, to 23 Ms. Stewart's counsel, and Mr. Yousry's counsel. 24 MR. TIGAR: I do not intend to make the argument that 25 the government suggests. That's not any part of our SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11325 4CUMSAT2 1 consideration. And as the Court knows, I have been very, very 2 careful about policing the line. As I said at the opening of 3 this colloquy, I have made a deliberation decision not to go 4 there, and I am not going there. 5 MR. STERN: We likewise will not comment on the 6 government's perception of the importance or lack of importance 7 of this case. 8 THE COURT: Then it is sufficient for me to say that I 9 sustained objections. Why Mr. Fitzgerald stood down is 10 irrelevant to any matter that you have to decide. And if the 11 government thinks that I should put back in the longer 12 instruction on law enforcement techniques -- 13 MS. BAKER: Your Honor, respectfully, the government 14 doesn't believe that the proposed instruction on law 15 enforcement techniques adequately addresses that issue. I 16 don't have the instruction in front of me to remind the Court 17 of its exact language, but the fair understanding of that 18 instruction is more along the lines of, for example, in a 19 firearms possession case where the police don't fingerprint the 20 gun. And so it doesn't really address the issue of the timing 21 of the starting of an investigation or not starting an 22 investigation, which is really the issue here. 23 MR. TIGAR: Your Honor, I understood what the Court 24 said about Rule 30 and all the rest of it. If in my summations 25 I say something that invites the jury to sit in judgment in a SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11326 4CUMSAT2 1 way to call for a corrective instruction, I expect to have the 2 Court make such a thing. 3 THE COURT: It is sufficient for me to give the 4 instruction which I said, why Mr. Fitzgerald stood down is 5 irrelevant to any matter that you have to decide. Without 6 getting into the numerous reasons for that, if there is 7 anything said in the defense summations that makes me 8 reconsider that, I will reconsider it. 9 Let's take five minutes. 10 (Recess) 11 (Jury present) 12 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, before we broke, I 13 sustained certain objections and struck some remarks. Why Mr. 14 Fitzgerald stood down is irrelevant to any matter that you have 15 to decide in this case. 16 Mr. Dember, you may proceed. 17 MR. DEMBER: Thank you, your Honor. 18 Ladies and gentlemen, after Mr. Fitzgerald stood down, 19 a decision was made not to start a criminal investigation. He 20 still took measures, made efforts to try to ensure that Stewart 21 abided by the SAMs and didn't in any other way, in any other 22 time again violate the promise that she had made when she 23 signed the attorney affirmations to abide by those SAMs. And 24 what he did was, as you know, drafted a new version of the 25 affirmation which was stronger. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11327 4CUMSAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Now, before that actually took place though, Stewart 2 told you during her testimony that in late July of 2000 she 3 received a call from Pat Fitzgerald. And in that call she told 4 you that Mr. Fitzgerald told her that she had violated the SAMs 5 by issuing the press releases. Of course, that's obvious. But 6 he told her that. He told her that she could no longer see 7 Abdel Rahman or speak to Abdel Rahman because of it. And she 8 claims that all she told Pat Fitzgerald at that time was that 9 she would have a lawyer get back to him. 10 How credible is that, that that's all she said to him? 11 She said to you at the same time, that conversation, which took 12 me about I don't know, 15, 20 seconds to tell you about, she 13 said it took five minutes, five minutes. I just gave you 14 essentially the rendition of her testimony she gave to you. 15 She said five minutes. Lynne Stewart thought she had every 16 right in the world to issue press releases, which included 17 statements by Abdel Rahman. She thought it was part of her 18 ethical duty. She thought it was part of her defending 19 vigorously, defending and representing Abdel Rahman. 20 And here Pat Fitzgerald calls her up and says, you're 21 being cut off. You can't talk to this man because you violated 22 the SAMs by issuing these press releases. And she says, I'll 23 have somebody call you back. Well, you know that's not 24 credible. You know that's not credible because you got to see 25 Lynne Stewart on the witness stand. And Lynne Stewart is not SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11328 4CUMSAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 afraid to say anything to anyone. When she testified, 2 particularly when we cross-examined her, we would ask her 3 questions that normally or typically would require a one-word 4 answer, and then she would start talking on and on and on and 5 on. And eventually she might actually have answered the 6 question by the time she stopped talking. But more typically 7 she would tell you what she wanted to say, not what was 8 responsive to the question. That's Lynne Stewart. 9 You know that Lynne Stewart is not shy about talking 10 to anybody about anything. We introduced statements she made 11 or asked her about, statements she made to two New York Times 12 reporters, Mr. Fried and Mr. Packer, where she shared her views 13 about the use of violence and when it is appropriate. She 14 shared her views about innocent noncombatants who happened to 15 be killed because they are somewhere targets of people who are 16 involved in struggles and her view about how she -- that's just 17 too bad basically, or rather she was inured about the fact that 18 innocent people, noncombatants, got killed, and she doesn't 19 know what's wrong with that. 20 She goes on television, national television, after she 21 has been charged in the case and talks away. We will have a 22 long discussion about that conversation a little later in my 23 summation. She is not afraid to say anything to anybody about 24 her views, as unusual as they are. You don't think for a 25 second, if she believed she was entitled to issue press SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11329 4CUMSAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 releases with Abdel Rahman's statements in them that she 2 wouldn't have said to Pat Fitzgerald on the phone, when he 3 says, you violated the SAMs by issuing these press releases, 4 you don't think she would have said to him, that's ridiculous, 5 of course, I'm allowed to do that if in fact she truly believed 6 it? She knew full well then she couldn't. She knew full well 7 it was a violation of the SAMs. She knew full well she had 8 violated the law by issuing those press releases. 9 That's why she didn't say to Pat Fitzgerald, oh, I'm 10 allowed to do that because at the end of July 2000 she knew 11 full well she couldn't do it. But she only tells you when she 12 comes to court she is now entitled to because she has to. The 13 bubble becomes important, it is fabricated because she can't 14 walk into court without it. It is the pretext she needs 15 because she is guilty of committing or involved in a conspiracy 16 to defraud the United States. She is guilty of lying in her 17 affirmation when she submitted it, of Counts 1 and 6. She has 18 to create the bubble to defend herself. 19 Well, what's interesting is that after that phone call 20 she tells you she retained a fellow named Stanley Cohen as her 21 lawyer to represent her. And when we questioned her about 22 that, we questioned her and asked, had she, she herself, at any 23 point in time said to Pat Fitzgerald or written to Pat 24 Fitzgerald and said no, Mr. Fitzgerald, I am entitled to issue 25 press releases. The answer was no. In fact, she never spoke SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11330 4CUMSAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 to Pat Fitzgerald at any point in time about the SAMs, about 2 the attorney affirmations, or their contents, at any point in 3 time. And then we asked her, well, did you ever direct your 4 lawyer, Stanley Cohen, to tell Pat Fitzgerald that Lynne 5 Stewart was entitled to issue press releases, and once again we 6 get the answer no. 7 Now, you know that what happens after that phone call 8 is a letter, Government Exhibit No. 9. I keep referring to it 9 this morning and it is a letter from Pat Fitzgerald in which he 10 sends to Stewart and says: You have to sign a new affirmation. 11 If you don't, you can't see or communicate with Abdel Rahman. 12 And she retains Mr. Cohen to deal with this letter and this new 13 requirement. 14 Now, if in fact she believed back then that she was 15 entitled to issue press releases, what's the first thing she 16 wants her lawyer to say to Pat Fitzgerald? The first thing she 17 wants to say, she wants her lawyer to say to Pat Fitzgerald if 18 you were in her position would be: Gee, Pat, there is nothing 19 wrong with her issuing press releases. She is entitled to do 20 that. She shouldn't be cut off from her client because of it. 21 She is entitled to it. She shouldn't be required to sign a new 22 attorney affirmation, which she clearly didn't want to do and 23 resisted doing for months, because she is entitled to issue 24 these press releases. 25 But they don't say it. Stewart and Cohen never say SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11331 4CUMSAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 it. They never communicate it. Why? Because that's not what 2 she believed and thought at that time. She knew full well back 3 then that she couldn't issue press releases, but she can't walk 4 into court and tell you that because it makes her guilty of 5 Counts 1 and 6. So she creates her little bubble. 6 What do they do? By the way, in Government Exhibit 7 No. 9, it is clear, by the way, if you read the letter, the 8 letter from Fitzgerald, Mr. Fitzgerald to Stewart, that all he 9 is aware of, apparently, according to this letter, is that she 10 has issued the press releases. There is no indication in this 11 letter that at that point Pat Fitzgerald knows that she has 12 been passing messages in and out to Abdel Rahman from Taha. 13 All it says in the letter is, you've issued a press release. 14 In fact, the first sentence, let me read it to you. 15 It is: Dear Ms. Stewart. Several recent press 16 articles have been brought to my attention which appear to 17 indicate that in or about June of this year, you visited Omar 18 Abdel Rahman -- it was actually in May -- at the Federal 19 Medical Center at Rochester, Minnesota and thereafter released 20 a statement or statements of inmate Abdel Rahman in violation 21 of Special Administrative Measures imposed upon him. That's 22 the only reference in this letter to any SAMs violations is 23 that. She issued a press release. Not that she smuggled 24 messages. The whole focus of what happens after he calls her 25 and after he sends this letter is, you've issued a press SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11332 4CUMSAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 release. That's the whole focus, nothing else. 2 And neither she nor her lawyer ever say to Pat 3 Fitzgerald or communicate to Pat Fitzgerald that in fact she 4 was entitled to. Isn't that their first argument? Of course, 5 it is. If she believed it. The first argument is, she should 6 continue to have access to Abdel Rahman by visits and telephone 7 because she has done nothing wrong. She should not be required 8 to sign a new affirmation which they didn't like and didn't 9 want to sign because she has done nothing wrong. But they 10 don't make that argument. They don't present that to the 11 government. Because she knew full well at the time she was 12 violating the SAMs. That's why they don't say that, because 13 she didn't have to create that fiction at that time. She only 14 had to create the fiction when she walked into this courtroom. 15 Well, let's talk about what happens when Mr. Cohen 16 starts representing her. Well, what he does is -- what he does 17 at some point in time is consult with his client and decide 18 they are going to write a letter to the U.S. Attorney's Office 19 about this affirmation. 20 Now, what's interesting about their protesting the 21 affirmation and the affirmation -- the original version of the 22 affirmation is attached to Government No. 9. That's the 23 letter. It has the proposed affirmation. That's the one she 24 didn't want to sign. The one she eventually signs in May of 25 2001 is Exhibit No. 12. She signed it back on I believe it is SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11333 4CUMSAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 May 7, yes, May 7, 2001, and she faxed it to the U.S. 2 Attorney's Office. That's before the July 2001 visit. 3 But what's happening is, she sees him in May 2000. In 4 late July she says Fitzgerald called her and said, can't see 5 him anymore, can't have access. You violated the SAMs. In 6 August he sends a letter to her saying, if you want to have 7 access to him, you have to sign this new affirmation. She sees 8 the new affirmation. You'll remember about three weeks or so 9 after she gets it, she has that conversation with Mr. Yousry I 10 referred to earlier where she says I don't care what Ramsey 11 Clark has to say on these issues. And from May of 2000 to July 12 of 2001, she doesn't see or speak to Abdel Rahman, this very 13 important client of hers. 14 During that period of time, she refuses to sign, until 15 May of 2001, the new affirmation. She doesn't like the 16 language. What part of the language does she not like? Is it 17 the part of the affirmation that says she can't pass Abdel 18 Rahman's messages to the media? No. It is the last paragraph 19 of the affirmation. 20 Let's put up for you Government Exhibit 610 which is 21 obviously in evidence. This is a memo. As you see, it is 22 dated February 23, 2001. And you see -- let's zoom in a little 23 closer to that, can we, please. You see it is to SC. That's 24 Stanley Cohen, obviously. It is from LS, Lynne Stewart. And 25 it is regarding the Sheikh Abdel Rahman, of course, and it SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11334 4CUMSAT2 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 says: Paragraph language that L.S., Lynne Stewart, will agree 2 to sign off on. 3 If you look at that paragraph and you compare it to 4 the last paragraph in the affirmation attached to Mr. 5 Fitzgerald's letter, or the paragraph that actually exists in 6 the affirmation she finally signs, you see that that paragraph 7 is a lengthy paragraph and it discusses what her knowledge is 8 about people committing terrorist acts in Abdel Rahman's name, 9 like the Luxor incident, and what she knows about it and Abu 10 Sayyaf, who took hostages and demanded his release. It 11 basically talks about, it is important to follow the SAMs 12 because people are committing acts of violence in Abdel 13 Rahman's name and, obviously, the restrictions in place need to 14 be followed, so it doesn't encourage that sort of conduct 15 basically. And she understands that. That's the substance of 16 that paragraph. That paragraph has nothing to do with issuing 17 press releases or communicating Abdel Rahman's messages to 18 third parties, including the media. 19 That memo pertains to paragraph No. 4 in the 20 affirmation, both the proposed one and the one she actually 21 signs. 22 (Continued on next page) 23 24 25 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11335 4cuesat3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 MR. DEMBER: Now, why don't we put up Exhibit 609. 2 Why don't you just zoom in a little bit on that, Ms. Griffith. 3 That's a letter, clearly, from Stanley Cohen, 4 Ms. Stewart's lawyer. It's dated February 28, 2001, and it's 5 written to Mr. Kelley from the US Attorney's Office. His name 6 has been mentioned, he worked for Mr. Fitzgerald. He is an 7 attorney in the office. 8 And can we go down through the document a little bit. 9 And essentially what Mr. Cohen is doing, he's writing 10 to Mr. Kelley, who apparently is dealing with the Abdel Rahman 11 SAMs in the office on behalf of Mr. Fitzgerald, or assisting 12 Mr. Fitzgerald with it. And what Cohen does is put in letter 13 form the memo that Stewart had written to him. 14 And in that letter form he essentially writes a letter 15 to Kelley proposing this language for paragraph 4. And he 16 essentially takes the language that she proposed in her memo 17 and puts it in his letter and they send it off to Mr. Kelley. 18 Why don't we go down to the bottom of the letter. Can 19 we do that, Ms. Griffith. Again, it's about two pages to get 20 all that language in on the letter. And on the bottom you see 21 it's very truly yours, and signed by Stanley Cohen, who is 22 obviously Ms. Stewart's lawyer. 23 Now, what's interesting about these two exhibits is 24 Stewart and Cohen are unhappy with the new affirmation. And 25 they're complaining about this paragraph 4. But they're not SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11336 4cuesat3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 complaining about paragraph 3 that deals with the fact that 2 Abdel Rahman cannot pass his messages to third parties, 3 including the media. 4 Well, hold it. If she thinks she's entitled to do 5 that as his lawyer, and it's the whole reason why she doesn't 6 have access to him at this point in time, why they're requiring 7 her to sign an affirmation she doesn't want to sign, why isn't 8 she protesting that paragraph? Why isn't she saying, hold it, 9 you know, we don't like paragraph 4 but paragraph 3 is even 10 worse? Paragraph 3 is bad also. We don't like paragraph 3. 11 There's no limitation to how long lawyers -- how long 12 letters can be from lawyer to lawyer. There's no limitation on 13 that, nothing in the rules of ethics. You can write as long a 14 letter as you want. You can protest as much as you want about 15 another lawyer or another requirement, legal requirement. 16 Where is the protesting about that provision? Why isn't she 17 putting in -- why aren't they, Stewart and Cohen, putting in 18 their letter to the US Attorney's office, a protest to 19 paragraph 3 that deals with press releases? 20 Why? Because she knew full well. They knew full well 21 at the time the SAMs did not permit them, did not permit her to 22 issue press releases with Abdel Rahman's statements in them. 23 She knew there was no justification as a lawyer under the rules 24 of ethics or otherwise to do that. There was no need, of 25 course, in vigorously representing Abdel Rahman to be issuing SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11337 4cuesat3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 such press releases. And so she knew full well what she had 2 done was wrong. 3 If she believed back then in 2001 and in 2000 that she 4 truly was entitled to issue press releases like she told you 5 she was on the witness stand here, she would have protested in 6 this letter and indicated that she wants to also clarify in the 7 new affirmation she can't issue press releases with Abdel 8 Rahman's statements whenever and wherever she wants to. 9 But she doesn't. And the absence of the protesting -- 10 the only reason why she's now being cut off from Abdel Rahman 11 and required to sign a new affirmation, the language of which 12 she doesn't like in paragraph 4, is because, quite obviously, 13 she knew full well what she has done was wrong. She had 14 promised not to do it and yet did it and wasn't protesting it 15 because she knew she had no right, no ethical obligation, 16 nothing required as a lawyer to issue such statements in press 17 releases for him. If she truly did -- and because it was the 18 only reason why she was being cut off, why isn't she protesting 19 and suggesting different language which allows her to issue and 20 continue to issue press releases? 21 The bubble didn't exist in 2001. It didn't exist in 22 2000. It didn't exist in 1999. It didn't exist in 1998. And 23 as you'll see later in my remarks, it didn't even exist in 24 2002. It came into existence when she marched into this 25 courtroom before this trial. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11338 4cuesat3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 We're going to turn to a new topic. We've finished, 2 as you'll be happy to hear, with the ceasefire. It's time to 3 turn to a different topic. 4 As I told you at the very beginning of my remarks, 5 there were two acts, two occurrences in this case committed by 6 these defendants that were significant. That's what the case 7 is all about. One is transferring messages, carrying messages 8 in to Abdel Rahman and from Abdel Rahman which resulted in his 9 declaration that the ceasefire should come to an end and 10 violence should be resumed. 11 And the second one is the fatwah, the fatwah to kill 12 Jews wherever they were, wherever they could be found. 13 Now, the fatwah itself is evidence, powerful evidence 14 of Sattar's guilt of both Counts 2 and 3 of this indictment, 15 his participation in a conspiracy to commit murder and his 16 solicitation of crimes of violence. 17 If you remember, the fatwah, or the most significant 18 parts of it, it itself is clearly itself, standing alone, a 19 solicitation to violence, if there ever was one. And what I'm 20 about to discuss pertains to just those two counts. And 21 Mr. Sattar is the only defendant charged in those two counts. 22 This evidence pertains to him. 23 Let's talk about the fatwah a bit. You know from the 24 evidence presented in the government's case, you even know it 25 from Sattar's testimony, he did it. He did it, there's no SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11339 4cuesat3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 dispute. There's no mystery about it. He and Taha created it 2 and disseminated it and spread it around the world. 3 But we're going to also talk -- while I said to you 4 the evidence of the fatwah, the evidence of the fatwah itself, 5 its creation, its dissemination, is evidence against Sattar, 6 before I conclude my remarks on this particular topic later 7 today you'll see that there's a fascinating, fascinating 8 conversation between the two defendants who aren't charged in 9 Counts 2 and 3 regarding the fatwah. We'll talk about that 10 quite a bit. 11 Well, as I said, the evidence that Sattar participated 12 in the creation and dissemination of the fatwah is beyond 13 dispute. It is clear. He clearly directed Taha to write it. 14 And we'll talk about the recording, where that took place. He 15 read the fatwah in a recording that has been played for you or 16 read to you and reviewed on cross-examination of Sattar. It 17 was read by Sattar to Al-Sirri, his media guy in London, before 18 it was disseminated. He discussed the dissemination of the 19 fatwah. 20 What Sattar told you about the fatwah -- the only 21 thing he could say, because the evidence that is before you 22 catches him red-handed talking to Taha, having him write it. 23 And then perhaps what is damaging when he reads the fatwah, he 24 got -- the version he got when Taha did the first draft, when 25 Sattar reads it to Al-Sirri, he's caught with the goods, you SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11340 4cuesat3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 know. It's like a person who's caught with a stolen piece of 2 property in his hands. He's caught with it. 3 So the only thing he can tell you is, ooh, I really 4 didn't mean it. I really didn't want anybody to die. I didn't 5 mean it. I was just a little bit upset or upset. Well, that's 6 I guess the only thing he can tell you, because the words of 7 the fatwah are as ugly and as hateful as anyone could issue. 8 So the best he can do is say, oh, gee, I didn't really want 9 anybody to die and that wasn't my intention. 10 He told you he was upset when it was written, when he 11 had Taha write it because of what was going on in the Israeli 12 Palestinian conflict. Obviously there's a lot of conflict 13 there. It gets many people upset. It doesn't necessarily lead 14 people to issue fatwahs in convicted terrorists' names who are 15 still, despite their presence for the rest of their lives in 16 American prison, persons who still have tremendous influence in 17 the Middle East with terrorist groups like Abdel Rahman. Let's 18 talk about it. 19 Well, I think the first exhibit we offered, we 20 presented to you was Government Exhibit 1179X. It's an 21 October 3rd, 2000, conversation between Sattar and Taha. And 22 this is sort of like the beginning, the beginning of a process, 23 the beginning of the evidence against Sattar and about the 24 fatwah. It's the beginning of the actual process of getting it 25 written. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11341 4cuesat3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 And actually, initially, Sattar got on the stand and 2 testified and told you people, oh, I had nothing to do with the 3 writing. I didn't write it. But of course you know better, of 4 course. He's very much the reason why the fatwah was written. 5 And if he didn't write every word, he's just as responsible for 6 it as Taha, who did much of the drafting. 7 And in that conversation on that day, he tells Taha to 8 write the fatwah calling for the killing of Jews everywhere. 9 And Taha asks Sattar if the fatwah should be in Abdel Rahman's 10 name. And Sattar says, yes, of course. Because it will be 11 most powerful and most influential and get people to act upon 12 it. He doesn't quite say this, but this is clearly what is 13 meant by it. If it's in Abdel Rahman's name. If Sattar issues 14 a fatwah in Sattar's name, it will be meaningless. Issued in 15 the name of Omar Abdel Rahman, a convicted terrorist, a person 16 who has advocated the killing of Jews for a period of time, a 17 long period of time, that would be good. 18 And then Taha asks Sattar in this conversation, shall 19 we, quote, instigate the people? And Sattar's response to that 20 is -- there's seven words in his response. It's all the same 21 word. It's yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, seven times. 22 Powerful. Yes. He says the word yes seven times. We should 23 instigate the people. 24 What does that mean, instigate the people? Just use 25 your common sense. Should we get the people to act on this SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11342 4cuesat3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 fatwah, instigate them? Yes. And Taha needs to know that 2 because he needs to know how powerfully he should write this 3 document. How ugly should it be? How hateful should it be? 4 And Sattar, who's the director of the operations here, 5 says, make it real ugly. Make it real, real hateful. Seven 6 times, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes. And Sattar tells -- 7 by the way, Sattar tells Taha in that conversation, don't worry 8 about the fact that we might be or you might be asked, how did 9 this statement get out? Obviously Sattar is very conscious of 10 the SAMs. Very conscious of the fact that getting hateful 11 messages like this out of prison ain't easy to do when the SAMs 12 are abided by. 13 But Sattar tells Taha, don't you be concerned about 14 that. He -- Sattar -- will deal with it and take care of it. 15 And towards the end of the conversation they agree that they'll 16 send the fatwah, once it's completed, the drafting is complete, 17 to of course their favorite man in the media, Al-Sirri, Yassir 18 Al-Sirri, in London because he can't issue a press release 19 without Al-Sirri having his hand in it. He's kind of the 20 expert. 21 Now, sometime apparently either on October 3rd or 22 October 4th, either the day of this conversation or the next 23 day, Taha e-mails to Sattar what he's done, his draft of the 24 fatwah. You know, computers and e-mail, it's a great thing, 25 isn't it? Now terrorists can use it, too. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11343 4cuesat3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 And on October 4th, the next day, 2000, next day after 2 the first conversation, Government Exhibit 1182, there's a 3 conversation between Sattar and Al-Sirri. And Sattar tells 4 Al-Sirri that he's going to send him a report, quote/unquote -- 5 that's the fatwah -- and that it's to be publicized regarding 6 the latest incidents of Palestinian events, he says. 7 And it's interesting, Sattar says to Al-Sirri, it's a 8 statement from the doctor. Well, Dr. Omar Abdel Rahman, of 9 course. What's interesting about his conversation, it's a very 10 long -- it's a pretty long conversation he has with Al-Sirri at 11 that time. And as I will get to it in a few minutes, he 12 actually reads to Al-Sirri the whole fatwah that he gets from 13 Taha. Reads it to him over the phone. That's why I said he 14 was sort of caught with the goods in his hands. 15 And what's interesting about what Sattar says to 16 Al-Sirri -- this is his pal in London who he always consults 17 with when he's about to issue a press release -- he says it's a 18 statement by Abdel Rahman. He doesn't say to him, I've created 19 this document because I'm really angry about what's going on 20 between the Israelis and Palestinians. Ariel Sharon went to 21 the Temple Mount and I'm really, really upset. And you know 22 the leaders in the Middle East aren't supporting the 23 Palestinians and so I want to issue this statement, you know, I 24 just want to issue the statement because I want to cry out and 25 scream out. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11344 4cuesat3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 He doesn't tell his pal Al-Sirri that. He told you 2 that, okay. He doesn't know you. Sattar doesn't know you, 3 okay. But Sattar knows Al-Sirri. But he doesn't tell his pal 4 Al-Sirri that, I don't really mean this fatwah to be acted on. 5 This is his pal. He's representing to his pal and buddy that 6 this is coming from the man himself, this is Omar Abdel 7 Rahman's statement, okay. 8 So when he told you, ladies and gentlemen, that, oh, 9 he was just upset, just crying out, he didn't mean it, didn't 10 have the intent for anybody to be killed, that's nonsense. 11 He's concealing from his media person, Al-Sirri, the fact that 12 it's a document drafted by him and Taha. He wants Al-Sirri to 13 believe this is Omar Abdel Rahman's words. This is serious 14 business. This is to be publicized. People are to act upon 15 it. 16 I mean, it's one thing to say to you, ladies and 17 gentlemen, oh, gee, I don't have the intent. Why isn't he 18 telling his pal that he really doesn't mean it to be acted 19 upon? Simple answer: Because he meant it to be acted on from 20 the get-go. He wanted people in the Middle East, supporters of 21 Abdel Rahman or anybody who would hear it or read it, to act 22 upon it. Kill Jews everywhere they are or where they can be 23 found. 24 Well, let me read you some select phrases, sentences, 25 parts of this fascinating document, this hateful ugly document. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11345 4cuesat3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 At the very beginning of it it states, a statement to the 2 nation, the old and the young, fatwah mandating the killing of 3 the Israelis everywhere. 4 And then it goes on and states later on, these 5 barbaric acts committed by these swine and apes are not 6 surprising. They kill the prophets and they are known to be 7 blood shedders. 8 Then it goes on. I, as a Muslim scholar, and because 9 of the limited time, I appeal this. I appeal to my brothers, 10 the scholars all over our Islamic world. And he has listed in 11 categories or paragraphs, one, from our Islamic world to 12 portray their role and issue a unanimous fatwah calling on the 13 Islamic nation to mandate the killing of the Jews, wherever 14 they are. And it's unintelligible on the tape. 15 What I'm reading from is, just to remind you, is 16 Sattar reading the fatwah to Al-Sirri in this exhibit. That's 17 1182, Government Exhibit 1182. It's found between pages 13 and 18 17 of the exhibit. And what he said was he wants -- let me 19 just go back a bit. 20 He wants to issue a unanimous fatwah calling on the 21 Islamic nation to mandate the killing of the Jews wherever they 22 are, it's unintelligible, and wherever they are found. That's 23 where the language comes from. It's right from the fatwah. 24 And they have occupied our land, they defiled our holy 25 places, killed our men and they destroyed our houses. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11346 4cuesat3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Therefore, it is the duty of every capable Muslim to wage the 2 jihad against them. And if the people of this country -- 3 apparently he's talking about the Palestinians -- are incapable 4 of performing this ordinance, then this becomes the duty of 5 other Muslims. And it had been proved conclusively that our 6 people in Palestine cannot undertake this task on their own, 7 especially after having sacrificed, and they are still 8 sacrificing tens and even hundreds of martyrs. Hence the jihad 9 today is the duty of the entire nation until Palestine and the 10 Aqsa Mosques are liberated, until the Jews are driven to their 11 graves or out to the countries where they had come from. 12 Paragraph two. The Muslim youth everywhere, 13 especially in Palestine, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, as 14 nations neighboring the Aqsa Mosque, they have to fight the 15 Jews by all possible means of jihad, either by killing them as 16 individuals or by targeting their interests and their advocates 17 as much as they can. For God almighty said fight and slay the 18 unbelievers wherever ye find. It goes on and reads, and seize 19 them, beleaguer them and lie in wait for them in every 20 stratagem of war, meaning to assassinate them whenever you find 21 them. Our Muslim brothers, trust in God, lift up the banner of 22 jihad and may God be with you. He will reward you. Your 23 brother, Omar Abdel Rahman, in the USA's prisons and a scholar 24 of the Azhar. 25 Pretty strong words. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11347 4cuesat3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 If you recall from Abdel Rahman's speeches that we 2 introduced into evidence to you, sounds kind of like Abdel 3 Rahman, doesn't it? Sure does. And who's the initial drafter 4 or the primary drafter of this? Who else, Taha, whose book is 5 Government Exhibit 2700 and 2700T. And he has no love loss in 6 his book for Jews. As I told you yesterday, he specifically 7 calls for the killing of Jews by any means possible. 8 By the way, interesting choice of writers for the 9 fatwah that Mr. Sattar found, isn't it? Sattar chose Taha to 10 do the primary drafting of this document. You know Taha, he's 11 as bad as they get. He's a hater of Jews. He's the most 12 militant, the most violent of the Islamic Group. In any 13 conversation that Taha and Sattar had about this fatwah, did 14 you ever hear Sattar say to him, oh, by the way, you know, I 15 just want you to draft this thing because I want to cry out and 16 I want to scream out and I don't want anybody to act on it? 17 Gee, did you hear that in their conversations? No, 18 you didn't. No, you didn't. You didn't hear anything like 19 that. Sattar chose Taha because he has some unique talent for 20 writing such hateful messages. He chose Taha because he's the 21 most militant and violent of the Islamic Group, and he chose 22 Taha because he wants the fatwah to be acted upon. And who 23 better to enlist on your team, to enforce this fatwah than 24 Taha? Nobody. 25 And his choice of Taha is because he wanted people to SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11348 4cuesat3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 go out and kill Jews wherever they were or wherever they could 2 be found. Swines and apes, he referred to them as. Kill Jews 3 everywhere and anywhere they could be found. 4 And their advocates. Mr. Sattar was nice enough to 5 tell us in his examination that Taha actually had written the 6 word Americans or America there, but that didn't quite sit 7 right with Sattar since, believe it or not, he's an American. 8 That's rather hard to believe. And he didn't think it really 9 was appropriate so they substituted the word advocate, or he 10 substituted the word advocate, which was a nice way of saying 11 Americans; obviously who support and help Jews, without 12 actually saying -- 13 THE COURT: By the way, the comment about American is 14 stricken and the jury is instructed to disregard it. 15 Go ahead. 16 MR. DEMBER: Now, one of the things that Mr. Sattar 17 told you -- let me go through what he fully said to you about 18 the reasons why, the reason why he really didn't intend people 19 to follow this fatwah. He said he was crying and screaming 20 out, that's what he told you. He told you that one of the 21 reasons he issued the fatwah was just to keep Abdel Rahman's 22 name out there in the public's eye. 23 I guess there's a lot of things one could say about 24 Abdel Rahman, if you want to keep him out in the public eye. I 25 guess it depends on what public you're talking about. Issuing SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11349 4cuesat3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 a hateful, ugly message like this fatwah in Abdel Rahman's name 2 certainly would keep him in the public eye. And of course 3 different segments of the public will see that differently. 4 The terrorist public would probably enjoy such a 5 writing and act upon it. The Egyptian government, the American 6 government would see such a statement and say, we're certainly 7 not going to transfer this guy anywhere. He continues to 8 advocate violence to the extreme. 9 He also said, Sattar also said, gee, I issued this 10 statement because, well, the leaders in the Middle East, the 11 Arab leaders weren't coming out publicly and commenting on what 12 was happening between the Israelis and the Palestinians. So he 13 decided, gee, let me issue a statement in -- in the name of 14 another leader in the Middle East, Abdel Rahman. 15 Now, I guess there's lots of things one could issue in 16 terms of a statement, because he was upset with the leaders. 17 He could have issued a statement in Abdel Rahman's name 18 saying -- critical of those other Arab leaders and urging them 19 to support the Palestinians against the Israelis. That's kind 20 of a statement that could have been issued from Abdel Rahman; 21 criticizing other Arab leaders, or Arab leaders, I should say, 22 and trying to persuade them to comment and get involved in the 23 Palestinian Israeli situation. 24 But apparently that didn't occur to Mr. Sattar. He 25 was more interested in creating a document which was hateful SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11350 4cuesat3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 which called for and reflected his intent. Kill Jews wherever 2 they were, wherever they could be found. 3 Now, you know that as part of his -- Sattar's 4 conversation with Al-Sirri is that after he read him the 5 fatwah, what he did was send it to Al-Sirri. And Al-Sirri said 6 to him, no problem, I'll review it, make it look nice and then 7 we'll disseminate it to the media so they can hopefully publish 8 it. 9 Now, in fact, Al-Sirri did what was required of him as 10 part of the fatwah team here. He prepared it. He disseminated 11 it and it made its way in the media. And there's a 12 conversation in Government Exhibit 1184X on October 5, 2000, 13 between Sattar and Al-Sirri in which Al-Sirri is telling and 14 tells Sattar that, in fact, the fatwah had been sent out and 15 was published in English in Reuters. He says that the French 16 had it better than Reuters and that it was also broadcast on 17 Al-Jazeera TV, got its exposure. 18 And, in fact, we put it into evidence, Government 19 Exhibit 540. It's an article from Al-Hayat dated October 6th, 20 2000. It is written by Mohammed Salah, and it's basically 21 announcing the issuance of this fatwah; that Abdel Rahman from 22 his prison cell has issued a fatwah because, as we all know 23 from Abdel Rahman's withdrawal of the ceasefire, it's good to 24 have Abdel Rahman saying such things, but it's more important 25 to get it out there in the public. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11351 4cuesat3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 And certainly if you want others to go about and kill 2 Jews, you've got to communicate the message to them. You've 3 got to get that fatwah out there so that those who follow and 4 support and love Abdel Rahman will follow his edict, his order, 5 and kill Jews wherever they can be found. And so it's 6 important to get it out into the media, and Al-Sirri assisted 7 Sattar in achieving that goal. It's out there and is 8 published, which is, of course, what Taha, Sattar and Al-Sirri 9 wanted, so that others can act upon it. 10 Now, this article was published on October 6, 2000. 11 Something else very interesting happened on October 6, 2000, 12 with respect to the fatwah. Sattar had a conversation with his 13 friend Yousef Odeh. If my memory serves me correct, Mr. Odeh 14 is not only a friend of Mr. Sattar's, he's in the baby formula 15 business with him as well. And as you will learn, he is kind 16 of a confidant of Mr. Sattar's as well. And their conversation 17 is found in Government Exhibit 1185X. 18 And by the way, when I mention that Odeh is a 19 confidant of Sattar's, later on in my summation we'll be 20 discussing the USS Cole, bombing of the USS Cole. And without 21 jumping too far ahead, let me just briefly say that by that 22 point in time Sattar was very nervous about using his own home 23 phone to talk to Taha about sensitive matters. And one of 24 those sensitive matters was the bombing of the USS Cole. We'll 25 get to that. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11352 4cuesat3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 And so Sattar recruited his pal Odeh and Odeh's cell 2 phone to be the recipient of calls from Taha so that Sattar and 3 Taha could talk about the bombing of the USS Cole and what Taha 4 had had in mind in terms of a threat to be made to the US 5 government. 6 But I tell you that now just to confirm in your mind 7 and give you some advanced warning, but also to support what I 8 just said, which is that Odeh was a guy that Sattar trusted, 9 okay, trusted with something as sensitive as a conversation 10 between Sattar and Taha about the bombing of the USS Cole. 11 And during this conversation, it starts -- it's not a 12 very long conversation but it starts with Odeh saying that some 13 other fellow, some fellow named Mohammed Musa, had told Odeh 14 that Abdel Rahman had issued a statement and wants to kill 15 Zionists everywhere. And Sattar apparently is upset by this 16 and he was actually questioned about it by his own counsel 17 during his testimony. And Sattar responds by telling Odeh that 18 Musa should, quote, shut his fucking mouth, okay? But what 19 happens next is more significant. 20 When Odeh asks Sattar after he relates that exchange 21 with Musa, when Odeh asks Sattar about the fatwah and how it 22 was issued, Sattar lies to his friend. What does he do? Well, 23 Odeh asks Sattar if he distributed or had anything to do with 24 the distribution of the fatwah. What does Sattar say? Quote, 25 I don't know who distributed it. Okay. He's lying to his SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11353 4cuesat3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 friend. 2 Why is Sattar lying to his friend, his confidant? 3 Well, answer is quite simple, really: Sattar knows, obviously, 4 who distributed the fatwah. It's him and Taha and Al-Sirri. 5 He also knows that the fatwah itself is essentially a criminal 6 act. It's a solicitation of crimes of violence. It's real 7 bad. 8 And Sattar knows what's meant -- what's said in the 9 fatwah is meant to be followed. He wants it to be followed. 10 And it's around that time when, as I said, October 6th, the 11 article we showed you, it's published, it's out in the world, 12 okay. People know about it. And Sattar doesn't want anybody 13 to know he is connected to it because he's concerned about his 14 own liability, that people will know that he has something to 15 do with it. 16 So he says, I know nothing about it. Does he say to 17 his friend Odeh, oh, gee, you know, I had something to do with 18 this but I really didn't mean actually for anybody to follow 19 it? Nope. He conceals the truth from his friend. Why? 20 Because he's connected to it up to the wazoo. He knows how 21 criminal it is, and he doesn't want anybody to know besides his 22 two partners, Taha and Al-Sirri, that he's connected to it 23 because he's got criminal liability. 24 Well, Odeh asks another question. He asks Sattar, is 25 the fatwah, quote -- he asks if the fatwah is, quote, is for SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11354 4cuesat3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 real, end quote. Is the fatwah for real? And you can guess 2 what his answer was. His answer to Odeh was, yes, it's 3 authentic. It's the real deal. It's Abdel Rahman's statement 4 calling for the killing of Jews everywhere. It's real. 5 And why does Sattar tell him it's real? Because 6 Sattar wants people who see it to hear about it and read it, to 7 act upon it. It's the real deal. It came from Abdel Rahman. 8 Again, does he say to his friend, no, it's not real, I 9 wrote it with Taha, we were sort of blowing off some steam, we 10 were upset about what's happening in the Middle East? This is 11 his friend and confidant. No. He doesn't tell him what he 12 told you, because what he told you about the fatwah, about it 13 being just his crying, is false, is not true. But of course 14 it's the only defense he has to this hateful and ugly document. 15 It is, as I said before, in itself a solicitation, a 16 solicitation of murder. So he's got to tell you something 17 different. 18 And when Odeh asks Sattar, well, it says -- he's 19 basically talking about the fact that the fatwah says kill Jews 20 everywhere, and that includes America. And he talks about 21 something called the oath of the visa, oath of the visa, which, 22 based on their conversation -- what it seems to be is that if 23 you're visiting or have a visa to a country, you have to abide 24 by its laws. And Odeh is saying, well, he can't mean 25 everywhere because, you know, if you're in America, you can't SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11355 4cuesat3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 go kill Jews in America because you're here and you have to 2 abide by the oath of the visa. 3 And Sattar's response to that was, what does that oath 4 of the visa have to do with anything? Meaning, no, you can 5 kill them anywhere you want. Does he tell his friend, no, this 6 fatwah is just my way of getting Abdel Rahman's name out there 7 in the public? No. Does he tell his friend, I'm really 8 unhappy with the other Arab leaders in the Middle East, they're 9 not coming out and supporting the Palestinians, that's why I'm 10 issuing the fatwah? No, he doesn't. Because that stuff ain't 11 true. It's not. But it's what he has to tell you because he 12 intended to be -- it was something they created and he and Taha 13 intended for it to be followed. 14 Well, did they intend for Jews -- did he intend for 15 Jews to be killed? Did Taha -- well, Taha of course. That's 16 sort of part of his constant mantra. He does. 17 The language of the fatwah -- and you can read it from 18 beginning to end, if you like, in the exhibit I mentioned 19 before -- it is explicit. It's unequivocal in its call for the 20 killing of Jews everywhere. The language couldn't be clearer. 21 It is vicious and hateful. Even Stewart in her testimony 22 referred to it as the equivalent of a hate crime. It's far 23 worse than a hate crime, it's the solicitation of murder. Even 24 Sattar's counsel had said in his opening, it's a hateful and 25 ugly statement. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11356 4cuesat3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Did Sattar mean for it to be followed? Yes. That's 2 why he used Abdel Rahman's name, because he's so influential. 3 Fatwahs by Abdel Rahman will be followed. There is no 4 catch-all at the end of a fatwah or anywhere else in the fatwah 5 that said basically, gee, just kidding, don't need you to 6 follow it. 7 It was written in Abdel Rahman's style. In a 8 conversation between Taha and Sattar, Taha and Sattar talk 9 about the fact that they've written it in Abdel Rahman's style. 10 As I said before, it was totally consistent with speeches and 11 sermons given by Abdel Rahman. And it was sent to the Middle 12 East, where Abdel Rahman, despite his conviction and sentence 13 in America, is still important to some people -- terrorists -- 14 and influential with some people, who happen to be terrorists; 15 sending it to that place where there are supporters and follow 16 orders of Abdel Rahman so they can, in fact, follow the fatwah. 17 And it was drafted, of course, by Taha. And Sattar, 18 as we said before, never told Taha, never said to Taha, I 19 don't -- I'm just kidding about this, I don't mean for it to be 20 followed. He specifically asked Taha to do it knowing who Taha 21 was, knowing the kind of hateful text that Taha is capable of; 22 knowing that Taha was in Afghanistan with Osama Bin Laden at 23 one point in time; knowing that Taha was considered by the US a 24 threat to national security; knowing that Taha was a person who 25 wrote his book attempting to justify the cold-blooded murder of SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11357 4cuesat3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 civilians at Luxor and Jews and Americans and nonMuslims; 2 knowing full well that Taha was seeking a violent end to the 3 ceasefire and resumption, I should say, of violence in Egypt; 4 and knowing full well, and we'll get to this later, that Taha 5 was trying to contact Atia, Atia, who they both knew was at 6 that time the military leader of the Islamic Group. And you 7 know what that means. That just means the guy in charge of the 8 terrorist operations. And knowing also that Taha had signed 9 Osama bin Laden's fatwah in 1998 calling for the murder of 10 Americans. 11 Sattar knew all these things, knew who he was dealing 12 with, and that's why he was dealing with them, because he 13 wanted the fatwah to be followed. He wanted it to be carried 14 out. And at no point in time did he ever say to any person -- 15 Taha, Odeh, Al-Sirri, anyone -- gee, I really am just getting 16 this off my chest. I'm upset, I'm crying out and screaming. 17 He saves that for you, because he has to tell you that. He has 18 to tell you that lie in order not to be convicted of soliciting 19 crimes of violence and participating in a conspiracy to murder 20 persons outside the United States. 21 Now, I told you when I started this section of the -- 22 of my summation, there is a conversation between Yousry and 23 Stewart that's real interesting and that you should -- we'll 24 discuss now. But it actually is preceded by a conversation 25 that Yousry has with Abdel Rahman. It's one of these legal SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11358 4cuesat3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 prison calls that Yousry would go to on the attorney's offices 2 for, Mr. Clark's office on October 6, 2000. 3 And during that call, or before that call, I should 4 say, Yousry had been told by Sattar, go out and buy not only 5 the usual newspapers I guess that he normally would buy and 6 read to Abdel Rahman on the phone, but also purchase I believe 7 it was -- he wanted him also to purchase Asharq Al-Awsat. 8 Yousry usually purchased Al-Hayat and Al-Quds. And he did that 9 and went to Clark's office to translate for Clark, which really 10 meant just him talking to Abdel Rahman for about an hour. 11 And he has a conversation with Abdel Rahman about all 12 kinds of things. Abdel Rahman complains about Stewart not 13 filing that lawsuit she keeps promising to file, complains 14 about that. Abdel Rahman's mad because there still isn't a 15 lawsuit filed on his behalf challenging his conditions of 16 confinement. 17 And as Yousry continues in the visit, he starts 18 reading the newspapers. And Yousry comes across an article. 19 There's no reason to believe he knew anything about this ghost 20 written -- this fatwah that Taha and Sattar wrote before this 21 moment in this call, no reason to believe he had prior 22 knowledge. No reason to believe he had any involvement in 23 this. And the same thing with Stewart, they had nothing to do 24 with the creation or the distribution, dissemination of this 25 fatwah. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11359 4cuesat3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 And during the course of this call, as Yousry is 2 reading the newspapers to Abdel Rahman, he comes across an 3 article in Al-Hayat; I think it's Government Exhibit 540 that 4 we just showed you. And he starts reading it to Abdel Rahman. 5 And Yousry is surprised because he's reading that Abdel Rahman 6 has issued a fatwah calling for the killing of Jews everywhere. 7 And since the only time anybody speaks to Abdel Rahman 8 it has to be through and is through Yousry, Yousry is a little 9 mystified by all this and says something like, gee -- words to 10 the effect, how did this sort of get out? And Abdel Rahman's 11 response to him -- and by the way, this is all in Government 12 Exhibit 1732T. Abdel Rahman's response to Yousry when he's 13 reading this article and says, essentially, gee, how did this 14 happen, Abdel Rahman, who turns to Yousry and says in English, 15 in English, Mr. Yousry, none of your business, none of your 16 business. 17 And then Yousry says, well, gee, I've got to tell 18 Stewart about this, because obviously by that time, October of 19 2000, she has been cut off from Abdel Rahman because of her 20 press releases and her refusal to sign the attorney 21 affirmations. 22 And then Abdel Rahman says to Yousry that he is 23 directing Yousry to tell the lawyers not to negate the fatwah 24 or what's written in this article, that he had issued a fatwah. 25 Not to negate it. Abdel Rahman, having heard Yousry read the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11360 4cuesat3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 article to him, obviously likes what he hears. Killing of Jews 2 everywhere, that's a good thing for Abdel Rahman. And so he's 3 telling Yousry directly, the lawyers, Clark, Jabara, Stewart, 4 don't let them say to the media or anybody else that Abdel 5 Rahman didn't issue this fatwah. 6 He's essentially -- not essentially, he's adopting it. 7 He likes it. Kill Jews everywhere. That's something Abdel 8 Rahman likes. That's what he favors. He likes it. Not only 9 does he like the message, he likes the fact that it's published 10 and his name is on it. And he says to Yousry, make sure nobody 11 negates it. 12 Now, of course, Abdel Rahman didn't issue the fatwah. 13 Sattar with Taha and Al-Sirri are the ones who created it and 14 issued it. But as I said, Abdel Rahman likes it, and so he 15 wants it to be distributed, or he wants it not to be negated. 16 He wants the world to believe he actually issued it. 17 Now, five days later, Yousry has a conversation with 18 Stewart. That's the conversation I referred to earlier. That 19 tells you a lot about Stewart, great deal about Stewart. It is 20 Government Exhibit 1193X. It is a conversation on October 11, 21 2000, as I said, between Yousry and Stewart. 22 And the gist of it, of course, is Yousry calling her 23 up or talking to her and saying, let me tell you about this 24 fatwah thing, let me tell you about the fatwah, what it says; 25 and that, you know, Abdel Rahman doesn't want you to negate it. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11361 4cuesat3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 And we're going to play a part of it in a moment or 2 two. Before we do that, though, I just want to make reference 3 to what Stewart said in her testimony about what she learned 4 from Yousry. 5 This is what she got from Yousry when Yousry was 6 telling her about the substance of the fatwah. I mean, she 7 testified that she spoke with Yousry and he told her that Abdel 8 Rahman issued a fatwah -- actually, I'm going to quote, quote, 9 fatwah, in other words, a religious command, end quote. That's 10 what Stewart sees it as. And then, quote, and that that fatwah 11 was to kill Zionists, to kill the supporters of Zionists, fight 12 to the very end wherever you find them, that the edict was very 13 broad and very connected. 14 So that's what Stewart took from what Yousry had told 15 her the fatwah was about. That's her version of it. That's 16 her understanding of it. 17 And what happens is Yousry tells Stewart that he went 18 to Clark's office five days previously. He had been told to go 19 buy some newspapers, even including Asharq Al-Awsat, the one he 20 normally doesn't buy, told to do that by Sattar. He goes to 21 the office of Clark where they connect Abdel Rahman to Clark 22 and Yousry for their twice-a-week legal call. And during the 23 call -- this is Yousry telling Stewart this -- he's reading the 24 newspapers to Abdel Rahman, he tells Stewart, and he says at 25 the time that he is reading the articles to Yousry -- Abdel SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11362 4cuesat3 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Rahman. He comes across this article in which it states Abdel 2 Rahman's issued this fatwah calling for the killing of Jews, 3 and relates to her that Abdel Rahman's response to him is to 4 tell the lawyers -- and he's telling Stewart -- Abdel Rahman 5 says, don't negate it. Don't tell anyone that he didn't issue 6 the fatwah. 7 We're going to play an excerpt of the recording now. 8 Why don't we take a moment, take our headsets. It's, again, 9 Government Exhibit 1193X. Pages 10 -- start on line 5, we'll 10 go through pages 13, line 23. As you know, it's an English 11 call, so the call itself is in evidence. The transcript we're 12 going to display for you to help you follow along, if you wish, 13 is obviously not an exhibit itself. 14 Why don't we start. 15 (Recording played) 16 (Continued on next page) 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11363 4CUMSAT4 1 MR. DEMBER: Your Honor, I don't know if the lunch is 2 ready yet. We are having a technical problem at the moment. 3 THE COURT: The lunch is almost ready. 4 MR. DEMBER: May I have a moment, your Honor? 5 THE COURT: Yes. 6 MR. DEMBER: Your Honor, we are having a bit of a 7 problem. 8 THE COURT: We can break for lunch. Ms. Gill has gone 9 down to bring the lunch back and the lunch should be back 10 within about a couple of minutes, so we will break for the 11 lunch hour and resume at 2:00. 12 Ladies and gentlemen, it is very important, please, 13 please, do not talk about this case at all. Don't talk about 14 the case at all. Again, always remember to keep an open mind 15 until I have finally instructed you on the law and you've gone 16 to the jury room to begin your deliberations. Fairness and 17 justice to the parties requires that you do that. 18 With that, have a good lunch. I look forward to 19 seeing you after lunch. 20 All rise, please. 21 (Jury not present) 22 THE COURT: Please be back at ten minutes of two. 23 I'll see you after lunch. 24 (Luncheon recess) 25 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11364 4CUMSAT4 1 AFTERNOON SESSION 2 2:15 p.m. 3 (In open court; jury not present) 4 MR. PAUL: Your Honor, I have an application. Your 5 Honor, during the course of Mr. Dember's argument to the jury, 6 he made reference to Mr. Sattar with regard to basically 7 questioning the fact that he is an American. And I quote, 8 again, from the record. Mr. Dember's remarks were -- this is 9 regarding the fatwah -- Mr. Sattar was nice enough to tell us 10 in his examination that Taha actually had actually written the 11 word American or America there, but that didn't quite sit right 12 with Sattar since, believe it or not, he is an American. 13 That's rather hard to believe. Then he goes on from there. 14 Your Honor, this is now not the first time, but now 15 the second time that Mr. Sattar's patriotism, which was the 16 first rhetorical improper comment that resulted in a mistrial 17 application being made during his cross-examination. Now we 18 have a second reference to Mr. Sattar's patriotism or him being 19 an American. Clearly, there it is improper, as your Honor so 20 instructed. But now what we have is in the closing argument a 21 reference back to what Mr. Morvillo had conceitedly made in his 22 comment to my client on the stand, an improper reference to my 23 client's patriotism. 24 I think, your Honor, it is bad enough when such a 25 statement is made in front of the jury which results in one SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11365 4CUMSAT4 1 mistrial application, and your Honor dealt with it at that 2 time. But given the fact that this is now coupled with the 3 summation which I think lends the jury to think back to Mr. 4 Morvillo's improper comment about my client's patriotism, 5 couples the problem. 6 And, therefore, based on that comment, your Honor, I 7 see no instruction, no response, no sustaining of an objection 8 that would be proper short of a mistrial. Once again, your 9 Honor, I am faced with the situation of moving for a mistrial 10 based on Mr. Dember's comments, which I think went beyond the 11 bounds of the impropriety and I think it was wrong for him to 12 do. And I think coupled with the prior comment by Mr. 13 Morvillo, it is clear grounds for a mistrial. 14 MR. TIGAR: If your Honor please, on behalf of 15 Ms. Stewart, I join in the application. I ask in the 16 alternative, ask for a severance and a mistrial for 17 Ms. Stewart; and in the alternative, for an admonition to 18 Mr. Dember in the presence of the jury. And that the Court ask 19 Mr. Kelley to come down here to address this issue. 20 I say that, your Honor, because a quarter of a million 21 Americans died and 400,000 more died of disease to put the 22 words in the Constitution that begin: All persons born are 23 naturalized in the United States. And Mr. Dember can smirk 24 now, as he is doing, and did when your Honor sua sponte 25 admonished him in the presence of the jury. He made a face and SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11366 4CUMSAT4 1 we saw it. 2 But it is our position, your Honor -- I've been 3 practicing law a long time. And I have never heard a 4 prosecutor in this country refer in this way to a person born 5 abroad who became a naturalized citizen. I have heard it in 6 Capetown, I have heard it in Johannesburg, I have heard it from 7 police officers in the southern part of the United States, but 8 I have never heard it from a lawyer. 9 I submit that it goes so far beyond the bounds of 10 propriety that it calls for an extraordinary remedy. 11 THE COURT: Mr. Dember. 12 MR. DEMBER: Your Honor, I really don't think there 13 needs to be much response, your Honor. Your Honor struck the 14 comment from the record. That is more than sufficient. 15 Mr. Sattar made his citizenship, essentially, his patriotism an 16 issue in his own testimony. And he has aligned himself with a 17 person who aligned himself with a person who called for the 18 death of Americans everywhere. 19 Any fair expression that I had on my face when your 20 Honor struck the comment was not a smirk. I frankly had moved 21 on to the argument and I was just not sure why the Court was 22 doing it. Then I realized it. But it was a look of question. 23 I wasn't aware of what your Honor was doing. And then I 24 realized what it was. It wasn't a smirk. I don't smirk at 25 defense counsel or their comments. I never have. And the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11367 4CUMSAT4 1 remedy, your Honor, has been imposed, which is to strike it 2 from the record and tell the jury to disregard. It is more 3 than sufficient in this case, and no other remedy is required. 4 MR. RUHNKE: Your Honor, I simply rise to join the 5 application on behalf of Mr. Yousry. 6 THE COURT: The motion for the mistrial is denied. 7 The motion for a severance is denied. The motion to call 8 Mr. Kelley down is denied. 9 I will remind the jury that I struck a comment and 10 instructed the jury to disregard it because I found the comment 11 to be improper. That is more than sufficient. The Court sua 12 sponte struck the comment and instructed the jury to disregard 13 it promptly with no objections being raised with respect to the 14 comment. And when I dealt with this issue before, which was a 15 comment directed to patriotism rather than a comment directed 16 to Americans, I did point out that there was testimony from the 17 defendant who raised the argument about his citizenship and 18 matters related to that and also with respect to the fatwah, 19 how he struck the word American. 20 Nevertheless, without any objection on the part of any 21 of the defendants, I struck it sua sponte, instructed the jury 22 to disregard it. After the session this morning was over, I -- 23 there were no applications at all. Had the comment, 24 particularly in light of the entire record been such to raise 25 the concerns now raised, they would have been raised either by SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11368 4CUMSAT4 1 an objection or after the jury was let go for lunch this 2 morning. There were no such applications. 3 The instruction that I gave this morning sua sponte 4 was more than sufficient. But, in addition, I will tell the 5 jury that I struck the comment and instructed the jury to 6 disregard it because I found the comment to be improper. 7 MR. TIGAR: With respect, your Honor, I want to take 8 exception to your Honor's finding of some implied waiver that 9 is by not making an objection earlier. The comment wasn't made 10 about my client and, therefore, I thought it best to wait until 11 the recess to ask Mr. Sattar's lawyers what they wanted to do. 12 There is at least one judge in the court of appeals, either 13 Judge Lombard or Judge Timbers, my memory fails me, in the case 14 of United States v. Busic, that commented during the summation 15 one isn't always required to make these objections because 16 there are sound reasons for doing so. 17 So to the extent your Honor is imposing a cause and 18 prejudice requirement on us, a waiver analysis, I want to make 19 clear that these are the reasons for my conduct to making the 20 objection the way that I did. I take it now that the record is 21 clear. I won't argue with your Honor about the ruling the 22 Court has made, but simply disagree with it. 23 MR. PAUL: Your Honor, I should point out for the 24 record that it is not my habit to object even during summations 25 because I usually expect the same courtesy in response when I SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11369 4CUMSAT4 1 am summing up. The first opportunity -- we recessed. This is 2 the first time we are back on the record since the recess. 3 Short of asking for a recess in the middle of summation to make 4 an application, I don't think it would have been appropriate. 5 And I think that this was the appropriate time to put it on the 6 record and to make the application. If your Honor disagrees, 7 your Honor disagrees. 8 THE COURT: One of the times that I pointed out was at 9 the conclusion of the session this morning and before we broke 10 for lunch. The jury was gone. And I just point it out because 11 I consider all of the circumstances in determining what I find 12 in the course of all of the circumstances to be the appropriate 13 action that I should take under all of the circumstances. 14 MR. PAUL: Your Honor, I appreciate that. But I just 15 want to also state for the record that perhaps the more 16 appropriate time would have been at the time when we broke for 17 lunch. However, at that time, after listening to Mr. Dember 18 for the entire morning attack my client, I was in the midst of 19 discussing with my client several issues that he wants to 20 address to me. He is incarcerated. I don't have a great deal 21 of time over the lunch hour to talk to him. He was bringing 22 items to my attention that he wished to draw to my attention 23 for the purposes of summation. That is the reason I didn't 24 have time. I didn't think it was appropriate and on 25 reflection, when we came back, I think that was the most SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11370 4CUMSAT4 1 appropriate time. 2 THE COURT: Let's bring back the jury. 3 (Jury present) 4 THE COURT: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. It 5 is good to see you all. 6 Ladies and gentlemen, in the last session I struck a 7 comment by Mr. Dember and instructed you to disregard it. I 8 struck it because I found it to be improper and, again, I 9 instruct you to disregard it and it is stricken. 10 Mr. Dember, you may proceed. 11 MR. DEMBER: Thank you, your Honor. 12 Ladies and gentlemen, just to remind you, right before 13 we broke for lunch we were talking about a conversation between 14 Stewart and Yousry after Yousry had had a conversation five 15 days earlier with Abdel Rahman about this fatwah that it turns 16 out Sattar, Taha, and Al-Sirri had prepared and disseminated. 17 And we are about to play a portion of the conversation that 18 Stewart had with Yousry about the fatwah. Why don't you grab 19 your headphones at this point, turn them on, and we will listen 20 to that portion of the transcript and recording. 21 (Recording played) 22 MR. DEMBER: Let's start with the last comment, the 23 last comment made by Stewart in that recording. Her position 24 is, as you well know now, Abdel Rahman's message is going to 25 get out, no matter what, no matter what the SAMs say, no matter SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11371 4CUMSAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 what promises she makes when she signs an attorney affirmation, 2 no matter what commitments she makes to the United States 3 Government, no matter what his message is. In her view, his 4 message is going to get out, no matter what. You know what his 5 message is. His message is a resumption of violence. His 6 message is, end the ceasefire. His message is, violently 7 overthrow the Egyptian government. And his message is, with 8 respect to the fatwah, kill the Jews wherever they can be found 9 and wherever they are. That's his view. He read the article. 10 It is Exhibit 540T, the translation, and he knows what the 11 fatwah says because it is transcribed in that article, and he 12 is for it. It doesn't merely make a difference to Stewart what 13 the government does, what restrictions are placed on him, 14 because one thing she does know about Abdel Rahman, if he has 15 got a message, it is a message of violence. 16 Now, what's interesting about what she said during 17 that conversation was what? About the Palestinians. She said, 18 well, gee, if somebody had issued a statement in Abdel Rahman's 19 name, basically stating to the Palestinians, stop throwing 20 rocks, or translation, hey, resolve your differences with the 21 Israelis peacefully, what did Stewart say in the recording? 22 What she said was, that would be a travesty, that would be -- 23 actually, to use her words, we would say, this is a fraud and a 24 terrible travesty, a terrible travesty that Abdel Rahman would 25 say, resolve your differences, Israelis and Palestinians, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11372 4CUMSAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 peacefully. A fraud and a terrible tragedy. That would be 2 peaceful. That would be resolving differences in a civilized 3 way. That's not Abdel Rahman and it is not Stewart. What did 4 she say about the statement? Well, if he is adopting it, 5 because, obviously, Yousry had told her that Abdel Rahman says: 6 Don't negate the statement. Don't negate the statement. 7 Well, he is saying, don't negate the statement. He is 8 adopting the statement, meaning, he is adopting the fatwah. 9 And she says, because now she knows he doesn't want to negate 10 it, he is adopting it. Well, if he is for it, well I'm for it, 11 too. I'm for a call for killing of Jews everywhere they are 12 and everywhere they can be found. 13 What did Stewart say about that in her testimony? 14 Obviously, she didn't get that lie. That's damaging. That's 15 her supporting violence. She has to say something to you 16 because that really hurts. It hurts on two charges, Counts 4 17 and 5, providing materials, support to a terrorist crime, to a 18 crime being conspiracy to murder persons outside the United 19 States, and conspiracy to commit that crime as well. She has 20 got to say something. 21 Well, she says to you, well, hold it. I'm just a 22 lawyer and I can't just substitute my decision for the decision 23 of my client, as if what Abdel Rahman says about that statement 24 is some legal matter having to do with some legal 25 representation that she is involved with. The fatwah and Abdel SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11373 4CUMSAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Rahman's adopting it has nothing to do with any legal matter 2 that relates to Abdel Rahman, not his conditions of confinement 3 lawsuit that never gets filed, not a possible transfer to Egypt 4 which never comes about, nothing, nothing at all. 5 But she uses the legal terminology for you to say, 6 well, I had to explain that. When she said to you: When I 7 said, I'm for it, too, what I meant was, I'm not for the 8 substance; I'm for the result. Those are her words. Not for 9 the substance. I'm for the result. What on earth does that 10 mean? Well, the result is, people follow the fatwah and Jewish 11 people get killed everywhere. Is she for the result? The 12 substance? What does that mean? She is not for the substance; 13 she is for the result. The end result? That was her 14 explanation. It made no sense but, frankly, she has no 15 legitimate explanation other than she supports violence and she 16 supports Abdel Rahman and, of course, Abdel Rahman supports 17 violence, and she supports him not as a lawyer representing a 18 client in legal matters. None of this has anything to do with 19 any legal matter having to do with Abdel Rahman, not a lawsuit 20 challenging the conditions of his confinement, not his 21 conviction and his sentence, which were affirmed, not the 22 possibility that maybe they will some day find some new 23 evidence that they can come to the Court for a new trial on, 24 not for transferring him or trying to get him transferred to 25 Egypt. None of this is related in any way to any legal matter. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11374 4CUMSAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 She said to you, she said to you in her testimony: 2 This fatwah really, really bad for Abdel Rahman's case. She 3 told you that. And she said: "For whatever case we are trying 4 to make to get him moved to make the United States Government 5 open or perhaps even sympathetic to the notion of getting him 6 out of this country, it was very bad. Of course. That's what 7 she tells you. Did you hear her say anything like that on that 8 recording that we played? We played a part of it. Play the 9 whole thing in deliberations if you would like. Listen to it 10 as many times as you would like. She said nothing like that 11 when she is talking to Yousry. 12 An attorney doing legitimate work and legitimately 13 trying to get Abdel Rahman transferred to Egypt, upon hearing 14 that he essentially has adopted the fatwah, and the word is out 15 through the media that he has issued such an ugly and hateful 16 message which says, this is bad for my client. My goal, 17 meaning Stewart's goal and Ramsey Clark's goal, is to get him 18 transferred. Here he is, it is reported in the newspapers, he 19 has issued a fatwah in which he is calling for extreme 20 violence, killing of Jews. This is bad for our efforts, our 21 goal, to get him transferred back to Egypt. We have to go and 22 talk to him about this. We have to convince him, yes, he 23 should negate this, because he clearly didn't issue it. We 24 need to talk to him about this. 25 Certainly, by this time she has been cut off, but she SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11375 4CUMSAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 has other lawyers that she is in communication with, and she 2 can talk to him about them, about doing such an act. She is 3 not interested in doing that. She tells you, this is bad for 4 his case, this is not good. Did she tell Yousry that? Of 5 course not. Because she doesn't believe it. She doesn't 6 believe it. But she has to tell you that to explain this 7 horrific conversation that she participates in. 8 You have heard our evidence, our initial evidence on 9 the fatwah. What does it signify? What does it indicate to 10 you? Certainly, there is no question that Sattar is for 11 violence. He is soliciting others to kill Jews everywhere, and 12 that's Stewart, who has nothing to do with creating or issuing 13 this fatwah, also is for violence. That's okay. Of course, 14 you also know, as Stewart clearly indicated at the very end of 15 the portion of the recording we played for you, she doesn't 16 care what the United States Government is trying to do 17 preventing violence, preventing terrorism by imposing SAMs so 18 Abdel Rahman can't get his message out. It makes no difference 19 what promise or commitments that she makes. Her signature on 20 an attorney affirmation saying, I promise to abide by the SAMs 21 is worthless. That's what she said. Because according to her, 22 no matter what, his message is getting out and his message is 23 violence. 24 Now, I am going to turn now to the next section of the 25 summation which deals with this person Atia. You heard about SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11376 4CUMSAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 him. Most recently you heard about him during Sattar's 2 testimony. And the evidence that relates to Atia, the 3 recordings that Atia is on, that Atia's people are on are all 4 evidence that pertain to Counts 2 and 3 of the indictment. 5 Those charges only pertain to Mr. Sattar and those charges are, 6 to remind you, Count 2, conspiracy to commit murder and 7 kidnaping persons outside the United States, and Count 3 is 8 solicitation of crimes of violence. Those are the two charges 9 that this evidence pertains to. It pertains only to Sattar. 10 Let me give you first a step back a little bit and 11 talk a little bit about the Atia evidence. The Atia evidence 12 is to say, the very least, we have given you the ceasefire 13 evidence, we have given you the initial part of the fatwah 14 evidence. The Atia evidence spans both periods of time. In 15 fact, it spans and what is significant is the obtaining from 16 Abdel Rahman and Taha of the ceasefire, and the issuance by 17 Taha and Sattar and Al-Sirri of the fatwah. As I go through 18 the evidence involving Atia, you will see that the ceasefire 19 comes into play as well as the fatwah. It sort of joins those 20 two major sections of the summation together and the evidence 21 together. 22 Now, let's talk a little about Atia and what he means 23 to various people in this case that you've heard about. Atia, 24 by the year 2000 -- actually late 1999, word had it, had begun 25 the military leader or the leader of the military wing of the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11377 4CUMSAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Islamic Group. As I've mentioned a couple of times now, what 2 that means is, he is the guy in charge of the terrorist 3 operations. And what you also learn about Atia up front from 4 the evidence when you step back and look at the whole span of 5 the Atia evidence is, he is an important person to the people 6 who support the ceasefire, but also an important person for the 7 people who don't support the ceasefire. In other words, he is 8 important to Hamza, who supports the ceasefire, and others like 9 him, like Salah Hashim. But he is equally important to Taha 10 and Sattar, who are against the ceasefire, and Abdel Rahman, I 11 should add, because each side wants him. 12 Each side wants him to be with them. Why? Because he 13 holds an extremely important position when it comes to 14 committing terrorism and terrorist acts. He is the guy who 15 does it. He is the guy in charge of those operations, and he 16 is too important in this case, too important to either side. 17 So what you see in this evidence as we go through it is, both 18 sides struggling. 19 Your Honor, do we need a recess, do you believe? 20 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, we will take five 21 minutes. Please remember my continuing instructions not to 22 talk about the case and always remember to keep an open mind 23 until you have heard all of the evidence and I've instructed 24 you on the law. 25 We will take a brief break. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11378 4CUMSAT4 1 (Jury not present) 2 MR. TIGAR: Your Honor, just before the break counsel 3 said that what you learn about Atia up front from the evidence 4 when you step back, he is the guy in charge of the terrorist 5 operations. I must say I don't recall any evidence of 6 Mr. Atia's role in that respect that was offered and admitted 7 for the truth, except for evidence that came in only with 8 respect to Count 2, or with limiting instructions with respect 9 to Mr. Sattar. I, therefore, lodge my objection and ask there 10 be a continuing objection to this language. 11 MS. BAKER: Your Honor, Mr. Dember began this portion 12 of his summation by saying that he was addressing Counts 2 and 13 3 and by identifying Mr. Sattar as the defendant charged in 14 those counts. There is evidence in the record admitted for its 15 effect on Mr. Sattar that Atia was the military leader of the 16 Islamic Group and Mr. Dember already argued earlier that the 17 military leader of a terrorist group doesn't mean you lead an 18 army. It means you plan terrorist operations. Moreover, there 19 is evidence as to this point that was admitted for its truth. 20 So for all of those reasons, there is no basis for the 21 objection. There were statements by Atia or coconspirator 22 statements in the calls. That's the evidence that was admitted 23 for its truth. 24 It is just not practical for Mr. Dember to repeatedly 25 identify every piece of evidence that he refers to in this part SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11379 4CUMSAT4 1 of his summation as admitted only against Mr. Sattar where that 2 is true. And in some instances it isn't true. But where it 3 is, it is not practical. And because of the preface to this 4 portion of Mr. Dember's summation, it is simply not necessary. 5 MR. TIGAR: If it is not practical, your Honor, then 6 we renew our motion for a severance. It is supposed to be 7 practical. Otherwise, we are supposed to have a separate 8 trial. 9 THE COURT: To the extent that the statements by Atia 10 were, my recollection, admitted for the truth, they were 11 admitted for the truth against Mr. Sattar, right? 12 MS. BAKER: That's correct, your Honor. There were 13 calls that were admitted as coconspirator statements initially 14 subject to connection, and then your Honor made the finding at 15 the end of the trial that they all came in as coconspirator 16 statements. 17 THE COURT: Mr. Dember, can you repeat again, after 18 the break, that this argument is directed to Counts 2 and 3 and 19 with respect to Mr. Sattar only. 20 (Recess) 21 THE COURT: Let's bring in the jury. 22 (Jury present) 23 THE COURT: Mr. Dember, you may proceed. 24 MR. DEMBER: Thank you, your Honor. 25 Let me just repeat something I said a few minutes ago SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11380 4CUMSAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 and that is, the evidence I'm about to discuss pertains to 2 Counts 2 and 3 of the indictment. That's the conspiracy to 3 murder count and the solicitation of crimes of violence counts. 4 And only Sattar is charged in those two counts of the 5 indictment of these three defendants. 6 As I was saying at the time we broke, each side, the 7 pro ceasefire group and the anti ceasefire group, were 8 essentially competing and did compete over Atia. Each side 9 wanted him to be with them, wanted him to align himself with 10 that group, and you will see that as we go through the 11 evidence. 12 You will see also as we go through the evidence that 13 in trying to bring Atia over to their side, Taha and Sattar 14 tell Atia about Abdel Rahman's withdrawal of support for the 15 ceasefire. They communicate that with him. And you will see 16 from the evidence, as we get deeper into it, that once it is 17 clear that Atia turns out joins the anti ceasefire group, joins 18 Sattar and Taha, that they tell him and want him to go by the 19 fatwah, carry out the fatwah. 20 When I said earlier the ceasefire or Abdel Rahman's 21 withdraw of support for the ceasefire and the fatwah meet up in 22 this series of evidence, it is because Taha and Sattar use the 23 fact that Abdel Rahman is now with them and is a supporter of 24 violence and with -- and has withdrawn his support for the 25 ceasefire as a way to recruit Atia because, as you well know, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11381 4CUMSAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Abdel Rahman is a powerful and influential leader still of the 2 Islamic Group despite the fact that he sits in American prison. 3 Let's put up Exhibit 800, if we could. Can we focus 4 in on the bottom two boxes, Ms. Griffith. 5 Just to remind you, a number of people in these two 6 parts of the exhibit become rather important in this series of 7 the evidence. Let me first talk about Atia himself. He is in 8 the left-hand side box, box on the left-hand side. He is sort 9 of in the middle there. His full name is Alaa Abdul Raziq 10 Atia. During the recordings, interceptions of these calls, he 11 is called by different names. Mr. Hamid, Hammam Badrawi. For 12 purposes of my argument, I'll just refer to him as Atia, to 13 make it easier for you, I hope. You see underneath his name 14 three other names or three other people. 15 There is this person Hani, who is also known as Fawzi. 16 For our purposes, I will just refer to him as Hani. Hani is 17 Atia's middleman, his main middleman. He is the guy who Atia 18 has reach out and contact the other leaders, Hamza and Taha, 19 because, as you know, as Sattar told you, Atia was a fugitive. 20 He was wanted. He held a rather important position in the 21 Islamic Group, that head of the military wing, and he was 22 wanted. And so he himself wasn't jumping on the phone all the 23 time and calling various people. He had Hani do that. 24 The two names below that, Ahmad Sharif and Dr. Ismail, 25 are individuals who Hani used because apparently Hani may have SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11382 4CUMSAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 not had a telephone. They were people who had telephones and 2 those telephone numbers for those two people were given to 3 Sattar so that Sattar could reach Hani and, of course, Atia. 4 You know some of the other names that are most 5 relevant in this section of the evidence. You know Salah 6 Hashim, who is the engineer. He is also known as Abu Nadhara. 7 Of course, you know Taha, Abu Yasir, one of his names, a/k/a's, 8 and, of course, Hamza himself or Yunis or Abu Hazim, or 9 Mr. Ali. Those are names that are used. For simplification 10 purposes, I'll refer to Atia as Atia, Hani just as Hani, Atia 11 just as Atia, and Hamza just as Hamza where during these calls 12 they use various names for the call, depending on when the call 13 takes place. I'll just refer to them by those names. 14 We can take that down. Thank you. 15 The first call that comes up in this series of the 16 evidence is Government Exhibit 1048X. It is an early call. It 17 is January 5 of 2000. It is a call that Hani makes to Sattar. 18 And we learn in the call Hani has gotten Sattar's phone number 19 from Salah Hasham, the engineer. And he asks Sattar or he 20 tells Sattar or asks Sattar, I should say, please have Hamza 21 call either of two phone numbers. One of the phone numbers is 22 Dr. Ismail, and the other phone number is for this fellow Ahmad 23 Sharif. And this is the initial contact by Hani on behalf of 24 Atia to Sattar. Again, he says he got the phone number from 25 the engineer Salah Hashim. That's why he is calling. And it SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11383 4CUMSAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 is clear that Atia and Hani apparently may have been out of 2 contact with the Islamic Group and this is the first effort to 3 get reconnected to them. 4 And what we learned from Sattar and his testimony was, 5 after this call -- first of all, he didn't know who this guy 6 Hani was, which is understandable. And he sent an e-mail, 7 interesting enough, to both Hamza and Taha about this call. 8 Now, in the call, Hani is just asking to speak with and be 9 connected to Hamza, Abu Hazim. He says nothing in this call 10 about Taha. Yet, Sattar, who was always in Taha's corner, 11 alerts his partner that this call has come in, alerts both 12 those people. 13 The next call is January 15, about ten days later, I 14 believe, and it is Government Exhibit 1050X. And it is another 15 call from Hani to Sattar. As I said, ten days later. And at 16 that time, while he had given a different name for Atia in the 17 earlier call, he comes out and says to Sattar in this call that 18 he is calling on behalf of Alaa Abdul Raziq. He doesn't 19 actually say Atia in the call. He gives those parts of his 20 name to Sattar. He says that's who he is calling for. He then 21 gives two phone numbers of the contact people, Dr. Ismail and 22 Ahmad Sharif. 23 Now, what's interesting about this call is when Sattar 24 is given the name Alaa Abdul Raziq, that is not the first time 25 that Sattar learns that name or is told about that name. He is SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11384 4CUMSAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 told about that name earlier. This, again, is January 15, 2 2000. But he was told about that name back in October of 1999. 3 The recording is Government Exhibit 1031X. And that was a 4 conversation that Sattar had with Al-Sirri. 5 And during that conversational, Al-Sirri, the man in 6 London, the media guy, tells Sattar that after Farid Kidwani -- 7 I told you yesterday it would pop up again in the summation. 8 It just popped up. In that call back in October of 1999, 9 Al-Sirri is telling Sattar that after Farid Kidwani, the 10 previous leader of the military ring of IG, who had been killed 11 in September of '99, the month before, he is telling him, two 12 people have replaced Farid Kidwani as the leader of the 13 military wing of the Islamic Group. And one of the names that 14 Al-Sirri told Sattar was Alaa Abdul Raziq -- Atia. So that 15 name is not a mystery to Sattar. He knew that name months 16 beforehand from the conversation he had with Al-Sirri. 17 Now, a month or two passes and then we get to the next 18 call, which is Government Exhibit 1065X, March 26, 2000. And 19 what's different about this call is -- first, it is Hani 20 calling Sattar. What's different about this call is when Hani 21 calls Sattar. This time he asks for either to be connected to 22 Taha or Hamza. This is the first time that happens, the first 23 time he had asked to be connected to anybody was Hamza. 24 Remember, he is pro ceasefire. This time he is asking to be 25 connected to either Hamza or Taha. Obviously, they are the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11385 4CUMSAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 leaders of the two separate factions that obviously represent 2 different parts of the Islamic Group, pro and anti ceasefire. 3 There is no connection actually made at that time, of 4 course, because Sattar can't call either of those two people. 5 They call him. Of course, at that time also in the 6 conversation Hani repeats to Sattar, again, that he is calling 7 on behalf of Atia. 8 The next call is a few days later, April 1 of 2000. 9 It is Government Exhibit 1068X. And what happens in this call 10 is Sattar is able to connect Hani to Hamza. So this is the 11 first time Hani is talking to either Hamza or Taha. And he is 12 talking to Hamza, pro ceasefire. And Taha identifies himself 13 and then he tells Hamza that Atia has been trying to connect 14 with either him, Hamza, or Taha for a long time, that he got 15 Sattar's number from Salah Hashim. We know that now from the 16 previous calls. And he is saying, Atia, Hani is telling Hamza, 17 Atia needs money. 18 Now, Sattar told you when he testified that it was 19 after this call that he reached out to Salah Hashim, had a 20 number for him, spoke to him, and wanted to know if Salah 21 Hashim had given Sattar's number to Hani and to Abdul Raziq and 22 Atia. If you remember his testimony, Salah Hashim was angry 23 with him asking this question because his own phone, Salah 24 Hashim's phone, was being monitored in Egypt where he was, and 25 he wanted to be asked this question. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11386 4CUMSAT4 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Now, the next call between Hani and Hamza, because 2 that's essentially what happened in the call I just mentioned, 3 the next call is ten days later. It is Government Exhibit 4 1070X. 5 (Continued on next page) 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11387 4cuesat5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 MR. DEMBER: It's Government Exhibit 1070X. It's a 2 call on April 11, 2000. Again, it's obviously Sattar 3 connecting Hani with Hamza. 4 And Hani at times says, apparently the plan was for 5 the connection to be made and for Hamza to actually speak to 6 Atia. But Hani is on the phone and explains to Hamza, okay, 7 that Atia didn't come to the phone. 8 And the reason he didn't come to the phone -- there's 9 two reasons. One of the reasons was that they got information 10 that Salah Hashem had been called down to the ministry of -- 11 some ministry, Egyptian ministry. And Salah Hashem had been 12 asked by some official, asked him, who are the people who want 13 to contact Ahmed in America? Ahmed in America is Sattar. 14 And so Salah Hashem, who obviously had spoken and has 15 spoken to Sattar a number of times, and there were a number of 16 intercepted calls in evidence with transcripts, Salah Hashem is 17 being asked, who are these people who are trying to reach 18 Sattar, Ahmed in America? And it seems pretty clear that it 19 appears that Salah Hashem and Atia are concerned that the 20 Egyptian authorities know where Atia is and that his people are 21 trying to -- have reached and have spoken to Sattar. So, 22 because of that, Atia doesn't want to get on the phone. And 23 that's what Hani tells Hamza at the time. 24 He also mentions that there had been a report in some 25 kind of publication about -- and this is the words they used -- SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11388 4cuesat5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 that -- basically that Atia, quote, was assigned to a new 2 place. And that refers to the fact that Atia was made and word 3 was out that he was named the leader of the military wing of 4 the Islamic Group. 5 So that word is out there in the media. You know that 6 because in October of '99 Al-Sirri is telling that to Sattar. 7 It's out there. And plus you know that Salah Hashem is called 8 down and questions are being asked about people contacting 9 Ahmed, meaning Sattar in America. So Atia is not comfortable 10 talking. 11 And Hani basically says to Hamza, they need to talk 12 through third persons; they need to talk in code; they need to 13 not talk directly; that Atia needs money. That money should be 14 sent to him, but it's going to be sent through third persons. 15 You can't send it directly to him. Obviously they're trying to 16 protect Atia because he's a fugitive in Egypt. The authorities 17 are looking for him. And so a lot of this sort of undercover 18 and covering is being done to protect him. 19 Now, the next call is Exhibit -- Government 20 Exhibit 1072X. It's an April 18th, 2000, call between, once 21 again, Sattar connecting Hani to Hamza. And this is a real 22 interesting important call, because it's during this call that 23 Hamza starts communicating to Atia through Hani; because he's 24 not talking to Atia directly yet, but Hamza is sending the 25 message through Hani to Atia that Atia should only, should only SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11389 4cuesat5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 be dealing with Hamza and Salah Hashem from the Islamic Group. 2 He shouldn't be talking with or taking direction from anyone 3 else. And he says essentially that during the conversation. 4 Hamza is telling this to Hani, obviously to pass on to 5 Atia, don't take direction, don't listen to anyone else. If 6 someone tells Atia or his people they will send money if -- if 7 Atia agrees to, quote, to do some things, unquote, that being 8 terrorist acts, they're not to listen to those persons or that 9 person. If someone calls Atia or calls Hani and his people, 10 and Atia and directs an operation that should be done, they 11 should ignore that person. 12 What is clear from this conversation is without 13 mentioning Taha's name -- because Taha's name is not mentioned 14 in this call -- Hamza is communicating to Atia, don't talk to 15 anybody except Hamza or Salah Hashem. Indirectly what he's 16 saying, which should be clear by now, is don't talk to Taha. 17 But he hasn't quite said that yet, okay, because he's 18 concerned, Hamza is concerned that if Atia talks to Taha and 19 obviously aligns himself with Taha, being the leader of the 20 military wing, that's a very bad thing for the ceasefire. 21 Because if he aligns himself with Taha, he's got a powerful 22 figure -- in other words, Taha is a powerful figure, leader of 23 the military wing, aligned with him. That's the guy in charge 24 of terrorist operations. 25 So the last person you want Atia aligned with is Taha, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11390 4cuesat5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 because Taha wants to return to violence. And Atia is his man. 2 That's the man he really wants. So without, as I said, 3 mentioning Taha's name, he sends this message. 4 Now, on April 24, 2000, and that's six days later, 5 Government Exhibit 1075X, this is the important call. They're 6 all important, but this -- they become more important as we go 7 on, okay. This is an important call. For one reason it's 8 important because this is the first time that Sattar connects 9 Hamza to Atia, the first time they talk directly to one 10 another. That's important. 11 And the first thing that Hamza does in the 12 conversation, or one of the first things he does is tell Atia 13 about the initiative, about the ceasefire, and developments 14 over the last few years. Apparently, as we mentioned before, 15 Atia seems to have been disconnected from the group; probably 16 because he's been in hiding, he's a fugitive and out of touch 17 with the rest of the group. So Hamza is bringing him up to 18 speed. 19 And then Hamza tells Atia that there's a disagreement, 20 and he refers to Taha by Abu Yasir but he says Taha is in 21 conflict with others, and that Atia -- this is Hamza talking -- 22 Atia should follow, quote/unquote, the general policy of the 23 Islamic Group, which is in favor of the ceasefire. 24 So in this call Hamza is coming straight out and 25 saying, Taha is off on his own. He's not with the general SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11391 4cuesat5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 policy, he's going in a different direction and that Atia 2 should follow him. In fact, later in the call Atia again says 3 to -- excuse me, Hamza again says to Atia, he says this: 4 Quote, that Abu Yasir, Taha, represents some kind of 5 instability, end quote. And that, quote, he, meaning Taha, is 6 the only one among all that is not in agreement with the rest 7 of the people regarding the direction, regarding the policy of 8 this period, end quote. That's on page 38 of the transcript. 9 Well, clearly what Hamza is trying to do is isolate 10 Taha, okay, get Atia to join him, Hamza, because he's saying, 11 Taha is on his own. He's not with the rest of the group. 12 Atia, you're the head of the military wing. Obviously you 13 should be with the rest of the group. Stay with us. Be with 14 us. Stay away from that guy. Stay away from Taha. 15 Now, another interesting thing that's mentioned in 16 this call is Atia explains to Hamza that he, Atia, had heard a 17 report on a broadcast of the Voice of Israel that he, Atia, was 18 appointed the military leader in late September of 1999. And 19 that he essentially was -- he was appointed to succeed Farid 20 Kidwani, who had been killed in September, earlier in September 21 of 1999. And Atia was obviously concerned about that, 22 concerned about how the Voice of Israel, or anyone else, for 23 that matter, would have learned that he had been the named 24 leader of the Islamic Group. 25 And then Atia says something also significant. It's a SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11392 4cuesat5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 very significant call. The next thing comes up in the 2 conversation, or one of the next things is Atia says to Hamza, 3 quote -- this is Atia talking -- you must have known by now 4 that we did the big matter on our own. We had no link to 5 anybody and nobody told us anything. 6 And Mr. Sattar told you, Sattar told you in his 7 testimony the big matter was -- the big matter is -- and if you 8 had to guess without knowing it, the big matter, you would 9 guess, is the Luxor massacre. Atia told Hamza that he was 10 involved. We did the big matter. We did the Luxor massacre. 11 Is that in dispute? No, because Sattar told you on the stand, 12 he understood, he knows the big matter is the Luxor massacre. 13 We'll come back to this in a moment. 14 Also in the conversation Hamza says to Atia, because 15 they're sending him money, going to send him money, that Atia 16 should not use the money they're sending to purchase weapons. 17 And Atia says, that's not a problem, they have enough. And 18 Mr. Sattar tells you that's what they're saying in his 19 testimony. And obviously Hamza doesn't want Atia buying 20 weapons because he doesn't want him committing any terrorist 21 acts. He wants him with Hamza supporting the ceasefire, not 22 fighting the ceasefire. 23 And also there's a -- also in the conversation they 24 discuss about using money, money that Hamza's going to send or 25 has sent to Atia to buy a cell phone -- or a mobile phone, they SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11393 4cuesat5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 call it. And Hamza tells him not to do that, not to buy a 2 mobile phone. So what you have here is -- very important call 3 is Hamza, one, trying to isolate Taha and convince Atia, don't 4 join that guy, stay with us. 5 What's also important about this call is that during 6 this call, when it happens, when it happens, Sattar learns and 7 knows that Atia did the big matter; did the Luxor massacre. 8 Now, how do you know that? If you recall Sattar's 9 testimony, what he said to you was -- when he testified about 10 this conversation, he said to you, yes, the big matter was the 11 Luxor massacre, and I knew that. He knew that. 12 And then we took a break, came back from the break and 13 Sattar gets back on the stand and testifies and he says, oh, by 14 the way, I didn't know that, of course, until this trial when I 15 heard that conversation. Well, he wasn't being truthful with 16 you, because when he connected Atia and Hamza for this call, he 17 continued to listen. 18 And how do you know that? Okay, lots of ways, okay. 19 Well, we're going to start backwards and come forwards, okay. 20 The last thing I told you about in the sequence of the 21 conversation between Hamza and Atia was Atia asking about using 22 some of the money to purchase cell phones. Now, Sattar was 23 listening at that time. 24 And how do you know that? You know that because of 25 Government Exhibit 1078X. It's a conversation between Hamza SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11394 4cuesat5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 and Sattar right after Hamza's conversation with Atia. And 2 what does Sattar and Hamza talk about? They talk about Atia. 3 And Sattar was listening to the conversation, and he 4 tells Hamza that he heard Atia talking about purchasing a 5 mobile phone and that he should not purchase a mobile or cell 6 phone because they are more easily intercepted. That's an 7 interesting note. How does Sattar know which is more easily 8 intercepted, a regular telephone with the ground line or a cell 9 phone? But he seems to know. 10 But he's telling Hamza that he should tell Atia not to 11 buy a mobile or cell phone because he had just heard Atia 12 talking about it on the phone minutes beforehand, because he 13 was listening to the conversation. 14 I said we're moving backwards, okay, in the order of 15 the conversation. Now, in a conversation that takes place -- 16 remember, this conversation is April 24, 2000. When I say to 17 you "this conversation," I'm talking about the Atia/Hamza 18 conversation. The conversation I just referred to was a 19 conversation which took place between Sattar and Hamza right 20 after that call. And Sattar saying to him, oh, don't have him 21 buy a cell phone, they're bad, they're easier to trace or 22 easier to intercept calls on. And Sattar's saying that because 23 he just heard Atia saying he wants to buy a mobile phone with 24 the money, part of the money that they sent. 25 Okay. Now, about two or three weeks after the call SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11395 4cuesat5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 between Hamza and Atia, Sattar has a conversation with Taha. 2 And the call with Taha is Government Exhibit 1083X. It's a 3 conversation on May 9, 2000. And Sattar and Taha are talking. 4 And what Sattar tells Taha is -- he repeats for Taha 5 the part of the conversation Hamza had with Atia about the fact 6 that it was reported on the Voice of Israel that Atia had been 7 made or named the leader of the military wing of IG. The only 8 way Sattar knows about that, because he's relating the 9 conversation, he's saying -- he's saying Hamza and Atia had 10 this conversation which Atia tells him that Atia first learned 11 about his being named head of military wing was through the 12 Voice of Israel, and that he was concerned about that. And 13 Sattar was relating that conversation to Taha. 14 Well, the only way that Sattar could know about 15 that -- because it doesn't come up in any conversation between 16 Hamza and Sattar or Atia and Sattar -- is because Sattar was 17 listening to that conversation 1075X. That's how he knows. 18 Well, the part of the conversation -- going back to 19 1075, the first call we're talking about between Hamza and 20 Atia, the part of that conversation where Atia says to Hamza, 21 they did the big matter, the Luxor massacre, falls between 22 those two parts of that conversation. That part -- that 23 conversation where Atia says he was involved, they did the 24 Luxor massacre, falls between the time Atia and Hamza talk 25 about the Voice of Israel conversation and the mobile phone SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11396 4cuesat5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 conversation. 2 In fact, also in another call, 1067X, a conversation 3 later in the year in September, September 4, 2000, it's another 4 conversation between Sattar and Taha, Sattar tells Taha that 5 conversation about the part of that original conversation, 6 1075X, where Atia and Hamza talked about money for weapons. 7 So what you learn from this is, quite clearly, Sattar 8 was listening to the conversation because he talks to other 9 people about those three parts of the conversation, three of 10 those parts of the conversation. And the part about Luxor 11 falls in between the parts he's telling other people about in 12 subsequent conversations. 13 Sattar told you on the witness stand, when they talked 14 on 1075, 1075X, April 24th, that call, he connected Atia with 15 Hamza and then he got off the phone and wasn't listening and 16 was just letting the conversation go and drinking coffee and 17 smoking cigarettes and didn't listen to the conversation. 18 Well, those three calls I just mentioned prove he wasn't 19 telling you the truth. Go back and look at them, if you like. 20 Compare those three additional calls to 1075 and see that, in 21 fact, in subsequent occasions Sattar relates to Taha parts of 22 that original conversation between Taha -- excuse me, Atia and 23 Hamza. And that proves that Sattar was listening to the 24 conversation, and it proves that on April 24th, 2000, Sattar 25 knew at that time Atia had done, was involved, did the Luxor SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11397 4cuesat5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 massacre then; not now, not during the trial, he knew it then, 2 because he knew right away the big matter meant the Luxor 3 massacre. 4 Sattar wasn't telling you the truth. He wasn't 5 telling you the truth for an obvious reason, and that is 6 because from that point on, he continues to deal with the 7 person -- or I should say a person, who did the most horrific 8 of terrorist acts, the Luxor massacre where 58 tourists were 9 killed and four Egyptians. And he doesn't want to let you know 10 when he testified that he knew that back in April 2000 because, 11 as we go through the evidence, he keeps connecting people to 12 Atia and his people. 13 And even worse happens. He doesn't even -- and worse 14 things happen beyond just conducting calls between Atia. He 15 doesn't want you to know that he connects people and keeps 16 dealing with and he himself speaks with Atia, who did the Luxor 17 massacre. 18 Now, the next call I want to discuss with you, it's 19 kind of brief, is Government Exhibit 1083X. It's a May 9, 20 2000, call between Sattar and Taha. This is -- and Sattar told 21 you this was the first call with Taha that he had had in quite 22 some time. For a month or two they had been sort of 23 disconnected, weren't together in any way. Obviously Sattar 24 told you, was his testimony, he didn't have a way of contacting 25 Taha. He had to wait for Taha to call him. And Taha's getting SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11398 4cuesat5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 back in contact with him. 2 And what does Sattar tell Taha? Well, he tells him, 3 importantly for them, that Atia has already spoken to Hamza. 4 He's already spoken to the other side. And obviously he 5 advises Taha of that because they're competing with him. 6 Now, the next call of consequence is Government 7 Exhibit 1164X. It's an August, August 14, 2000, between Sattar 8 and Ahmad Sharif. Now, if you remember, just to keep the names 9 straight, Ahmad Sharif is one of the people whose phone number 10 Hani originally gave -- gives to Sattar in order to contact 11 Hani and Atia. And Sattar calls Al-Sharif on that date. And 12 what he's trying to do is set up a future contact between Taha 13 and Atia. Hamza's got in the door first, he's made the first 14 direct contact with Atia. We talked about that conversation. 15 But Sattar isn't aligned with Hamza. Sattar is 16 aligned with Taha. And what he's trying to do now is get Taha 17 in the door. They're competing for Atia. Hamza and Taha are 18 competing for Atia, and this is his effort to get him in. He 19 calls Al-Sharif. There's some conversation about how they've 20 been out of contact, and he tells -- Sattar tells Al-Sharif 21 that there are other brothers who want to speak to Hani and 22 Atia. And they want to create an avenue to create a way to 23 communicate with them. 24 And then Sattar tells Al-Sharif that it's Sheikh Abu 25 Yasir -- that's Taha -- that Sheikh Rifa'i Taha -- this is his SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11399 4cuesat5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 words -- wants to talk to him, meaning Hani and Atia. And 2 Sattar tells Al-Sharif that Taha wants to communicate with them 3 so he can present his point of view. Taha knows now that 4 Atia's got the point of view from Hamza. Taha wants to get in 5 the competition and give him his point of view. 6 Now, what's interesting, Sattar tells Al-Sharif -- and 7 you know this isn't true. Sattar tells Al-Sharif in this call 8 that Hamza will not object to Atia speaking to Taha. And you 9 and of course Sattar knew better because Hamza was telling Atia 10 and Atia's people, don't talk to Taha. But Sattar tells him 11 otherwise. 12 Now, the next call is Government Exhibit 1166X, it's 13 September 4, 2000, and it's a conversation between Sattar and 14 Hani. It is five minutes after Sattar has spoken -- withdrawn. 15 Excuse me. 16 Sattar is telling Hani -- what he's doing is setting 17 up the call between Hani and Taha, trying to set up the first 18 call between Hani and Taha. And what he says is consistent 19 with what you would expect, consistent with what you would 20 expect. 21 In the call Sattar tries to alert Hani that the person 22 he'll be speaking to is one of the two people that Hani had 23 originally asked to be connected to, Hamza and Taha, okay. And 24 what Sattar says to Hani at that point now is that this new 25 person who wants to speak to Hani and Atia, quote, is bigger SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11400 4cuesat5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 than him, meaning bigger than the one he's already spoken to, 2 Hamza. Meaning Taha is more important than Hamza. That's what 3 Sattar is doing. He is, of course, aligned with, partnered 4 with the coconspirator of Taha. So he's putting his spin in 5 favor of his guy in the mix here and telling Hani, Taha is more 6 important than Hamza. 7 Now, the next call is the same day actually. It's 8 Government Exhibit 1167X. Again, the same day, September 4, 9 2000. It is the first conversation that Sattar connects Taha 10 to Hani. And it's maybe one of the most important 11 conversations in this string of evidence. 12 What happens is Taha asks Hani if he is aware, first 13 of all, that there is a difference in opinion in the Islamic 14 Group. And Hani says they have an idea about that, they know 15 about that. And then Hani says that they learned from Salah 16 Hashem that Hamza is the one in charge of the company, they 17 call it, the Islamic Group; that Salah Hashem told them that, 18 quote, we aren't strong enough to get into a dispute. We are 19 too weak to do so. 20 And what he means by that is "dispute" means a violent 21 confrontation, a military operation, a terrorist act. And 22 Hamza told Hani that any contact with any outside party will 23 result in suspension of Hani or Atia's contact with them. So 24 in other words, Hani's telling Taha that when they spoke to 25 Hamza, Hamza says Hani and Atia shouldn't be talking to anybody SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11401 4cuesat5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 else, okay, and as we saw in the conversation earlier. 2 Now, we're going to put up for you part of this 3 transcript, which is, as I said, Government Exhibit 1167X, 4 particularly at page 6, lines 2 to 25. And I'm going to -- if 5 you like, you may try to read along. What I'm going to do is 6 read what Taha is telling Hani, just that part. 7 What Taha is doing during this part of the 8 conversation is sending through Hani to Atia his message. Taha 9 is sending his message to Atia through Taha -- through Hani. 10 Here's what he says, and we're going to start not at the very 11 top but actually first full sentence. Here's what Taha says. 12 He says, and he's referring to Islamic Group, our relationship 13 with the regime is and will continue to be unfriendly 'til God, 14 the almighty, allows his law to dominate our country. Eh, to 15 have action or no action depends on the capability, not on a 16 change of vision and method. 17 Then there's some exchange, and you go down to line 18 16. And he continues by saying, Taha continues by saying, we 19 will continue, God willing, to be enemies of the regime. We 20 will continue to -- it's unintelligible -- the best among the 21 people and the brothers. And if anyone changes or gets to be 22 friendly or becomes weak one way or the other, we give him a 23 chance to rest but he shouldn't drag everyone to his side. He 24 who wants to rest can rest, but the entire company -- the 25 Islamic Group -- will not likewise rest. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11402 4cuesat5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 So -- and skip down a line -- so, to sum up, if people 2 have something they can do, they do it. If they can't, if they 3 don't have the capability, they prepare themselves. 4 And what he's saying is if people don't want to be 5 engaged in terrorist acts, then they can rest. They don't have 6 to. But his vision, what he says is if people have something 7 they can do, they do it. If people have something they can do, 8 they do it. If people can commit a terrorist act, they do it. 9 If they can't or if they don't have the capability, they 10 prepare themselves. Prepare themselves to commit terrorist 11 acts. 12 Now, later in the conversation Taha tells Hani about 13 Abdel Rahman's withdrawal of support for the ceasefire. And 14 obviously what Taha is doing is telling Hani, and more 15 importantly, telling Atia, Abdel Rahman has withdrawn his 16 support for the ceasefire. Abdel Rahman is with Taha. 17 And then he goes on to say that the other people had 18 tried to distort that message basically and say that that 19 wasn't true. And Hani says, yes, we heard about that. They 20 heard about that. And then Taha repeats, to do or not to do is 21 subject to capability. To do a terrorist act is subject to 22 capability. That's what he's saying. It's not governed by any 23 other factor that is not subject to our capability to work. If 24 we can work, we work. If we can't, we prepare until our 25 brothers get released from jails. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11403 4cuesat5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 And Taha says, we didn't make a promise -- meaning the 2 initiative -- to anybody, the regime or any other. 3 Capability to do work, that word came up yesterday. 4 And what I told you it meant was terrorist act. And you'll see 5 it again in this series of calls. 6 And then Taha tells Hani, well, you know, the 7 engineer -- he says the engineer, Salah Hashem, is one of the 8 most supportive people to the initiative, he and the inside 9 brothers. Most likely they are behind it, meaning the 10 distortion of Abdel Rahman's withdrawal of support for the 11 ceasefire. 12 But Taha goes on and says, but most young men like 13 you, myself and the big Sheikh -- Abdel Rahman he means -- may 14 God set him free -- clearly Abdel Rahman -- I mean Doctor, and 15 the other leadership people do not approve of these things. Do 16 not approve of the ceasefire, he's saying. 17 And Taha tells Hani that he wants this message -- this 18 is his message to Atia, he wants it passed on to Atia. And 19 Hani tells Taha in response that he, meaning Atia, says it will 20 be great if he meets with you, end quote. 21 Now, the conversation ends. Hani gets off the line 22 but Sattar remains on the line. He's been listening to this 23 conversation all along. And what happens is Sattar says, after 24 Hani gets off the line, quote, I'm happy this call was made. 25 And Taha asks Sattar, what do you think of what was SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11404 4cuesat5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 said? 2 And Sattar responds, quote, good, thank God. Good, 3 good. Gives Atia the, quote, other point of view. 4 Sattar was on the line. He's, of course, aligned with 5 Taha. And the message Taha gave to Hani was Taha's message, 6 end ceasefire, resume violence. We work when we're capable. 7 If we're not capable, we prepare. We commit a terrorist act if 8 we're capable. If we're not capable, we prepare for a 9 terrorist act. That was Atia -- excuse me, Taha's message to 10 Atia. 11 Two weeks later, two weeks later on September 18, 12 2000, and this is Government Exhibit 1170X, Atia responds -- 13 MR. TIGAR: Excuse me, your Honor. I'm sorry. May I 14 request a short break. 15 THE COURT: Sure. Absolutely. 16 Ladies and gentlemen, it's time for an afternoon 17 break. We'll take five minutes or so, or ten minutes. 18 Please remember my continuing instructions. Please, 19 don't talk about the case at all. Always remember to keep an 20 open mind until you've heard all of the evidence and I've 21 instructed you on -- I'm sorry. Please keep an open mind until 22 I finally instructed you on the law and you've gone to the jury 23 room to begin your deliberations. 24 (Recess) 25 (Page 11405 sealed by order of the Court) SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11406 4cuesat5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 (In open court; jury present) 2 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Dember, you may proceed. 3 MR. DEMBER: Thank you, your Honor. 4 Just to sort of pick up, Government Exhibit 1167X, 5 that September 4, 2000, conversation that we went through which 6 was Taha's message to Atia through Hani, was obviously an 7 effort to seek and recruit Atia to Taha's son. 8 As I was about to get into when we broke, two weeks 9 later on September 18, 2000, Government Exhibit 1170X, Hani 10 delivers to Taha Atia's response to Taha. And what Hani says 11 towards the beginning of the conversation is, Hani tells -- 12 Hani tells Taha that he, in fact, had delivered Taha's message 13 to Atia, and that Atia is sending the answer on a paper here. 14 So in other words, Hani's talking to Taha now, 15 connected to each other by Sattar. Sattar is listening to this 16 conversation. And Hani has Atia's response on a piece of 17 paper. 18 What does he say? Well, let's go to the exhibit 19 itself. We'll put it up on the screen for you, if you care to 20 follow us. It's Exhibit 1170X, pages 3, line 8. We'll start 21 with 3, line 8, and move to the second page. Let me read it to 22 you, or most of it to you. 23 Hani starts by saying, first -- he's apparently 24 reading off a piece of paper -- concerning the base, the 25 capacity and the, unintelligible, obligations, it is a SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11407 4cuesat5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 legitimate base. 2 Taha says yes. 3 Hani goes, it is a legitimate base. We have to focus 4 on it. 5 He continues. What happened in Manfaloot, Tema, Qena 6 and Luxor and others were executed through it. 7 Then drop down a line and Hani continues. 8 After the initiative was announced, and after the 9 declaration of the cease of the work, and with no regard to it, 10 skip a line, Hani continues, also through it, we did not 11 execute any operations before the issuance of the statement, 12 faith and commitment -- that's in quotes -- to stop the work 13 for a number of months. 14 We'll skip down, turn the page to page 4, skip down to 15 line 9. Hani goes to the second item on the list he's got. 16 This is the response, again, from Atia. And he says, secondly, 17 regarding the preparation, we hope that our brothers will help 18 us to surprise our enemy with a fatal attack, by God's will, or 19 at least it will be a step forward to a happy ending, by God's 20 will. 21 This is the essence of Atia's response to Taha. Let's 22 look back at it. And the first part of the response is 23 legitimate base. It's a legitimate base. What happened at 24 Manfaloot, Tema, Qena and Luxor was executed through it. But 25 the legitimate base is terrorist base, the base from which the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11408 4cuesat5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Luxor massacre was launched. It's a legitimate base. It's a 2 legitimate base terrorist cell that Atia operated and operates. 3 Continue, go down to 16 on page 3, and Hani reports 4 that after the initiative was announced, and after the 5 declaration of the cease of the work. What is he saying? 6 Well, after the initiative was announced -- the initiative is 7 the ceasefire, okay, it's a call for the halt to violence, 8 terrorist acts and killings. He's saying, after the initiative 9 was announced, and after the declaration of the cease of the 10 work. 11 What's the work? Like we told you yesterday, it's a 12 terrorist act. When Sattar uses the word "work," when Atia and 13 Hani use the word "work," work means a terrorist operation, a 14 terrorist attack. And it is as clear as day in this part of 15 the conversation that's what it means, that they halted the 16 terrorist acts, terrorist operations after the initiative was 17 called. They didn't conduct it. But of course they refer to 18 the others by names of cities or locations in Egypt, and of 19 course there is none more infamous than Luxor. 20 And if we go to page 4 again, page 4, the second part 21 of the message from Atia to Taha is, again, regarding the 22 preparation, we hope that our brothers will help us to surprise 23 our enemy -- who's the enemy? The Egyptian government -- with 24 a fatal attack. 25 How explicit, how more explicit can you be? They SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11409 4cuesat5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 want -- Atia wants his brothers in the Islamic Group to help 2 them to surprise the Egyptian government with a fatal terrorist 3 attack. That's what it says. Or at least it will be a step 4 forward to a happy ending, which is a terrorist attack. 5 Later in this same conversation, Hani goes on and 6 reports to Taha as part of this message, therefore, we are 7 looking forward to sit with you -- you meaning Taha -- and we 8 will hear -- and then he says, and you will hear from us 9 delightful things which will please you. And, God willing, we 10 will be behind the success of the group in prevailing over 11 their enemy and in solving their own files as well. 12 Hani is telling Taha that Atia's message is when we 13 meet, meaning when Atia meets Taha, he will be very happy to 14 hear what Atia has to say because the response to the message 15 sent -- the message sent by Taha to Atia, the response which we 16 have in this recording, as clear as day, is Atia is joining 17 Taha, Sattar and Omar Abdel Rahman. Hamza has lost. Taha has 18 won. The allegiance, the support and the membership of Alaa 19 Abdul Raziq Atia. They've got in their camp now the military 20 leader of the Islamic Group, the man responsible who has a 21 legitimate base, a legitimate terrorist base that committed 22 terrorist acts in many places, most significantly in Luxor, 23 Egypt, the site of ancient temples is with Taha now. They've 24 succeeded. They've won. 25 Taha, on hearing this message from Hani from Atia, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11410 4cuesat5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 dictates to Hani a message to Atia that what he has read, what 2 Hani has read to Taha, the message from Atia makes Taha happy. 3 Surprise, surprise. He's thrilled. 4 And Taha takes the opportunity just to lock in Atia as 5 being with him. He tells Hani at that point, quote, the 6 Sheikh, the big doctor -- Omar Abdel Rahman -- has many times 7 sent Taha messages supporting his opinion, meaning Taha's 8 opinion. And you learned all that yesterday and today, yes, 9 through Yousry, through Stewart with the aid of Sattar, Taha 10 sent messages in to Abdel Rahman and the ceasefire in March of 11 1999, in May of 2000. It also happened in September of '99 as 12 well. 13 They sent in messages from Taha to Abdel Rahman, and 14 Abdel Rahman responded the way Taha wanted: Supporting him and 15 to end the ceasefire, resume the violence. And Taha is able to 16 say honestly to Hani and Atia, yes, Abdel Rahman has supported 17 me in the past. He is with us as well in this conspiracy. 18 Now, at the end of the conversation after Hani gets 19 off the line, Sattar is still there because he has heard all of 20 this. Sattar has heard the entire conversation between Taha 21 and Hani. He has heard Atia's response. It is a response that 22 he and Atia and Taha wanted. They've got what they want. And 23 Taha speaks to Sattar at the end of this call. And Sattar is 24 pleased with the conversation and tells Taha so. They've got 25 what they want. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11411 4cuesat5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 It is, ladies and gentlemen, September, the middle of 2 September 2000. And what you know about the middle of 3 September 2000 is that it's only a couple of weeks away, only a 4 couple of weeks away from the issuance of the fatwah to kill 5 Jews anywhere they are found, anywhere they are. We're two 6 weeks away from that at this point in time. 7 And what Taha and Sattar have is Atia in their camp. 8 And just to review, on October 3rd, that Sattar tells Taha to 9 write that fatwah. The next day Sattar receives the e-mail 10 from Taha with the fatwah, that being October 4th. October 4th 11 is also the day that Sattar reads the fatwah to Al-Sirri over 12 the phone and it gets disseminated on the 4th or 5th and 13 published in the Arabic newspapers, or in Al-Hayat at least, on 14 October 6, 2000. Literally two-and-a-half, three weeks after 15 Atia is in their camp. 16 Let me defer to a brief call on October 6th, 2000, 17 between Sattar and Taha. During that call -- it's Exhibit 18 1187X -- Taha and Sattar turn their discussion -- they had been 19 discussing something else. They talk about Atia. And Taha 20 expresses some concern that Atia might leave Egypt. There's 21 nothing in any of the calls up to that point to indicate that 22 Atia is planning to leave Egypt, but Taha -- excuse me, Taha, 23 yes, just indicates that he wants obviously Atia to remain in 24 Egypt. 25 And you know why that is, of course. Taha is in SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11412 4cuesat5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 Afghanistan or somewhere else in the Middle East. But Atia is 2 right there in Egypt. He has his legitimate cell, his 3 legitimate base, his terrorist cell still there in tact and 4 capable. And so Taha and Sattar want him to remain where he 5 is, because he's in the ideal position to conduct terrorist 6 attacks within Egypt. He is there, Taha is not. 7 And just to confirm, they chat a little about Atia 8 also in this call. And Sattar just relates to Taha about the 9 fact that he had seen in some magazine back in December of '99 10 a story about Atia, and that the article in this magazine had 11 reported, like the Voice of Israel perhaps a couple months 12 beforehand, that Atia had been named the military leader. And 13 Atia -- Taha's response to Sattar telling him about the article 14 and the fact that it was reported in this magazine article that 15 Atia was named the military leader, Atia -- excuse me, Taha's 16 response was, quote, I'm telling you they have good details 17 about -- good details, damn it, meaning the magazine accurately 18 had reported, accurately knew that, in fact, Atia was the 19 military leader. 20 Now, now, what comes next in this series of evidence 21 is, as won't surprise you, Sattar and Taha getting Atia the 22 fatwah, getting him educated on what it is and most -- more 23 important, getting Atia to act on the fatwah, to carry it out, 24 to kill Jews wherever they are and wherever they can be found. 25 Your Honor -- SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11413 4cuesat5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 THE COURT: All right. 2 MR. DEMBER: May I just have one more commentary, but 3 is this a good time? May I just make one or two more 4 statements and then end it? 5 THE COURT: Yes. 6 MR. DEMBER: Thank you. 7 That's where we'll pick up, obviously, on Monday. 8 You'll learn about Taha's efforts and Sattar's efforts to 9 employ this terrorist leader, Atia, to, in fact, carry out the 10 fatwah created by Sattar and Taha. And both will participate 11 in conversations towards that end. 12 We'll pick it up again on Monday. Thank you. 13 THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, we'll 14 break for the day and for the weekend. And we'll continue on 15 Monday morning at 9:30. 16 As I've told you, we'll only sit until 4:00 next week. 17 It is very important, very important, that you follow all of my 18 instructions carefully. 19 First of all, please, do not talk about this case at 20 all. Don't talk about it among yourselves, don't talk about it 21 with anyone when you go home over the weekend. Don't talk 22 about it when you come back on Monday. Simply don't talk about 23 the case. 24 Second, please, please, don't look at, listen to, read 25 anything to do with the case. If you should see or hear SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11414 4cuesat5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 something inadvertently, please, please simply turn away. 2 Finally, ladies and gentlemen, it's very important 3 that you continue to keep an open mind. We are at the point in 4 the trial where we're in summations. The first summation by 5 the government is not concluded, and you haven't heard any of 6 the summations by any of the defendants. After those 7 summations, the government has the opportunity to give what is 8 called a rebuttal summation. So you haven't heard all of the 9 summations at all, and so it's important to continue to keep an 10 open mind. 11 And furthermore, as I explained to you yesterday, it's 12 so very important to continue to keep an open mind until I have 13 instructed you on the law. Summations are explanations by the 14 lawyers. They are submissions by the lawyers to you as to what 15 they submit to you the evidence has shown or not shown. 16 They're statements by the lawyers. It is your recollection of 17 the evidence, your evaluation of the evidence, your evaluation 18 of all of the evidence in the case that is determinative. 19 But you evaluate the evidence in accordance with my 20 instructions on the law. And it's only after I have given you 21 the instructions on the law that you are to begin 22 deliberations. And it's only at that point that you will have 23 the entire case before you. That's why I continually emphasize 24 to you, please, continue to keep an open mind until I have 25 finally instructed you on the law and you've gone to the jury SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300 11415 4cuesat5 Summation - Mr. Dember 1 room to begin your deliberations. Fairness and justice to the 2 parties requires that you do that. 3 With that, have a very good evening, and I look 4 forward to seeing you on Monday morning at 9:30. 5 (Jury excused) 6 THE COURT: See you all at 9:00 Monday morning. While 7 I have a moment, let me talk to you. 8 (Pages 11416 through 11421 sealed by order of the 9 Court) 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300